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preface
PREFACE
This monograph, is a compendium of the individual works of eight students enrolled in a cross-listed 
course NR 545 (EIH 575). The focus of this course, like prior years, is captured in its title "Population-
Environment Dynamics: Toward Building a Theory". The course began with an examination of 
alternative theoretical constructs useful in studying the interaction between human populations and the 
environment. Also, at the beginning of the course, each participant was asked to select a topic of inquiry 
and a geographical setting for their study. This selection then became their major focus for the entire 
semester.
Students participating formally in the course this fall had a delightful mixture of backgrounds and 
interests. Schools and colleges represented included the School of Natural Resources and Environment, 
School of Public Health, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, and College of Literature 
Sciences and Arts. In addition to the formally enrolled students, others sat in from time to time, 
including participants from previous year’s seminars. Disciplines and areas of interest represented 
included area studies, economics, sociology, architecture, urban planning, public health, and natural 
resources. Participants in this year’s seminar included colleagues from the Continents of North America, 
Europe, and Asia. 
A very important element in the seminar was the use of data sources that recently have become available 
in machine-readable form. These data sources permitted the students to quickly gain experience in 
handling longitudinal datasets, especially those that were not amenable to modeling with linear 
functions. The most useful and user-friendly dataset provided participants was The World Resources 
Institute Data System (1996-97). Another tool used in the course was state-of-the-art PC-based 
Geographic Information Systems. The GIS package selected as most helpful this year, was Atlas GIS 
version 3.03. Extensive use also was made of information from the Digital Chart of the World. Another 
device used this semester for the second time was the simulation software, Stella 5. A doctoral student, 
Rhonda Ryznar, provided a brief and concise introduction to this tool that included examples. Two 
students then chose to include its use in their individual papers. This year’s seminar also saw a 
heightened use of data and documents coming directly from the World Wide Web. In one instance, the 
student’s project could not have been carried out without this new source of readily available data. Prior 
to the publication of the monograph outside reviewers provide feedback on several of the chapters. 
Papers included in this monograph all had completed this review process by the time of publication. 
Remaining papers will be published at a later date. Dr. Sandra Lach Arlinghaus, Adjunct Professor in 
The School of Natural Resources and Environment, co-taught the course, as she has in previous years. 
The success of the course resulted largely from the enthusiasm of the participants. As in previous years, 
extra sessions were held near the end of the semester, which often extended beyond scheduled meeting 
times. Feedback from fellow participants was provided in these sessions. In addition, each student was 
asked to develop a brief synopsis of how their study related to the other participants in the class. These 
thoughtful remarks are presented as the main body of the concluding chapter. This monograph was 
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published during the winter term in the academic year 1997-98.
William D. Drake 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, MI 48109 
February, 1998 
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Introduction
POPULATION-ENVIRONMENT DYNAMICS:  TOWARD BUILDING A THEORY
INTRODUCTION
This volume is a collection of separate but related studies focusing on
the relationship between human populations and the environment. The effort
consists of this introduction followed by seventeen chapters each written
by a seminar participant which investigates a different aspect and
geographic setting of the population-environment dynamic. A concluding
chapter provides comments written by each participant relating their work
to those of the others.
 
In this introduction we present a synopsis of the common framework, which
we call a family of transitions. In addition to the common framework, this
introductory chapter presents the abstracts for each ensuing chapter.  
Readers of the monograph reporting work from prior years should note that
the material in the following section on a family of transitions is
repeated here for background and therefore can be skipped.
1.    A FAMILY OF TRANSITIONS  
One way of viewing the complex dynamic relationships between population
and the environment is to visualize them as a family of transitions. That
is, not only is there a demographic and epidemiologic transition but also
a deforestation, toxicity, agricultural, energy and urbanization
transition as well as many others. In this chapter it is argued that for
each transition there is a critical period when society is especially
vulnerable. During that period, rates of change are high, societal
adaptive capacity is limited, in part, due to this rapid change, and there
is a greater likelihood that key relationships in the dynamic become
severely imbalanced. The trajectory society takes through a transition
varies, depending upon many factors operating at local and national
levels. Transitions not only are occurring in many different sectors but
also at different scales, both temporal and spatial. At times, a society
experiences several transitions simultaneously, which can raise social
vulnerability because of how they amplify each other.
1.1 TYPES OF TRANSITIONS
The Demographic Transition
Let us begin with a review of the ideas behind the widely accepted
demographic transition. At the onset of this transition, births and deaths
are both high and are in relative equilibrium with each other.
Historically, births exceed deaths by small amounts so total population
rises only very gradually. Occasionally, famine or an epidemic causes a
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downturn in total population but in general, changes in rates are low.
During the transition, however, death rates drop dramatically, usually due
to a change in the health condition of the population. This change in
health is caused by many, often interrelating factors. After some time
lag, the birth rate begins to drop and generally declines until it is in
approximate balance with the death rate again.
The Epidemiological Transition
The term epidemiologic transition was coined to describe the changing
source of mortality and morbidity from infectious diseases occurring
primarily in the younger age groups to degenerative diseases in older age
groups.  As with the demographic transition, there is considerable
volatility during the transition.  At the onset, infectious diseases begin
their decline usually due to extensions of health care and sanitation by
the national or local government. Single vector programs such as malaria
control and immunization programs are often the first implemented because
they are capable of ready extension and do not require as heavy a
commitment to education and other sustained infrastructure - especially in
rural areas. These single vector programs are then followed by
broader-based health care which demand heavier investment in
infrastructure. But an entirely successful move through this transition
does not always happen. At times, other sectors in transition overpower
the health care delivery system. 
The Agricultural Transition
For several hundred years, worldwide agricultural production has been
rising in relative harmony with population. Overall, increases in
production have kept up with and even outpaced growth in population. The
two factors that have been responsible for these increases are 1)
extensions of land under cultivation and 2) improvements in productivity.
At times changes have been dramatic. Formulating an agricultural
transition reflects the condition that, in general, sources 
of increase in production shift from extending land to intensifying
production on land already under cultivation. 
The Forestry Transition
At the onset of the forestry transition generally a large percentage of a
region is under forest cover. Rapid deforestation occurs during the
transition and finally forest cover stabilizes at a lower level determined
by many factors such as the local region's needs, the state of the local
and national economy, climate and soil characteristics. In most settings
this transition will end in a steady state equilibrium balancing growth
and harvest. Again, how society handles the vulnerable transition period
often determines in a profound way the quality of life for the region.
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The Toxicity Transition
The toxicity transition can be considered a composite of many transitions:
global atmospheric, local air pollution, surface water, ground water and
solid waste to name a few. Again, there are at least two sets of factors
operating in tandem. The transition begins with low levels of industrial
or agricultural production and correspondingly low levels of toxins. As
production and population increase, toxic byproducts increase to levels
which eventually become unacceptable to the general public. This in turn,
causes a public demand for pollution abatement. After an environmentally
costly time lag, remediation steps are taken which helps to bring
pollution under control.
The Urbanization Transition
The urbanization transition is driven by the dual forces of rural to urban
migration and central city population growth. The early stages of the
transition are characterized by rapid growth of urban population; however,
in later stages, growth declines and may reverse. Rural to urban migration
is a product of many forces - both  "pull"  and "push". In terms of the
population-environment dynamic, the urbanization transition often acts as
an amplifier as it interacts with other transitions.
The Fossil Fuel Transition
The fossil fuel transition is a special case of the energy transition.
Historically, many energy transitions have already occurred in different
regions and time periods. Significant transformations began in the
sixteenth century brought about by sail and later, by steam power. Today,
we are now in the most universal and perhaps critical energy transition:
fossil fuels. Studying this transition is especially instructive because
the record on different societies' passage through the vulnerable period
is varied and appears to be heavily influenced by public policy. 
1.2  GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSITIONS
Similarity of Trajectory Across Sectors
We have attempted to show in the seven example sectors discussed earlier
that the notion of transitions apply across all sectors of investigation.
Each class of transition, whether it be demographic, toxicity, forestry,
agriculture, urbanization, energy or epidemiological have similar 
patterns. It is this perception that has caused us to posit the existence
of a family of transitions possessing some common attributes useful in
analysis. The first common attribute of all  transitions is their
trajectory. They all begin in reasonable stability, then move to the
volatile transition period where change is rapid, and finally return again
to relative balance. Analytically, these are clearly nonlinear systems but
ones which have properties that lend themselves to well-understood
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mathematical functions. 
Applicability of Transitions Across Scales
The second attribute has to do with scale. One of the most interesting and
at the same time vexing aspects of studying population-environment
dynamics is that many phenomena manifest themselves at all levels of
geographic and temporal scale. For example, data depict one  demographic
transition for an entire continent, a different one for a country within
that continent and still other different transitions at the regional
level. Local conditions may delay or advance the onset and or completion
of the transition in relation to the larger body. Thus, moving through the
demographic transition can take more or less time as the scale changes.  
This same variation seems to exist in all other population-environment
transitions that have been investigated. True, national or regional-level
determinants often set the stage for the local dynamic, but in the end it
is these local conditions which determine the timing, magnitude and
specific trajectory of the overall transition. 
One can think of our world, seeming to be chaotic, but instead consisting
of a multitude of well defined transitions in many sectors, each with its
own local characteristic. Different transitions begin at different times
and places, but ebb and flow in an overlapping way, sometimes reinforcing
one another and at other times dampening their dynamic. As adjustment
occurs, occasionally useful niches are created which are then exploited by
stressed elements of the ecosystem. Unfortunately, at other times,
different sectors interact with each other in a harmful way to broaden and
extend the susceptible period.
Societal Vulnerability
During transitions there seems to be a special vulnerability borne by
society. Ample evidence indicates that key relationships are most likely
to become out of balance during the transition. A primary cause of this
vulnerability is the rapidity of change during the high velocity portion
of the transition. Adaptive capacity is impeded because there is little
time for systems to adjust and often there are limited feedback mechanisms
operating which otherwise could help this process. Another contribution to
social vulnerability during a transition is the amplifying effects created
by transitions occurring simultaneously in several sectors.  Rapid rates
of change in several sectors could more easily overpower the available
infrastructure which leads us to the next source of vulnerability during
transitions: capital availability.
 
Capital or investment capacity can either amplify or reduce societal
vulnerability during a transition. If there are financial resources
available to deal with the effects of rapid change, remediation is easier
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to implement. Africa which is trying to deal with a difficult demographic
transition has almost no capital available for its use and will therefore
undergo great hardship. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are struggling
to find financial resources to deal with their flawed toxicity transition.
Another dimension of transitions which affects societal vulnerability is
the degree of interconnectedness. How closely is the local village
connected to the regional and national economy? How much does what happens
in one location determine what happens in another? There is no question
that interconnectedness is increasing worldwide. We also know that under
some circumstances linkage creates dependencies which in turn, increase
vulnerability. However, it can work in the opposite direction as well.
These very same links to a larger domain can also act as a safety net. If
there are connections, resources can be brought to the stressed area more
easily to mitigate the local adversity. The final and perhaps most
important dimension of transitions affecting vulnerability is feedback.
Analytic Properties of Transitions
We have seen that many characteristics of transitions are common across
all sectors and geographic scales. The question then, is whether there are
analytic techniques which might be useful in describing this family of
transitions. If so, these techniques may be helpful in portraying 
transitions in a way that facilitates comparison and thereby increases our
understanding. In this quest we are especially interested in techniques
and functions which reduce complexity and at the same time provide a
reasonably accurate portrayal of reality.
  
Functions which are candidates for consideration include exponential,
exponential to the limit L, logistic, Gompertz, and the power function.
Bounded functions which fit data more precisely but cannot be used for
predictive purposes may also be helpful in uncovering patterns.
1.3  POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSITION THEORY
But what does it gain us to fit an exponential or logistic or for that
matter any function to transition data? The answer lies in our ability to
gain insights by relating different transitions to each other. First,
consider the transitions within a given sector and at a given scale. We
know there are transitions in a sector which some societies have already
experienced while others have yet to endure. If the nature of these
experiences can be captured in general form, it is more likely that
knowledge can be transferred to other settings where a transition is first
starting. Of course, each civilization or local culture has its own unique
characteristics but any one emerging transition may be comparable to one
or more of those which have occurred before because conditions are
similar.
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Second, there may be useful comparisons across different scales. We
already surmise that a national-level transition, perhaps now in process,
is actually comprised of a myriad of local transitions also in process or
which have recently occurred. But there may be other locales in the region
for which the transition has yet to happened. If similar patterns emerge
because of similar local conditions, a useful prediction could be made
about the nature of the passage through the transitions yet to appear.
Third, there may be insights gained simply by the process of fitting a
function to historical data. Different mathematical functions often have
very specific underlying characteristics which can provide useful ideas. 
The next potential use of transition theory is to facilitate analysis
across sectors. There is, of course, no good reason to expect the
trajectory of, say, a forestry or agricultural transition to mimic an
epidemiologic transition. However, for any society at a given time, there
may be similarities in the rates of change across sectors. Developed
economies have slower rates of change in their agriculture sector than
developing economies when conditions are favorable. Rural based cultures
may be expected to have urbanization transitions which are steeper than
non-rural cultures. In short, it is worth testing to see if patterns can
be empirically determined which would be helpful in predicting the shape
of future transitions, given a stated level of intervention.
We have already mentioned the special societal vulnerability associated
with several sectors being in rapid transition simultaneously.  From a
modeling perspective this simultaneity a very difficult condition to
describe and analyze, which may be why less progress has been made in 
this area to date. However, being able to portray these multiple
transitions with specific functions could be helpful. There is no question
that each transition interacts with the other. And to the analyst this
means that a reliable model must be structured as a set of simultaneous
relationships. Describing transitions as functions facilitates this
manipulation.
Another potential benefit of transition theory lies in the identification
of lead indicators. If success is achieved in fitting transition data to
an appropriate function, then for a given condition and point in time, the
future trajectory can be predicted more accurately. Identifying lead
indicators is facilitated because with an orderly function, only one, or
at most, two parameters need to be determined to define the trajectory.
This advantage is even more evident when several functions are considered
simultaneously.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, transition theory may permit more
informed public and private intervention. At one level we find ourselves
believing that the trajectory of a transition is somehow fixed by an
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immutable law of nature. But at another level we know that this is not the
case. Public and private policy can make a difference as we have seen from
some of the cases discussed in this book. Rates of change can be
influenced by policy redirection and consequent resource allocation. To
the extent that we can link historical rate differentials with historical
policy implementation, a better determination can be made about which
intervention mix works best in dealing with problems facing society today.
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Over the past decade, issues of justice, equity and racism have become significant developments in the 
environmental movement. Research, scholars, community activists and members of the general public 
are beginning to see that environmental issues are not just about wilderness preservation, pollution 
prevention, and resource conservation. There has been a growing awareness that environmental hazards 
are not uniformly distributed. In general, studies have shown that lower income and minority 
communities experience a disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards. This understanding is 
known as environmental justice. 
Using data for the State of Michigan that has been compiled by Dr. Elaine Hockman of the Research 
Support Laboratory at Wayne State University, I explore the relationship between race, income and the 
distribution of environmental hazards. The findings support previous studies from other regions that 
identify a strong association between income level and the location of environmental hazards and an 
even stronger association between areas of high minority concentration and the location of 
environmental hazards. Data are displayed in graphs using Excel and are also mapped using Arcview. 
Following an analysis of the data, policy recommendations are made based on the current United States 
Environmental Protection Agency's (US EPA) environmental justice decision making process for 
Region V. 
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West African Sahel is facing several challenges in trying to cope with environmental pressures in 
relation to population activities. The growth of population and the lack of natural resources have created 
numerous struggles for food and access to land. It has  
also created displacement and conflict between herders and the cultivators. In this paper, it is my 
intention to deconstruct the  
reasons for this struggle. This will be done through analyzing five transitions: ecological, population, 
urbanization, economic, and  
social. The main question is, has the ecological and the social carrying capacity been surpassed? 
 The question of carrying capacity depends on the state of "vulnerability" within each of these 
transitions. In terms of the  
environment, desertification is a barrier to population and ecosystem sustainability. This "vulnerability" 
will also create tensions  
among people in search for fertile land. This tension is already occurring in many parts of the urban 
Sahel where herders and  
cultivators are fighting over limited pieces of sustainable land. The scramble for land is also strongly 
effected by economic  
policies implemented by the governments in this region. The transition to the market economy, 
structural adjustment policies and profit incentives all contribute to the tensions between people in the 
Sahel. To a great extent, the market economy deteriorates  
the social conditions as family structures are being broken down leading to more poverty. The 
interrelationships between these  
transitions are very much permeable and interrelated. 
 These conflicts can nevertheless be appeased. There are several policy suggestions that could lead to 
long term sustainable  
development. In terms of direct environmental policy, more importance must be paid to reforestation 
issues to reduce  
urbanization. There must also be an emphasis on reducing population growth through education and 
family planning. Finally,  
agriculture and herding could be implemented through "double strategy" where products of one benefit 
the other. Ultimately, the governments of the Sahel need to advocate the improvement of the standard of 
living in the rural parts of the Sahel that are  
facing most of these difficulties. There must also be an effort to include herders and cultivators into the 
development process in  
order to avoid the "overshoot and collapse" scenario. 
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This paper is an attempt to explore the relationship between violent conflict and environmental scarcity by focusing on 
Burundi as a case study. As a former Peace Corps volunteer in Muyinga province in 1993, I had occasion to witness some 
of the violence in Burundi first hand. This paper provided me an opportunity to explore the conflict from 
political, demographic, and environmental viewpoints. In the course of study, I determined that there is some evidence 
to indicate that access to agricultural land played a crucial role in the conflict that continues to engulf Burundi today. While 
the association does not prove causality, it may point the way to important policy recommendations for solving the 
problems facing Burundi. These include fostering a greater role of engagement from the international 
community, improvements in the Burundian judicial system, an expansion of family planning programs in Burundi, 
and focused research into improving the agricultural yields in the area. 
Links are provided below to charts and maps about Burundi. A few photos from Burundi are followed by the complete paper. 
Map of Africa, Population Density by Country, Large
Map of Africa, Population Density by Country, Small 
General Map of Burundi 
Map of Burundi's Agricultural Regions 
Map, Burundi's Population Density, 1988 
Map, Burundi's Coffee Production, 1988 
Map, Burundi's Population Density, 1991 
Map, Population Density for 1991 and Election Results for Burundi, 1993 
Map, Population Density for 1991 and Violent Conflict for 1993 
Map, Regions of Violent Conflict in Burundi, 1965 and 1972 
Chart One: Population Growth in Burundi 1950 - 1996 
Chart Two: Comparative Statistics on Population Density 
Chart Three: Population Density for Rwanda and Burundi 
Chart Four: Percentage of People Living in Absolute Poverty in Africa 
Chart Five: Average Life Expectancy Around the World 
Chart Six: Burundian Children Suffering From Wasting and Stunting 
Chart Seven: Daily Per Capita Calorie Supply, Percentage of Requirements Being Met for Aftica 
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Chart Eight: Effects of Ethnic Violence in Burundi Since Independence 
Chart Nine: Effects of Ethnic Violence in Burundi, Deaths and Refugees 
Chart Ten: Population Growth Trends in Burundi 
Chart Eleven: Crude Birth and Death Rates for Burundi 
Chart Twelve: Comparing Total Fertility Rates for Burundi and Rwanda with World Rates 
Chart Thirteen: Food Production Index for Burundi 
Chart Fourteen: Burundi's Use of Fertilizers from 1961 - 1993 
Chart Fifteen: Burundi's Arable and Permanent Cropland 1961 - 1993 
Chart Sixteen: Arable and Permanent Cropland Per Person for Burundi 
Chart Seventeen: Food Per Capita Production Index in Burundi 
Chart Eighteen: Gross National Product in US$ for Burundi and Rwanda 
Chart Nineteen: Gross Domestic Product Per Capital for Burundi and Rwanda 
Chart Twenty: Gross National Procuct Per Capita in Burundi and Rwanda 
Chart Twenty-One: Evolution of Coffee Production in Burundi by Type 
Chart Twenty-Two: Cattle Stocks in Burundi , 1961 - 1994 
Chart Twenty-Three: Total Freshwater Catch for Burundi, 1970 to 1993 
Chart Twenty-Four: Popuation Growth Plotted Against Ethnic Violence in Burundi 
Chart Twenty-Five: Arable and Permanent Cropland Per Person In Burundi Plotted Against Deaths  
 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Photo of Burundian Children 
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Photo of Burundian Fields 
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Photo of Burundian House and Fields 
file:///C|/545/1997/eng/abstract.html (4 of 5) [6/18/2008 10:22:14 AM]
Abstracts, NRE545 1997 Monograph
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
file:///C|/545/1997/eng/abstract.html (5 of 5) [6/18/2008 10:22:14 AM]




Urban decline is a phenomenon ascribed to both the United States and Russia; however, the disparity in 
the spatial configuration of that decline renders the consequences of each country’s situation as unique. 
In the US, the process of urbanization nationally has diffused from the traditional coastal cities of Los 
Angeles and the Boston-Washington, DC corridor into the less monolithic towns of the south and 
southwestern heartland. Similarly at the local level, suburbanization around metropolitan areas has 
significantly encroached into the agricultural hinterland of each city due not only to the general 
population increase but also to an out-migration of households and businesses from the center. This 
mode of development has been facilitated if not generated by an extensive transportation network 
accompanied by an increased accumulation of wealth at a national scale. In contrast, urbanization in 
Russia mainly occurred during the seventy years of Soviet rule which meant that the Marxist philosophy 
of equality dictated the patterns of settlement and migration. The central planners envisioned a landscape 
of urban areas dispersed evenly throughout the country that were equally sized and uniformly dense. 
Cities were created in Central Asia and the Siberian Far East, and households were directly and/or 
indirectly encouraged to migrate from European Russia located west of the Urals. The allocation of 
aggregate resources for the purpose of building the necessary physical infrastructure was based on 
political and bureaucratic power. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the foundation for 
the sprawling landscape was completely and swiftly abandoned. During Russia’s current transition from 
a planned to a market economy, the superimposition of cost accounting and demand-determined pricing 
for housing, transportation and employment is creating unprecedented migration patterns. Based on 
initial post-Soviet data and theories of population-environment dynamics, this paper develops 
predictions about an eventual spatial stasis of larger, polycentric cities that are regionally dispersed and 
possess important local economic and political linkages. 
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The Red River Delta of Vietnam is an area of dense human settlement and intensive land use. In the 
past, the region’s villagers have been able to increase production sufficient to cope with increased 
population. Whether further increases in population can be supported by the land and whether current 
high levels of production can be sustained are questions which have yet to be answered. This paper 
attempts to answer these questions in the specific context of an agricultural village, Nguyen Xa, in the 
densely settled Red River Delta province of Thai Binh. 
Nguyen Xa was selected because it represented the extreme case of population pressures on natural 
resources in Vietnam. This paper will draw upon fieldwork jointly conducted in 1991 and 1992 by 
researchers from the Southeast Asian Agroecosystem Network (SUAN), the Program on Environment at 
the East West Center, the Southeast Asian Agroecosystem Network (SUAN), Center for Natural 
Resources Management and Environmental Studies at Hanoi University, and Hanoi Agricultural 
University. 
This paper will be comprised of three different sections: the first section will focus on presenting an 
introduction to the region and providing specific information relevant to the understanding of this paper; 
the second section will present the village of Nguyen Xa, and briefly discuss certain key issues that 
might contribute to our analysis of the region’s sustainability; the last section will explore the issues of 
rural development in the Red River Delta, and how Nguyen Xa’s specific situation might provide clues 
to the prospect of the region’s long-term development. 
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Deforestation in Southeast Asia
Thammasack Manokham
I will attempt to find the underlying causes of deforestation, or the loss of forest cover, in eight 
Southeast Asian countries and to analyze prospects for sustainable forest management. These eight 
countries are Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. In order to explain deforestation, I examined the 
relationship of deforestation to population, agricultural production, slash and burn cultivation, and (over-
harvested and illegal) logging. I found that as deforestation increased, agricultural production, slash and 
burn cultivation, and logging also increased. Increasing population pressure expanded deforestation. 
After applying one successful program in Thailand to the other seven countries, I proposed several 
solutions to slow deforestation. 




This paper examines the spatial ramifications of the reunification of East and West Germany. 
Specifically, the population and environment dynamic are explored through an investigation and 
analysis of population trends, and the past and present environmental state. This paper proposes to 
answer the question: has reunification helped or hindered this former eastern bloc country, and more 
specifically, how has land development and the ecosystem been effected by reuniting the two nations? 
East Germany is the only eastern block country to have been united with a western nation. The 
implications or this union have had a great impact on the country; more money was given to the former 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the first few years after the fall of communism than any of the 
eastern blocks combined (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungry, Poland, Romania and 
Yugoslavia). Yet, monetary aid has not brought the country to the economic highs that many had hoped 
and predicted. Environmental problems coupled with a population emigrating to the west have created 
slow economic development in the east. Meanwhile, those remaining in the eastern portion of the 
country demand goods and services attainable in the west. Building and construction are the only 
industries which have consistently not experienced job losses. While the population of the entire country 
declines, and more people leave the east, we see a rise land development. Loss of green space, detraction 
of economic development from the older inner cities, increased traffic patterns and higher rates of 
environmental pollutants are only some of the repercussions of this type of rapid, unchecked growth. 
Proposals are made in this paper as to how the newly reunited country can curb and control this type of 
expansion. 
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Dengue fever incidence rates of are thought to be contingent upon weather variables, namely 
precipitation and temperature. Because the activity and survival of the primary vector of dengue fever, 
Aedes aegypti, is related to local weather conditions, it is believed that there may be a correlation 
between weather variables and morbidity rates due to dengue fever. The relationship between weather 
variables and morbidity rates may incorporate a time lag of up to twelve months. In this retrospective 
study, the statistical association between monthly morbidity rates and monthly temperature and 
precipiation records in the islands of Trinidad and Tobago were studied, taking monthly time lags of up 
to twenty-four months into account. It was determined that a statistically significant relationship 
between temperature and morbidity exists at time lags of six months. In this model there is a positive 
correlation between morbidity and temperature. Such a model may prove useful in determining possible 
effects of global warming or in implementing control strategies.
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Environmental Injustices in Michigan:





One of the most critical issues confronting the global society today is the understanding of the relationship that humans 
share with each other and with the environment. As we place greater demands on the environment, we also place 
increasing demands on the relationships among people. This is not a new issue. Throughout history, humanity has 
struggled with a fair and equitable distribution of resources and access to resources. More recently, a body of literature 
has been developing that convincingly documents the idea that the causes of environmental destruction and 
negative environmental impacts have their origins in social relations, specifically the dynamics of class and race (Bryant 
& Mohai; Painter & Durham, 1995). This understanding supports an argument that environmental degradation and 
social injustice go hand in hand (Faber, 1993). 
Instead of the popular notions of global environmental collapse, it is more likely that there will be a slow unevenly 
distributed environmental deterioration that will be confounded by humanity’s ability to adapt, deny and forget. While 
there will be growing pockets of wealth, environmental conservation and protection, there will be many other areas 
that experience desperate poverty, environmental contamination, and resource depletion. This is not just simply the 
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familiar North versus South dynamic. Rather there are increasing pockets of the "North" in the South and the "South" in 
the North where disproportionate environmental dilemmas will play out (Athanasiou, 1996). 
Moreover, during the past decade, issues of justice, equity, and racism have become significant developments in 
the environmental movement, particularly in regards to demographics and the environment. Researchers, 
scholars, professionals, community activists and members of the general public are beginning to see that environmental 
issues concern more than wilderness protection, pollution prevention and resource conservation. However, a number 
of important questions need to be explored further: In what ways do factors such as race and class interact in relation 
to environmental problems? How have attempts to solve environmental problems generated social problems? What is the 
link between environmental protection and social justice? How do specific environmental problems and 
hazards disproportionately affect certain communities over time? How have policy decisions and implementation 
addressed concerns about disproportionate exposure? 
One response to this disparity has been the environmental justice movement that has sought to identify and challenge 
the disproportionate exposure that minorities or low-income populations have to negative environmental impacts, 
particularly the siting of hazardous waste facilities. The Region V office of the US EPA Superfund Division offers 
the following definition for environmental justice: 
Environmental justice is generally defined as the fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, and incomes, with 
respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair 
treatment implies that no people should be forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of the negative 
environmental impacts of pollution or hazards due to a lack of political, economic, or educational strength. EPA is 
committed to investigate all environmental issues and situations that raise questions of justice and equity (US EPA 
1997).
History 
One of the first to raise questions about the connection between environmental hazards and social status in the U.S. was 
Alice Hamilton. Trained in medicine at the University of Michigan, Hamilton is known as the country’s first great 
urban/industrial environmentalist as well as a tenacious reformer, compassionate advocate and cautious careful 
researcher. Hamilton’s investigation of a serious typhoid epidemic in Chicago at the turn of the century, revealed a 
direct relationship between sewage outflow and outbreaks of disease in poorer neighborhoods (Gottlieb, 1993). 
In 1972, A. Myrick Freeman presented a paper for Resources for the Future that addressed the distribution of 
Environmental Quality. This was one of the earliest reports that was able to show a quantifiable correlation between 
hazardous air pollution exposure (suspended particulates and sulfation) and income level. In three areas of study (Kansas 
City, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C.) lower income groups were consistently exposed to higher levels of pollutants. In 
his summary, Freeman concluded that environmental quality is positively associated with wealth. 
Following on Freeman’s work, Peter Asch and Joseph J. Seneca carried out a national study that examined the 
systematic relationship between exposure to air pollution and economic and social characteristics of the population. 
Their findings showed a stronger correlation between income groups and air pollution than between racial composition and 
air pollution (1978). This study raises an important methodical concern regarding the unit of analysis for such studies. Asch 
and Seneca chose census tracts as the unit of analysis for their research while others (as will be shown later) work with zip 
code level information. Regardless of the unit that is selected or method of data analysis, an important characteristic that 
drives all of these studies is the principal that environmental policies in the U.S. should provide uniform regulations 
and ambient standards independent of local conditions and costs (Gianessi, Peskin, and Wolff, 1979). 
A major event that helped focus national attention on the question of race, income and environmental hazards occurred in 
1982 when state officials decided to locate a poly-chlorinated biphenyl (PCB) landfill near a predominately African 
American community in Warren County, North Carolina. This led to protests similar to the civil rights movement of the 
1960s and inspired further investigation into the link between social indicators and environmental hazards (Mohai and 
Bryant, 1992). 
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In 1983 the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted an analysis of the socioeconomic and racial composition of 
the communities surrounding the four major hazardous waste landfills in the South. The GAO study found that 3 of the 
4 landfills were located in communities that were predominantly black and living below the poverty line. 
The GAO report prompted the United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice to conduct a nation wide study 
(using zip code data) of the distribution of hazardous waste sites to determine if there might be results similar to the 
GAO report. The Commission found a clear pattern. The study revealed that the proportion of minorities residing 
in communities that have a commercial hazardous waste facility is about double the proportion of minorities in 
communities without such a facility. Where two or more facilities are located, the proportion of resident who are minorities 
is more than triple. Furthermore, the study showed that race is the single best predictor of where commercial hazardous 
waste facilities are located (United Church of Christ, 1987). 
In an analysis of 16 studies which explore this phenomenon, including their own in the Detroit area, Paul Mohai and 
Bunyan Bryant determined that regardless of the scope of the study, the distribution of pollution has been found to 
be inequitable by income. Where the distribution of pollution has been analyzed by both income and race, in most cases 
race has been found to be more strongly related to the incidence of pollution than income (Mohai and Bryant, 1992). 
The Data 
This study uses data that has been compiled by Dr. Elaine Hockman of the Research Support Laboratory at Wayne 
State University. Dr. Hockman has gathered information on 907 variables including race, income, environmental hazards 
and public health for all 873 zip codes in the State of Michigan. Sources for the data include the Michigan Department 
of Environmental Quality (DEQ), the Michigan Department of Public Health (DPH), US EPA, the 1990 Census, and 
several others. I will be using eight of the variables to explore the spatial association between race, income and 
environmental hazards. Six of the variables represent various environmental hazards by zip code and the other two 
variables provide information on median household income and the ratio of minorities to whites for each zip code. 
For this report I am simply looking at the spatial association of race, income and selected environmental hazards. An 
analysis of the statistical correlation of these variables will be done at a later date. A detailed explanation of each variable that 
I will be using is given below: 
Median Household Income Quartiles (QHHINCOM): This categorizes 1990 Census information household income data 
in quartiles. Zip codes are classified as "1" (where the median household income is below $21,391 per year), 
"2" ($21,392-$26,999), "3" ($27,000-$35,042) and "4" (greater than $35,043). Therefore "1’s" identify the poorer areas of 
the state and "4’s" identify the wealthier areas. 
Ratio of Minorities to Whites (QMIN2WHT): This variable also relies on 1990 Census information and categorizes 
zip codes based on the ratio of minorities (all minority groups) to whites. This is the total population for a zip code minus 
the white population divided by the total population. Zip codes identified with a "1" are areas with no minorities and 
areas identified by a "4" represent those zip codes with the most minorities. Zip codes with a "2" or "3" represent the 
quartiles between "1" and "4". 
Toxic Release Inventory 1989 (TRI.N89): In 1988, the US EPA began collecting information releases, transfers, and 
others waste management practices for certain listed toxic chemicals. The current Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) 
reporting requirements apply to facilities in the manufacturing sector of the economy with ten or more full-time employees, 
and that exceed an activity-based threshold limit for one or more for the 650 toxic chemicals and chemical categories on 
the TRI list. This information is collected annually by EPA. For this data set, this variable represents the total number 
of chemical records (or number of TRI chemicals) for a particular zip code. It does not quantify the amounts of various 
TRI chemicals for each zip code. 
Leaking Underground Storage Tanks (LUST.N): This variable quantifies the number of Leaking Underground 
Storage Tanks (LUST) sites identified in Michigan in 1990. Examples of LUST sites are leaking fuel tanks at service 
stations, deteriorated or abandoned home heating fuel tanks, etc. As with the TRI variable, the LUST variable only 
quantifies sites, it does not rate the severity of contamination, at a particular site.  
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Number of Incinerator Emissions (INCIN.N): This data represents the total number of incinerator records for a particular 
zip code. Like the TRI 1989 variable, the incinerator variable counts the number of types of emissions such as carbon dioxide.  
   
Number of Hazardous Waste Management Facility Sites (HAZFAC.N): This is the total number of hazardous 
waste facilities located in each zip code.  
   
Number of Landfills (D.NDUMP): The number of landfills located in each zip code.  
   
Number of Chemicals at Act 307 Sites in 1990 (ACT.90NC): Act 307 is the Michigan Environmental Response Act of 
1982. It provides for the identification, risk assessment, and priority evaluation of environmental contamination at certain 
sites in the state. This variable represents the total number of chemicals identified under Act 307 in a particular zip code 
in 1990. 
Working with these variables, I have used Excel to sort out the top (or worst) ten (there was often a natural break here) 
zip codes for each of the six environmental hazard variables (1989 TRI, LUST sites, number of incinerator emissions, 
number of hazard waste facilities, number of landfills and number of Act 307 chemicals). The relationship of these top ten 
zip codes is then graphed to compare the race and income information for that zip code with one of the environmental 
hazard variables. I then display GIS images created in Arcview to show the spatial association of these data sets. 
While the data cover zip codes for the entire state, the maps that I have created only reflect the Lower Peninsula of Michigan 
as the interactions between the variables I have selected only occurs in this portion of the state. 
Analysis 
 
Graph 1 bears some resemblance to a standard demographic transition map. There are periods of low growth, periodic 
peaks and valleys and finally exponential growth resulting in a steep climb. While this graph does not represent 
population figures it does represent one of the most disturbing facts of the population-environment dynamic: 
the disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards that certain groups experience because of their social class or 
their race. In the dark gray bars, graph 1 displays mean household income values (QHHINCOM) in descending order on the 
x-axis, the ratio minorities to whites (QMIN2WHT) in ascending order on the y1-axis. The blue line represents the number 
of incinerator records (INCIN.N) on the y2-axis. All of the data are based on zip code level information. The 
graph dramatically displays the relationship between race, income and incinerator records. The exponential rise in the 
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number of incinerator records on the right hand side of the graph is associated exclusively with zip codes that represent 
low-income area and areas with high minority populations. 
1989 TRI (TRI.N89) 
 
This graph shows that for the 10 zip codes with the highest number of TRI records in 1989 were also zip codes with 
primarily minority populations. Only one zip code had a QMIN2WHIT value of 2. On the other hand there is a wider range 
of representation in the QHHINCOM values. While there is a clear link between the zip codes of high TRI records 
and minority populations, there is not a clear link between zip codes of high TRI records and poorer areas. In fact many of 
the zip codes (8 out of 10) fall into the higher quartiles for household income. The GIS images display a clear 
connection between 
QMIN2WHT and TRI.N89 (map 1) while the connection between QHHINCOM and 
   
   
TRI.N89 (map 2 is not as direct). 
LUST Sites (LUST.N) 
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As with TRI.N89, there is a strong connection between QMIN2WHT and the location of the zip codes with the highest 
number of LUST sites (map 3) and unclear connection between LUST sites and QHHINCOM (map 4). 
   
 Incinerator Emissions (INCIN.N) 
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More than any of the other comparisons, the zips codes with the greatest number of incinerator records (INCIN.N) show a 
close connection between areas of low income and areas with the high minority populations. Seven of the ten zip code 
areas have QHHINCOM values of 1 and QMIN2WHT values of 4. A clear relationship between race, income and exposure 
to pollutants. Map 7 below displays the combination of both data sets. 
The graphs and maps that follow provide similar comparisons for HAZFAC.N, D.NDUMP, and ACT90.NC 
Hazardous Waste Management Facilities (HAZFAC.N) 
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Landfills (D.NDUMP)  
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Act 307 Chemicals (ACT90.NC)  
  
   
Reviewing all six of the environmental hazard variables reveals that, in general, there is a strong association between 
the location of the ten worst zips codes and zip copes with high zip codes having high minority populations. Only zip codes 
that reflected high numbers of incinerator emissions corresponded with both low income and minority populations. This 
pattern is similar to the findings of Mohai and Bryant (1992) who concluded that when the distribution of 
environmental hazards is analyzed by both income and race, in most cases race is more strongly related to the incidence 
of environmental hazards than income. 
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Questions 
Even with these results, there still remain many questions and policy concerns. Given the strong relationship 
between environmental hazards and areas of high minority populations, is there a justifiable claim of environmental 
racism? Some claim that environmental racism probably does not apply as many of the communities reflected in the data 
only became minority communities after the area was industrialized or the polluting facilities had been sited, (Been, 
1994; Been and Gupta, 1997). 
These claims against environmental racism, however, do not sufficiently incorporate broader societal dynamics that force 
or encourage minority populations into undesirable or polluted areas. Why is it that many of the zip codes with the highest 
rates of environmental hazards are not only associated with high minority populations, but also with medium to high levels 
of income? If racism were not a factor in these areas, why would not wealthier minorities simply move out of the 
contaminated areas? Putting this debate aside, there still is a valid complaint that as present conditions stand, minorities bear 
a disproportionate burden in regards to environmental hazards. 
Further Analysis 
More work is clearly needed to explain and prove the association between environmental hazards, race, and income. This 
study has only looked at a simple graphical and spatial association of the variables. To strengthen the findings of this 
study, statistical analysis of the data needs to be done along with a comparative study using a different unit of analysis such 
as census tracts or a geographical region (one mile radius, 3 mile radius) around an environmentally hazardous site. 
The data for this study has been limited to zip codes, as that was the basic unit for most of the combined data. The 
limitations of such a unit is that it is large and may not appropriately represent a particular area or community. For example 
the QHHINCOM variable (median household income) could be skewed by a combination of low and high-income 
households in one zip code. Another limitation of the data that I have used is that it does not address the severity of a 
particular hazard. For example, the D.NDUMP variable only counts the number of landfills per zip code. It does not 
account for the size or condition of the landfill. Despite the limitation of this study, some important policy considerations 
can still be suggested. 
Policy 
As a result of the growing awareness and interest in environmental justice, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12898 
on February 11, 1994, to establish environmental justice as a national priority. This was the first presidential effort to direct 
all federal agencies with a public health or environmental mission to make environmental justice an integral part of 
their policies and activities. The Order, entitled "Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations 
and Low-income Populations," focuses federal attention on the environmental and human health conditions of 
minority populations and low-income populations with the goal of achieving environmental protections for all communities 
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1995). The result has been the establishment of several U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency environmental justice programs across the country and many community groups that have begun to use 
the idea of environmental justice to challenge local environmental threats. 
Furthermore, numerous environmental justice bills have also been introduced in Congress and various state legislatures 
have attempted to create a statutory basis for environmental justice claims. To date, though, none have been 
enacted. Essentially all of the legal or policy developments to date in the environmental justice field have 
concerned procedures, disclosure and general policies (Gerrard and Bose, 1997). A recent ruling in Flint, Michigan, 
however, may have significant implications for future environmental justice policy and legislation. 
In October of 1995, the Flint chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 
and several Genesee Township residents sued Governor Engler, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources and 
Genesee Township (collectively, the state) alleging that the state violated Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen civil Rights Act 
by authorizing the siting of a wood waste incinerator in a predominantly African-American neighborhood in Genesee 
County without considering the incinerator’s impact on a community that is "forced to bear a disproportionate burden 
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of exposure to environmental harm." African Americans comprise only 13.9 percent of the population of the State of 
Michigan, and 19.6 percent of Genesee County, but they are a majority of the residents within a three-mile radius of 
the proposed plant. In addition, the NAACP claimed that the incinerator siting violated the Michigan Constitution and 
the former Michigan Environmental Protection Act. The state requested that the case be dismissed because the NAACP 
could not prove that the alleged discrimination was intentional. The court held that the NAACP was not required 
to demonstrate that the discrimination was intentional, only that it occurred, and allowed the case to proceed, (Smith, 1996). 
Judge Archie L. Hayman of the Circuit Court for Genesee County presided over the case. While noting people of color bear 
a disproportionate and unfair burden of society’s pollution he rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the case constituted a civil 
rights violation, because "most, if not all, of the major polluters in Genesee County and especially in Flint were located prior 
to any significant African American population being located there," and there was no evidence that the state’s policy of 
not considering race in its permit review process had caused the disparate impact. 
This was not the end of the case, however. Judge Hayman focused on a provision of the Michigan Constitution, which 
provides for the public health and general welfare of the people of the State. Thus, under both the state constitution and 
the Michigan Clean Air Act, Judge Hayman found that the state must, before issuing permits for any major polluting 
facilities, prepare comprehensive risk assessments that take into consideration the cumulative effect of all existing 
conditions. While Judge Hayman rejected the plaintiff’s disparate impact theory, he directly endorsed the examination of 
the cumulative effects of different kinds of chemical exposure on vulnerable populations. (Gerrard and Bose, 1997). 
The impact of Judge Hayman’s decision is still be analyzed. It has caused a major upheaval in the Michigan Department 
of Environmental Quality (DEQ). DEQ is currently appealing the decision, which could affect more than 480 air 
emissions permits pending before the DEQ Air Quality Division (McBrien, 1997). 
The issue of cumulative effect is pertinent to the findings of the data review above. Not only were most of the zip codes 
that were experiencing the burden of environmental hazards in zip codes reflecting minority communities, but in several 
cases they were the same community. As the graph below shows, nine of the zip codes show up on two of the top ten lists 
and four show up on three of the top ten lists of environmental hazard variables. (See appendix A for a complete listing of 
all six variables with the corresponding zip code, race and income information.)  
  
The cumulative impact of the data can also be clearly seen in the map below, both for individual zip codes with 
multiple hazards and regional cumulative impact from multiple hazards in the surrounding area.  
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Similar cumulative impacts can be seen in a close-up map of the Detroit area.  
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Conclusion 
The disproportionate burden of environmental hazards that minorities and some low-income communities experience 
is obvious. Arguments and legal challenges regarding environmental racism and the intentional or unintentional siting 
of environmentally hazardous facilities in minority communities will undoubtedly continue. These are cases that need to 
be determined on the merits of each individual case. However, there needs to be a mechanism established to prevent 
future cumulative impacts or disproportionate impacts from new or relicensed facilities. 
The Region V US EPA Superfund Division currently uses the following decision matrix to determine priorities cleanups 
in situations with environmental justice criteria (US EPA, 1997). 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DECISION MATRIX
 
 High Minority Population Low Minority Population
Low Income Category 1  
Highest Level of Action or 
Priority
Category 3  
High Level of Action or 
Priority
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High Income Category 2  
High Level of Action or 
Priority
Category 4  
No Extra Action Taken
  
While the data used in this study would not support decisions based on low income or high income (except in the case 
of incinerator records) a similar decision matrix or decision process could be developed to incorporate the information on 
based on levels of minority population and cumulative amounts of environmental hazard variables. For example, the 
DEQ could develop and follow a decision making process for new permits or renewals at environmentally hazardous 
facilities by zip code as outlined below:  
  
BY ZIP   
CODE
3 or more top 
environmental 
hazards
2 top environmental 
hazards
1 top environmental 
hazard
no top   
environmental   
hazards
High Minority  
Population   
 
moratorium on new 
permits or renewals 
for hazardous waste 
management 
facilities
5 year moratorium on 
new permits and 
renewals only for 
facilities with an 
approved pollution 
reduction plan
2 year moratorium on 
new permits and 
renewals only for 
facilities with an 
approved pollution 
reduction plan
new permits only 
for facilities with 
an approved low 
emissions 
application
Low Minority  
Population  
 
5 year moratorium 
on new permits and 
renewals only for 
facilities with an 
approved pollution 
reduction plan
2 year moratorium on 
new permits and 
renewals only for 
facilities with an 
approved pollution 
reduction plan 
new permits only for 





   
This decision matrix could be supported by an ongoing GSI analysis of the disproportionate distribution of 
environmental hazards. An argument could be made that based on the findings of this study neither race nor income need 
be incorporated into this matrix. The reason for this is that if the cumulative impact is addressed, then race would 
automatically be addressed and income has not shown to be strongly associated with environmental hazards. However, 
these two variables, race and income, have been too historically significant to ignore or to leave to implicit inclusion. Left 
on its own, society has repeatedly shown its ability to disproportionately burden low-income and minority communities with 
a variety of social and environmental problems. To appropriately address this history, these two variables should be 
explicitly included in such a decision-making process. 
Currently US EPA has begun to use GSI in identifying and prioritizing environmental justice concerns. Only in one 
region, however, is any attempt being made to address the cumulative impact of multiple environmental hazards. Region VII 
of US EPA has completed the GIS mapping for the city and county of St. Louis and has identified and located all 
industrial facilities subject to RCRA, CERCLA, UST, LUST, the Clean Air Act, and TRI on a series of GSI maps. The 
Region has also included blood lead information and plotted this information on a map. The Region overlaid this 
information with socio-economic data on poverty levels and racial makeup obtained from the Census Bureau in an effort 
to identify potential areas of environmental justice concern (US EPA, GIS, 1997). At present, though, this information is 
not yet being applied in any type of permitting or review processes. 
There are clearly limitations with such a decision matrix presented above and US EPA efforts, yet they represent a 
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beginning. There will no doubt be economic challenges to such processes given the limitations that they set. Yet, 
something must be done to restructure the environmental injustice burdens that minority communities face. New protocols 
must be established that are in line with the uniform regulations and environmental standards that exist in federal and state law. 
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The Sahel, a region between the Sahara Desert and sub-Saharan Africa, is one of the most naturally arid 
places in the world. Habitation has always been a struggle because the people of the Sahel have been 
constantly challenged by series of droughts and land degradation. Due to the harsh environment, there has 
been an intensification of conflict over natural resources. This conflict has displaced many people, such as 
herders and poor farmers, from their homeland or territory. Displacement has caused homelessness, loss 
of livelihood, and cultural dislocation. Such a situation has lead to the questioning of whether the 
ecological and social carrying capacity has been surpassed. Can droughts and land degradation ever be 
combated in this region to prevent further displacement? In order to answer this question, it is essential to 
understand the relationship between environmental change and population activities. 
In this paper, the state of the Sahelian region and the reasons behind displacement and conflict will be 
analyzed through four different aspects that make up a "family of transitions." The first goal will be to 
assess the environmental situation of the region by understanding the reasons for desertification. I will 
demonstrate the ecological patterns and changes in this region, and how they relate to growing aridity. 
Although natural environmental alterations are an important aspect, I will primarily demonstrate the 
correlation between the population growth rate of this region and its environmental state. Within the 
umbrella of the population transition, I will also include the effects of population pressure that lead to the 
third transition, urbanization. The fourth transition that I would like to focus on is that of the economic 
changes. I will explore the reasons behind certain economic policies implemented by the governments of 
this region and the effect of the market economy on the rural sector. Finally, the last transition I will focus 
on is that of social change, especially in the lives of the herders. During the analysis, it is important to 
keep in mind that these transitions do not necessarily occur independently of one another. They are 
permeable and interconnected. Furthermore, it is essential to note that the Sahel is not a homogenous 
region. Each country is unique in terms of their environment, policy practices, and culture. It is only the 
overarching problem of desertification and displacement that is common in the five western Sahelian 
countries of Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal that I will be concentrating on. 
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The four transitions that I have chosen to examine are all in a "vulnerable" state. Vulnerability, which 
mainly occurs in the early stages of transition, is determined when "rates of change are high, social 
adaptive capacity is limited…and the relationships in the dynamic are imbalanced" (Drake 1993: 303). It 
is the "vulnerability" occurring within environmental, population, urban, economic, and social transitions 
that are causing displacement and conflict between herders and cultivators. Although the Sahel is at a 
"vulnerable" state, there are policies that can be implemented to create a better future. However, first of 
all, it is essential to establish the environmental state of the Sahel. 
The Environmental Transition 
The Sahel is 500-1,000 km wide and stretches for 7,000 km from the west to the east coast of Africa. In 
the distant past, the Sahel was a "well-watered savanna" where forests, rivers, and grassland plains use to 
thrive. However, since 2000 BC the region has been drying up. The Sahel now mostly consists of a semi-
arid ecosystem that fluctuates between grassland and shrubland thicket, where the rainfall is only between 
150-600 mm/year. There are four different ecological zones in the Sahel: the sub-desert margin mainly 
located in Niger is sensitive to wind erosion since it is barely covered by vegetation; Sudano-Sahelian 
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zone which falls in Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal has an annual rainfall between 350-650 mm; edapho-
climatic zone in Burkina Faso which contains very poor soil quality and is susceptible to extreme climatic 
events; and the humid zone in Niger and Senegal which is affected by salinity and seasonal floods 
(Raynaut 1997: 31-35). Considering such a variety in terms of harsh climatic and ecosystemic zones, what 
have been the reasons for climatic change and degradation of the ecosystem? 
One of the main causes of climatic change has been series of droughts that have affected this region. In 
this century, there have been at least six recorded droughts. One of these droughts recorded between 1968 
and 1973, was declared an international disaster because rains failed for six consecutive years (Bennett 
1991: 13). Droughts could be caused by several reasons. One reason could be the temperature change in 
the Atlantic Ocean changing patterns of rainfall in West Africa. Another reason might be the greenhouse 
effect in relation to the global concentration of greenhouse gases (Hume 1993: 44). In addition to 
droughts, desertification has also contributed to environmental degradation. 
Desertification is growing at a very fast pace. Although it is understandable that deforestation is occurring 
for commercial and subsistence usage, there has been no encouragement for reforestation. Reforestation 
as a policy should be enforced because it is crucial for maintaining a viable ecosystem.  
  








(.) 3 2 1 2
Table 1; See map on Deforestation for further data; Source: Human Development Report 1995 
However, it is important to keep in mind that the popular image of the desert "spreading like a plague" is 
inaccurate. Instead, "the spread of the desert is more like a bad skin disease…individual patches then join 
together, until eventually a whole area is affected" (Bennett 1991: 14). Nevertheless, desertification is also 
caused by the increase of population growth. In order for people to feed a growing population, land use 
has been extensive in terms of, repeated cropping, salinisation, and land encroachment (IUCN 1986: 21). 
This has lead the land to be vulnerable to the loss of top soil and subjected to "nutrient mining." 
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The Population Transition 
The population growth rate in Africa is considered "over-exponential." It has been predicted that by the 
year 2020, Africa will have 20% of the world’s population compared to the 12% it has now (Raynault 
1997: 37). In the Sahel, there are 38.6 million people and the population is growing at an average rate of 
2.88% (Human Development Report 1995: 179). 
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Figure 1; Actual data till 1994; Source: World Resources Institute (WRD) 
   
By looking at Figure 1, it may seem as if population is decreasing. However, it is important to notice the 
time lag between birth and death rates (Figure 2). The average crude birth rate for the Sahel is 46.5 
compared to the 17.22 as the death rate (Human Development Report 1995: 179). The birth rate is still 
greater than the death rate suggesting that the Sahel is still in the early stages of the population transition. 
The Sahel is clearly an example of a neo-Malthusian prediction where overpopulation and this will lead to 
land fragmentation, over utilization of land and a degraded environment (Mobugunje 1995: 6). Because 
fertility is almost three times greater than mortality, population still increases at an exponential rate. This 
makes the Sahel "vulnerable" in terms of the environment being incapable of supporting more population 
growth.  
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Figure 2; Actual data till 1994; Source WRD 
 click here to see country-wise population projections 
The "vulnerability" allows us to induce that there is an imbalance between the timing of environmental 
transition and that of population growth. What is important to note is the extent of vulnerability. So far, 
the analysis has been based on exponential projection. However, looking at the linear and especially the 
logarithmic projections on Chart 1, the extent of vulnerability is not as great as the exponential projection. 
Therefore, it could be debated that the Sahel should not be alarmed about the depletion of its natural 
resources or the neo-Malthusian predicament. Instead, sustainability or even entering the middle stage of 
the demographic transition, where births and deaths are coming close to bring equal, is closer than 
expected. This could imply that the Sahel is not at a fully "vulnerable" state. However, it is still important 
to keep in mind that at the present, all of these projections to some extent, demonstrate an increase in 
population and is susceptible to "vulnerability." The extent of "vulnerability" may differ in the future but 
it is the high probability of vulnerability now that we should be cautious of when making policies. 
Even though the connection between population and environment can be debatable, there is evidence that 
there is a need to be weary. The increase in the mouths to feed, which is leading to the depletion of natural 
resources, will have future repercussions in terms of decreasing food production. As Figure 3 shows, with 
the exception of Burkina Faso, food production is already considerably fall. This could have detrimental 
affects on the health of the population. Therefore, not only is the ecological carrying capacity at stake 
now, but it will be in a worse condition by the year 2020 at the current rate of  population growth when 
population will double (Human Development Report 1995: 79). This is a situation of positive feedback 
where an increase in population results in increase in environmental degradation. This positive feedback 
can be slowed down by through family planning measures within the societies of the Sahel as well as 
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education. Population policies must also take into account geographical location of population density. 
 
Figure 3; Source: WRD 
The distribution of population in the Sahel is "discontinuous." In other words, in some areas, the 
population density is large and in others, hardly anyone inhabits the area. The most crucial indication of 
population density and carrying capacity is the climatic zones. With the worsening climatic conditions in 
the last twenty years and land degradation due to population growth, there has been a considerable amount 
of demographic decline in the northern areas. More people have been immigrating to the south because of 
higher precipitation and land fertility (Raynaut 1997: 47). In addition too natural population growth, 
migration to the urban southern areas is mainly responsible for conflict over fertile lands. 
Urbanization Transition 
Throughout history, internal migration has always occurred in the Sahel. Capital cities are especially 
"centers of attraction" because of employment opportunities. On the one hand, internal migration has 
created a considerable loss of population in the north and nation-wide, especially in the modern Sahel. For 
example, in Senegal, not only have people in the north immigrated to Dakar in the south, but many of 
those already living in Dakar have immigrated to Europe. Senegal represents a general trend in the Sahel. 
However, urbanization is not as prevalent in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger as it is in Senegal and 
Mauritania. In Mauritania alone, the rate of urbanization is 42%, a very high rate for most developing 
countries (Raynaut 1997: 75). Nevertheless, these "centers of attraction" have created an immense growth 
in urbanization. 
There are four zones of urbanization in the Sahel. The first is in the extreme west of the Sahel, which is 
file:///C|/545/1997/cha/sahel.html (7 of 15) [6/18/2008 10:22:26 AM]
University of Michigan, NRE545, 1997 Monograph
characterized by "an area of urban polarization." This area is very fertile and densely populated. The 
second region is the Upper Senegal Basin where labor is exported to other coastal countries, Bamako, or 
to Europe. The third region is between the Niger River and western Burkina Faso. This area has a high 
population mobility due to the search for favorable levels of rainfall. The last region is located in the 
Nigero-Nigerian border. Although this region acts as "pole of attraction," it shows no sign of "saturation" 
yet (Raynaut 1997: 85). It has been predicted that "spatial 
 
Figure 4; Actual data till 1994; Source: WRD 
Distribution of population…will depend primarily on the balance established between two opposing 
forces: on the one hand, the capacity of rural regions to retain their inhabitants, and, on the other hand, the 
level of attraction exercised by the urban world." (Raynaut 1997: 83). 
The rate at which urbanization is occurring suggests that there is an imbalance in the population flow 
between the urban and the rural areas. The imbalance is based on the timing of environmental and 
population transitions. The people of the north are vulnerable not only because of the high rate of 
environmental deterioration and population growth, but also because of dislocation. Dislocation is mainly 
occurring among herders being pushed into "foreign territory," threatening their traditional mode of 
livelihood and cultural life. Furthermore, the urbanization transition also jeopardizes the standard of living 
for those who were already settled in the "center of attraction." Playing more attention to the needs of the 
rural sector can dim the intensification of urbanization. For example, if reforestation took place, more 
people in the rural areas would have access to natural resources and they would not be forced to go to 
urban areas where the situation may be worse. Because such measures are not taken into account, regional 
conflict exists within the Sahel between herders immigrating from the north and cultivators in the south. 
The rate at which urbanization is occurring creates a scramble for the limited natural resources and is 
accentuated by the environment and population dynamics already in play. 
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The Herders’ Plight 
Over half of the 40 million "livestock dependent" people in the world live in Africa (IUCN 1986: 28). 
Herding in the Sahel has been a very important way of surviving for centuries, especially in the northern 
parts of the region. Pastoralists are known as the "Bedouins" made up of ethnic groups such as the Moors, 
Tuareg, and Toubou. In the past, there was a great balance between the number of herds, herders, 
cultivators, and the ecosystem. For example, the animals would convert sparse vegetation into milk and 
meat while providing manure for farmers (Bennett 1991: 18). Among many ethnic groups in the Sahel, 
such as the Fulani in Mauritania, cattle are considered a form of wealth. Meat is not consumed but traded 
for agricultural products. If tension between herders and cultivators was minimal, what then set off the 
trigger between these two groups of people? 
One answer is again the issue of drought, which reduces the resources for humans and livestock. The 
search for fertile land, especially in times of droughts, leads to permanent land degradation. This forces 
pastoralists to roam within smaller or marginal areas leading to overgrazing, preventing future 
regeneration of vegetation, and a significantly reducing productivity of the pasture. The primary erosion 
loop is the erosion of grass. When the grass is eaten down by the herds there is less vegetation, lower 
topsoil, and moisture, making erosion permanent (Meadows 1992: 128). Ironically, the drilling of more 
wells in order to ensure that there is at least some availability of water during droughts and the dry 
seasons, have also lead to more over-exploitation of land by the herders. The increase of livestock and 
wells, "blur the map of social control over the pasture lands" (Raynault 1997: 123). Wells create their own 
"center of attraction" while degrading land that they are on. Additionally, it is also the increase of 
livestock that eliminate fertile land in addition to human resource use, leading people and their cattle to 
the south. 
  
Total Number of 
Cattle (1,000)
Mali Mauritania Niger Senegal Burkina Faso
1990 4996 1350 1711 2740 3937
1991 5198 1400 1790 2770 4015
1992 5373 1400 1800 2800 4096
Table 2; See map on Pasture for further data; Source: Human Development Report 1995 
In the south, herders are threatened by the growth of agricultural land and land privatization. Many 
governments in this region since independence have implemented private property laws. This 
automatically becomes problematic for nomadic herders because they do not believe in "artificial 
borders." The prejudice, especially against nomadic pastoralists, has been in existence since the colonial 
days where the goal was to have better control over people to secure taxes from populations with "unused 
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wealth." More specifically, since the 1990’s the Taureg, a nomadic pastoral ethnic group in this region, 
have suffered rebel attracts by cultivators and air raids by the Nigerian government because they refuse to 
pay taxes. This conflict has spread to the Malian borders (Bennett 1991: 53-56). This example illustrates 
that there is no "rational" contact between the governments and nomadic populations, such as the Taureg. 
Not only do the people like the Taureg have little participation in the decision-making processes of the 
country, but the only form of contact comes through tax collection. The contact between pastoralists at the 
grassroots and administrative levels are as if it is through "the republican guard, who mostly behave as if 
they were on conquered territory, and because of this they [herders] symbolize pure violence in the eyes 
of the population (Bennett 1991: 57). The governments fail to recognize the limits of the environment, and 
the population transitions of the humans and the herds. This, thereby, marginalizes and further displaces 
herders. The governments’ place more emphasis on cultivation. 
 
Agriculture 
The other component of this vicious cycle is the extensification of agriculture. For instance, since 1985 in 
Senegal, the implementation of "structural adjustment" policies and cash cropping has increased the 
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quantity of farmers who arbitrarily clear land in order to be coerced into the greater national economy. 
Once the land has been used, farmers move on to more cultivable land. This practice not only hurts 
herders who may come to the same piece of land for their animals to graze only find it infertile, but it is 
only based on short term gains (Bennett 1991: 42). This is mainly the case because most of the farming in 
this region is extensive and based on shifting cultivation. Slash and burn methods are also used where 
lands lay fallow, reducing the amount of land available for use. When land is in short supply, the fallow 
period is shortened and the land no longer has sufficient amount of time to regain its production 
capabilities.  
Arable land is increasing majority of the areas because a greater emphasis is placed on agriculture. 
Figure 5; See map on cropland for more data; Source: WRD 
Nutrient mining pushes both farmers and herders to more fragile areas. Although cultivators may seem to 
be in a better position than herders, especially by having government support and property, there is a great 
disparity between rich and poor farmers. The social vulnerability between herders and farmers and among 
farmers themselves can be explained through the economic transitions. 
The Transitions to Market Economy and Government Intervention 
In conjunction with environmental and population transitions is the economic transition. The market 
economy and integration of agriculture into national economies influence economic transition. After 
independence, the goal for these Sahelian countries was not only to become "developed" but also to 
finance growing foreign debts. The only way to fulfill these objectives is to rely on agriculture. 
Agricultural production can not only feed the nationals of a country, but can also be used as export crops 
to receive hard currency for further development and financing debts. Governments support agriculture 
for sustained economic growth because it is lucrative and has the potential to alleviate poverty. 
Unfortunately, these theories about agriculture were not implemented efficiently. International donor 
agencies such as the World Bank advocated structural adjustment policies where aid would be tied to 
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economic stabilization. Structural adjustment policies were also highly coercive. In order to receive aid, a 
country had to engage in privatization and liberalization of its economy. This is not necessarily a negative 
policy but it has been enforced without understanding the socio-economic situation already in existence in 
the Sahel. Such a policy failed to take into account the costs of privatization among herders, and 
especially, poor farmers. This negligence has caused serious environmental deterioration and conflict. 
Privatization of land through the market economy is a new phenomenon that has resulted in inequality 
financial as well as access to land (Raynaut 1997: 258). Traditional land entitlements laws still exists but 
has been nullified to a great extent with establishment of nation states. The extent of nullification varies 
from state to state - in Niger land belongs to those who "develop" it and in Senegal, traditional land rules 
are nullified. Overall, access to land is determined by who has more financial resources. Not only does 
this exclude herders and poor farmers who lack finances, but it is completely foreign for herders. Such a 
situation gives the rich farmers the option to use land unsustainably by buying more and more land 
without any concern for future repercussions. Additionally, due to the lack of "economic assets," the poor 
have no rights. They also do not have any access to credit they need to invest in the new technologies or 
infrastructure (Mobuguje 1995: 32). Because of this, they too encroach on marginal lands and making the 
future more vulnerable in terms of feeding a growing population. 
The key to a successful future in the Sahel is to invest in agriculture because it has the potential of feeding 
more people and producing more money. However, it is not being practiced in a sustainable manner nor is 
the greater economy including herders in the process of economic growth and eradication of poverty. The 
concept of profit and the "get rich quick" phenomenon that results form privatization and liberation of the 
economy can lead to the "race for land" and conflict. This form of social and economic vulnerability can 
be reduced if governments advocate a more equality for both herders and poor farmers in terms of access 
to land or subsidize the poor farmers by providing them fertilizers, securing tenure rights, and educating 
them about soil conversation methods. In other words, emphasis must be placed on intensification of land 
use rather than extensification. Agricultural economists such as Ester Boserup states that population 
growth where "intensive agricultural practices…induce[s] more favorable attitudes toward technological 
and organizational innovation that will not only increase productivity, but improve environmental 
quality" (Mobagunje 1995: 6). It is then possible to redistribute the wealth from agriculture into other 
economic sectors such as herding to alleviate the herders’ level of poverty and create better sustainable 
grazing rights. In addition to redistribution of wealth, there can be a greater initiative placed on a "double 
strategy" where agricultural practices can be combined with herding. Like in the past, the increase of 
fertilizer use, for instance, can come from herding practices. For example, there are societies in the Sahel 
such as the Haalpulaar of the Senegal River where the results of cultivation and herding create a cyclical 
pattern. In this "double strategy," the residues of the flood plain agriculture create a common grazing land, 
the excrement from herds provide nutrition for the fish, and the organic waste helps produce more 
vegetation (Raynaut 1997: 115). However, with the current means of economic growth, social conditions 
are "vulnerable" leading to more hardships. 
Social Dimensions of the Sahel 
Such traditional methods of social and land control systems are now under serious threat from both the 
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agriculturist and pastoral perspectives. The economic transition and the introduction of the use of money 
can explain the social transition. The process of integrating the local economy or those living in the rural 
areas into the greater world economy has put an emphasis on individualization and monetary profit. This 
has caused disintegration of social structures such as the family. For instance, young people and women 
are now investing in their own plot of land. Ironically, to a great extent, the disintegration of the lineage 
and family structure is reducing economic productivity because small, individual production units are 
unable to mobilize work force at crucial times (Raynaut 1997: 280). If family units become smaller, they 
may fall behind in sowing or weeding, resulting in lower productivity and extensification. The loss of one 
family member, especially in agricultural societies, is greatly felt because it affects future population 
sustainability (Raynault 1997: 280). Additionally, those who migrate to the urban areas also pose 
vulnerability as family ties become disconnected. The migration for profit (although essential) can lead to 
anomie or alienation from the new atmosphere resulting in cultural deterioration. However, it is important 
to note that such reasoning is not advocating that people should remain in one place just to prevent social 
disruption while going hungry. The evidence of social vulnerability should be used as a sign that a 
significant portion of the policies made in the Sahel should emphasize the need to improve rural areas. If 
reforestation and better infrastructure were provided as an incentive to stay in rural areas, then social or 
familial disruption would be minimized. 
click here for a "theoretical diagram" 
Policy Proposals and Conclusion 
Governments need to invest more in the rural areas and place less emphasis on maintaining the political 
support of urban populations, especially the civil servants, army, and the police (Grainger 1982: 61). 
Although urban needs are no less important, majority of the population in the Sahelian countries still live 
in the rural areas where effort to encourage sustainable growth should be emphasized. Initiatives should 
be taken to increase reforestation as a direct solution to desertification. Reforestation as a policy also has 
the potential to decrease the rate of urbanization and perhaps social deterioration. Maintaining a 
sustainable ecosystem can also come with an early population stabilization no matter what projection is 
used. Reducing population, through education and family planning can significantly reduce the 
detrimental effects on the environment (Meadows 1992: 29). However, it is important to keep in mind that 
population pressure is not necessarily a problem. Taking into consideration Boserup’s theory on the 
increase of agricultural production through intensification of land use, population can be "put to work." 
Boserup’s theory has been practiced in Machakos, Kenya and it could work for the Sahel as well. The 
conditions in this region improved due to initial accumulation of capital and skill (Tiffen 1994). The 
accumulation of capital could lead to communal investment in other sectors of the economy, alleviating 
poverty and improving the state of the environment. The initial capital could come from investing in 
agriculture. 
Investing in agriculture will not only be able to feed the growing number of people, but it will also help 
the Sahelian governments finance foreign debts. However, agriculture will only be beneficial if it is 
practiced sustainably and equitably through better access to land and infrastructure. Herding communities 
will also be able to receive benefits through redistribution of wealth. It is evident that the importance of 
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herding is decreasing because it is not as lucrative and is a livelihood much harder to monitor due to its 
nomadic nature when considering integration into the world economy. Nevertheless, it is crucial for 
governments of the Sahel to integrate herders, a significant part of the population, into development. If all 
of these policies just suggested are practiced effectively, the Sahel should see fewer tensions between 
herders and farmers over scarce resources. 
All the transitions presented in this paper have positive feedback loops where the increase in 
environmental degradation increases population vulnerability and urbanization. The current haphazard 
economic transition, increases inequality and social vulnerability. Because the conglomeration of these 
four transitions that are out of sync with each other, they foretell the future of overshoot and collapse. 
With the data and the analysis provided, it is highly likely that the carrying capacity of the Sahel will 
collapse because the "signal from the limit is delayed" and the environment is "overstressed" (Meadows 
1992: 128). The rate at which the population is growing, the environment is being used, the economic and 
social pressures are forcing people to use the land extensively, will lead to the collapse of the resource 
base leading to an ever-present state of vulnerability. Interpreting these signals correctly and making 
policies for long-term sustainability is essential in order for the Sahelian people to live sustainably and 
without violence. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the overthrow of President Melchoir Ndedaye in October of 1993, Burundi has been locked in a 
gruesome civil war. Although estimates vary considerably, it is acknowledged that, at a minimum at least 
160,000 Burundians, mainly civilians, have been killed in the massacres. A brief literature search using 
'Burundi' and 'Violence' as key words turned up over a thousand news articles over the past two years. A 
glance at some of the more recent headlines about Burundi from the past year illuminates the magnitude 
of violence continuing to affect Burundians today: 
November 6, 1997, "54,000 Burundians returned from Tanzania to the Eastern and 
Southern Provinces of Burundi. Violence has forced a standoff in the government's move to 
dismantle 43 'regroupement' sites holding over 250,000 people. Many more refugees in 
Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo are unwilling to return to their 
homes."(Africa News) 
September 2, 1997 "OAU chairman Robert Mugabe warned that sanctions imposed on war 
torn Burundi will stay because the ruling junta appears not to have moved toward the 
return of democracy. 'they haven't done anything . . . . and there is still the military regime.' 
stated Mugabe" (Agence France Presse). 
July 24, 1997, "We visited [regroupement] camps in about five of the sixteen provinces. 
And the conditions in many of these camps is really quite shocking. We saw extensive 
malnutrition. There were a number of adults starving to death . . . and also we found it 
virtually impossible to speak with anyone who had not had members of their direct family 
killed by the armed forces of Burundi during the rounding up period , which took place 
from March-September of 1996."  
(All Thing's Considered) 
July 16, 1997, "The wife of the National Assembly was wounded when her car ran over an 
anti-tank mine in Bujumbura on June 30 . . . In Cibitoke province, armed men killed 26 
civilians between July 2nd and 6th according to eyewitnesses. . In Bubanza province 
Burundi civilians reported that they were afraid to leave their regroupement camps because 
it was not safe for them to return home. They added that they were unable to work in their 
fields because of fighting . .In Maramvya outside of Bujumbura, a nutritional survey 
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conducted by Action Contre la Faim in February found rates of severe malnutrition at 18% 
and global acute malnutrition rates of nearly 24%." (Africa News) 
May 2, 1997, "The army announced this week that it had killed at least 300 Hutu rebels in 
Bururi since April 6th . . . in another incident, the military claimed that suspected rebels 
killed 38 high school students and seven teachers in an attack on a school at Buta near 
Bururi. At least another 40 students were wounded in the attack"  
(Reuters World Service) 
April 2, 1997 "Fighting killed 147 people last Thursday in Tumonge, Southwestern 
Burundi, during engagements between the Tutsi-led Burundian army and Hutu 
rebels." (The Xinhua News Agency) 
March 13, 1997 "Residents in Burundi's capital city were caught unawares by anti-tank 
mines that killed at least six people yesterday . . . the mine attacks follow a foiled 
assassination attempt earlier in the week on President Pierre Buyoya." (Inter Press Service) 
January 30, 1997 "The nation's mainly Tutsi army, which grabbed power in a coup last 
year, has killed at least 1000 people since the beginning of December, said the United 
Nations human rights office in Geneva . . .the Hutu rebels are also accused of massacres of 
civilians and are responsible for killing at least 58 people in the same time period."  
(Los Angeles Times)
The natural question for anyone reading these articles or for anyone affected by the tragedy of war is 
always 'Why?' Attempting to understand the causes of any particular violent conflict is not an easy 
undertaking and there is never a simple explanation for violence. Attempts to clarify will almost 
inevitably lead to oversimplifications, nonetheless, the effort to understand - and hopefully to prevent - 
violent conflict is important. An interesting question about violence was once posed to public health 
practitioners in the United States by the Surgeon General, and it changed the way we think about violence 
in our own society. The reality is that the question applies equally well to any society plagued by 
violence: "If violence is not a public health issue, then why is it killing so many people? It is a good 
question and the issue deserves serious attention by scholars. 
Recent scholarship on international conflict has focused on the interaction between environmental scarcity 
and violence. Thomas Homer-Dixon is a professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto and 
co-director of the Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict. To date the project has 
researched several different countries and regions as case studies for the many hypotheses generated about 
the relationship between environmental scarcity and violent conflict. These have included studies of 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Senegal, El Salvador, Honduras, China, and Haiti. More recent work has focused on 
the Gaza strip, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, and Rwanda. 
I propose to examine Burundi as a case study for applying these models of environmental scarcity. I will 
also incorporate ideas of transition theory as explained by William Drake, Professor of Public Health at 
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the University of Michigan, to develop an understanding of the complex relationships evident in Burundi's 
current and past crises. 
II. Overview of Burundi 
Geography 
Burundi is a small nation in Eastern Africa surrounded by Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and Tanzania. (See Map 1.) The total area of Burundi is 27,830 square kilometers with 25,650 square 
kilometers of land, approximately equal in size to the state of Maryland. The country's climate is 
temperate with a hilly and mountainous terrain. There is a plateau in the east and plains along the coast of 
Lake Tanganikya. Arable farmland accounts for only 43% of the total land. Approximately 35% of the 
land is used for pasture and raising cattle. Soil erosion is growing problem in Burundi due to both 
overgrazing of cattle and expansion of agriculture into marginal areas. Soil exhaustion is also becoming a 
concern in some areas. Deforestation of Burundi's land is almost complete with less than 2% of the 
country currently covered by forests, primarily in designated national parks. Trees are cut down mainly 
for firewood fuel. 
Population 
The most recent estimates for Burundi's population place it at 6,088,000 as of mid-1996. This represents 
an almost 250% increase in population since 1950. The population growth rate for 1996 is estimated at 
2.9%. (See Chart 1.) 
Burundi's extreme population density of 237 people per square kilometer places it fifth in Africa just 
behind Rwanda and the island nations of Comoros, Reunion, and Mauruitius in terms of population 
density. If only arable land is taken into account, Burundi's population density approaches 551 people per 
square kilometer. Comparative statistics with some other countries noted for high population densities 
highlight the magnitude of current population pressures in Burundi. (See Charts 2, 3, Map 2) (Click here 
for a larger version of Map 2.) Population pressures are also not evenly divided in Burundi, some areas 
are much more densely crowded than others. (See Map 3.) 
Ethnicity 
Burundi's population is very similar ethnically and culturally to its neighbor Rwanda to the north. There 
are three main ethnic groups in Burundi: the Hutu, who comprise approximately 85% of the population, 
the Tutsi, about 14% of the population, and the remaining 1% consisting of Pygmy Twa, South Asians 
and Europeans. 
Burundi's ethnic divisions, like Rwanda's, are often depicted as representing centuries old animosities, 
originating with distinct tribal divisions that inevitably must lead to war. In reality, however, the divisions 
between the Hutu and Tutsi are not nearly so simple to explain and any reference to "tribalism" as a 
file:///C|/545/1997/eng/shanfin.html (3 of 24) [6/18/2008 10:22:35 AM]
University of Michigan, NRE545, 1997 Monograph
explanation for conflict in Burundi is essentially meaningless. Burundi is an anomaly in a continent of 
states with artificially constructed borders in that it was a 'kingdom' long before colonization and has been 
a "national entity" for centuries. Moreover, both Tutsi and Hutu speak the same language in both Rwanda 
and Burundi- in Burundi the language is known as Kirundi. Hutu and Tutsi also share the same social 
organizations and have never been separated geographically. In fact, Hutu and Tutsi have lived literally 
side-by-side, and mostly peacefully, for centuries. The issue is further complicated in Burundi due to the 
fact that Burundi's kingdom was ruled, not by the Tutsi as in Rwanda, but by a ruling class of royalty 
known as the Ganwa, considered neither Tutsi nor Hutu, but rather seen as having origins and legitimacy 
with both groups. 
The distinction between Tutsi and Hutu, historically, was based much more on socio-economic divisions 
than upon ethnic lines. Considerable intermarriage between "Hutu" and "Tutsi" was common, as was 
movement between groups. The term "Hutu" originally had more to do with social status and hierarchical 
relationships than with ethnic identity. In Kirundi the word was traditionally used to connote one who was 
in a subordinate position to another. 
Because of the importance of ethnic distinctions in Burundian society today, much discussion by both 
Tutsi and Hutu centers around perceived physical differences between the groups. Tutsi are often 
described in the media as 'tall, thin, beautiful people, descendants of a Northern Hamitic population of 
pasturalists' and the Hutu as 'darker, shorter, Bantu stock, traditionally agriculturalists.' The fact of the 
matter is that it is not always possible for Burundians to distinguish a 'Hutu' from a 'Tutsi' on physical 
characteristics alone. Many Burundians do not fit the stereotypes of their ethnicity and many are killed for 
it when violence erupts. The historical distinction of the Hutu as agriculturalist and the Tutsi as pastoralist 
probably has a bit more truth to it, but the reciprocal nature of cattle tending in traditional Burundian 
society was more of a uniting factor for Hutu and Tutsi than a divisive one. 
A full discussion of the pre-colonial relationships between Hutu and Tutsi is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but the important point is that ethnic conflict in the region is not the historical reality that many 
assume. For more information about pre-colonial society in Burundi, interested readers should refer to 
Rene Lemarchand's book Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice, Woodrow Wilson Press, (1994). 
Economy 
Burundi is a resource poor country, described by some as being in an early stage of economic 
development. The economy is dominated by the agricultural sector and 90% of Burundians depend upon 
subsistence level farming. The main crops for farmers are coffee, tea, sorghum, sweet potatoes, bananas, 
manioc (cassava), meat (cattle and goats), and milk. 
Burundi's per capita income is one of the lowest in the world at $210. The UNDP 1994 Human 
Development Report lists Burundi as second only to Rwanda for having the highest percentage of people 
living in poverty: eighty four percent of Burundians are estimated to live in absolute poverty. (See Chart 
4.) 
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Foreign exchange for the government is dependent upon the nation's coffee crop which accounts for 80% 
of the country's foreign exchange earnings. This dependence on one crop leaves Burundi's economy 
extremely vulnerable to both climate change and to market changes in world coffee prices. (See Map 4 for 
a depiction of Burundi's main agricultural zones.) 
Health Indicators 
The overall poverty rate in Burundi is reflected in several health status measures: the most notable of 
them being average life expectancy. A Burundian's average life expectancy is only 50.2 years, compared 
with 76.2 for North Americans and 64.7 for the world wide average. (See Chart 5.) Many Burundian 
children are subject to malnutrition resulting in growth problems. According to the UNICEF report on the 
State of the World's Children, almost half of the children in Burundi are suffering from malnutrition 
induced wasting and stunting.  
(See Chart 6.) Burundi is, in fact, among the worst fed countries in Africa: only about 84% of the 
country's daily per capita food supplies are currently being met. (See Chart 7.) Maternal mortality in 
Burundi is also very high, estimated at about 1,300 deaths per 100,000 live births. Contraceptive 
prevalence is extremely low with less than 1% of married women reporting the use of any contraceptives 
at all.  
  
III. Theories of Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict 
The central questions posed by scholars interested in the link between the environment and conflict began 
first and foremost with speculations about population growth. Given past growth rates, within the next 
fifty years or so, the total population of the earth will probably surpass nine billion people. Unless radical 
changes are implemented, global economic output is expected to grow exponentially alongside of total 
population. If we accept the notion that the earth has finite resources, the next question becomes this: 
what happens to human populations when resources become scarce? 
In his article "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict" Thomas Homer-
Dixon poses the question of what happens when renewable resources of agricultural land, forests, water 
resources, and fisheries become scarce: In his words: "If such 'environmental scarcities' become severe, 
could they precipitate violent civil or international conflict?" Based on research of specific cases, he 
presents his own answer to the question in his follow-up article, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent 
Conflict: Evidence from Cases." 
"In brief, our research showed that environmental scarcities are already contributing to violent 
conflicts in many parts of the developing world. These conflicts are probably the early signs of an 
upsurge of violence in the coming decades that will be induced or aggravated by scarcity. The 
violence will usually be sub-national, persistent and diffuse. Poor societies will be particularly 
affected since they are less able to buffer themselves from environmental scarcities and the social 
crises they cause. These societies are, in fact, already suffering acute hardship from shortages of 
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water, forest, and especially fertile land.
Social conflict is not always a bad thing: mass mobilization and civil strife can produce 
opportunities for beneficial change in the distribution of land and wealth and in the processes of 
governance. But fast-moving, unpredictable, and complex environmental problems can overwhelm 
efforts at constructive social reform. Moreover, scarcity can sharply increase demands on key 
institutions, such as the state, while it simultaneously reduces their capacities to meet those 
demands, These pressures increase the chance that the state will either fragment or become more 
authoritarian. The negative effects of severe environmental scarcity are therefore likely to 
outweigh the positive."
The concept of environmental scarcity defined by Homer-Dixon refers to three main sources of scarcity of 
renewable resources: environmental change, population growth, and unequal social distribution of 
resources. Environmental change occurs when human induced activity produces a decline in the quantity 
or quality of natural resources at a rate faster than it can be renewed by natural processes. Population 
growth creates a situation where per capita availability declines as resources are split amongst a growing 
number of people. Unequal resource distribution causes environmental scarcity by concentrating 
resources in the hands of a few at the expense of the many. 
These three causes of environmental scarcity can and do interact to produce even more extreme results. 
Two such patterns of interaction, "Resource Capture" and "Ecological Marginalization," are described in 
Figure 1. "Resource Capture" is described as a situation where environmental changes resulting in a 
reduction in available renewable resources combine with population growth to encourage elites within a 
society to shift resource distribution in their favor. Severe environmental scarcity is the result for the 
majority. "Ecological Marginalization" describes a situation where unequal access to resources combines 
with increased population growth to force migrations to regions that are ecologically unstable. High 
population densities and a lack of capital or knowledge necessary to protect natural resources, in turn, 
results in increasingly more severe environmental changes leading to greater environmental scarcity for 
all. 
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How does environmental scarcity cause violent conflict? A model of the sources of and possible 
consequences of environmental scarcity is presented in Figure 2. First, environmental scarcity may cause 
population movement which can lead to "group-identify conflicts" conceivably leading to violence. 
Migrations of newcomers may also place new demands upon states and decrease their legitimacy. 
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Environmental scarcity can also lead to violence by contributing to increased economic deprivation, 
resulting in a decreased legitimacy of the state. 
 
Homer-Dixon is careful to note that economic deprivation in and of itself does not lead directly to 
violence. Notions of 'deprivation' are subjective and poor people do not necessarily revolt. First, they must 
believe that they have a right to economic well being. Societies with fatalistic attitudes about deprivation 
are unlikely to be as prone to violence as are those where the poor believe they have a right to economic 
and social justice. Second, the economic deprivation must be severe and persistent enough to erode the 
moral authority of the state. The probability of civil violence is also increased when groups centered 
around social cleavages (class, ethnicity, religion) are already in existence and can mobilize aggrieved 
individuals to action. 
The theory further speculates that conflict induced in this manner is likely to be sub-national, diffuse and 
persistent. Environmental scarcity has cumulative impacts as it can lead a society into a continuous spiral 
of decline by encouraging widespread population movements and increased economic despair. Violence 
is also likely to increase in intensity as environmental scarcities increase. For states affected by 
environmental scarcity, Homer-Dixon predicts one of two outcomes: fragmentation and a decreased 
ability to control their regional territories or, alternatively, the state may become authoritarian and 
militarized in an attempt to control internal challenges to authority. 
It should be noted that Homer-Dixon and his colleagues are not without their critics. The critics argue that 
simply because environmental scarcity and violent conflict may happen to coincide in a particular region 
this does not imply that you can prove causality. Many possible causes of conflict can usually be 
identified and focusing on one particular cause (environmental scarcity) is unlikely to explain very much. 
Moreover, even if causality could be proved, by only studying cases where conflict and environmental 
scarcity are both in evidence, scholars in the field have left themselves open to the charge that the 
research does little to add to the overall body of knowledge. After all, ideally research would be directed 
at finding solutions to the problem of violence and conflict engendered by environmental scarcity- and not 
simply at proving that such a connection exists. By not examining a "control group" of countries or 
file:///C|/545/1997/eng/shanfin.html (8 of 24) [6/18/2008 10:22:35 AM]
University of Michigan, NRE545, 1997 Monograph
regions that have avoided conflict despite severe environmental scarcity, potentially useful "model cases" 
are overlooked. 
Thomas Homer-Dixon addresses some of these issues in a rebuttal specifically addressing both 
methodological techniques and the problems inherent in studying environment and population dynamics. 
He points out that all too often those analyzing violent conflict have focused on politics and have simply 
failed to consider the independent limits inherent in some environmental systems, as well as the resulting 
effect of those limits upon rational actors responses. In addition, "threshold" effects evident in many 
systems may lead to a situation whereby environments pass a point of irreversibility. Environmental 
scarcity in these systems will have long reaching effects upon human systems regardless of economic or 
political responses to the problem. He argues that ignoring such an important variable when analyzing 
violent conflict is not the answer. 
Homer-Dixon also argues that identifying "control countries" to match up to specific "experimental 
countries" would be virtually impossible given the highly complex nature of environmental and political 
interactions. His argument is that case studies focusing on areas where clear relationships between 
violence and environmental scarcity exist may help scholars identify potential relationships that can then 
be used to study conflict in other areas, and that case studies are a necessary first step to understanding 
those relationships. 
IV. Is Environmental Scarcity Related to Violence in Burundi? 
Introduction 
A brief introduction to Burundi's current political crisis will perhaps help to clarify a very complex 
situation of ethnic tension. An understanding of the historical situation is also crucial to interpreting any 
of the relevant data on environmental scarcity to be presented. The question remains, however, "Is 
environmental scarcity related to ethnic violence in Burundi? And if so, how?" In attempting to answer 
these questions in light of Homer Dixon's theories, it is perhaps best to focus on the availability of 
different renewable resources in Burundi over time. Water resources are not scarce in Burundi. For the 
most part, people have access to enough water to meet all of their personal and agricultural needs. 
Renewable resource sectors to examine then become the following: agriculture, fisheries, and forests. 
Because population growth is also necessarily related to environmental scarcity, it will additionally be 
useful to look at trends in Burundi's population growth over time. Transition theory, as described by 
William Blake in his article, "Towards Building a Theory of Population-Environmental Dynamics: A 
Theory of Transitions," will be used to speculate on Burundi's stage in these four different sectors over 
time. Finally, the history of recent violence in Burundi will be analyzed in light of this data and its 
relationship to current theory about environmental scarcity and conflict. 
Historical Overview of Recent Violence in Burundi
Patterns of Recent Violence
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Since independence from the Belgian administration in 1961, Burundi has experienced several major 
periods of ethnic turmoil and violence. As mentioned previously in the introduction, Burundi's most 
recent period of conflict began in October of 1993 with the assassination of the first democratically 
elected Hutu President in Burundi's history. During this most recent period of conflict, there have been 
upwards of 160,000 deaths with perhaps as many as 1,600,000 people dislocated from their homes. 
In 1991, a period of violence claimed between 4,000-6000 lives. There were over 5,000 Burundians killed 
by ethnic violence in 1988, and in 1972 over 100,000 Burundians were killed by their fellow countrymen 
in one of the most gruesome massacres in African history. In 1965 a wave of killing took the lives of 
approximately 5,000 Burundians. Charts 8 and 9 depict very conservative estimates of the number of 
those killed and the number of those forced from the country due to violence since 1961. 
The conflict in Burundi today is explained as a simple conflict for power between Hutu and Tutsi, but it 
cannot be understood completely without also considering intra-group rivalry between the ruling Tutsi 
elite. Each of the aforementioned outbreaks of violence involved to some degree a grappling for power of 
the state amongst different factions of the ruling Tutsi classes. Each wave of violence, too, is necessarily 
connected intimately with the ones preceding it. Indeed, violence and the memory of violence permeates 
the political consciousness and the meaning of ethnicity for all Burundians. One must also consider the 
history of Rwanda to understand Burundi. Due to cultural and historical similarities, the political situation 
and crises in Rwanda have always had a profound effect on subsequent events in neighboring Burundi. 
The political and historical events leading up to each of Burundi's massacres have been duly noted 
elsewhere and the story is not a pleasant one. A brief summary in this paper cannot do justice to the 
subject, but the story perhaps begins with the assassination of Burundi's first ever Prime Minister 
designate the Prince Louis Rwagasore on October 13th, 1961. 
Post-Independence Burundi
Prince Rwagasore, a member of the UPRONA party was assassinated in a plot by the rival PDC party 
(perhaps in conjunction with the departing Belgian regime) only one month after winning the election on 
the eve of Independence in 1961. The tragic death of Prince Rwagasore sent Burundi down a path of 
violence that some beleive could have been avoided. Rwagasore's popularity, charm, and perhaps more 
importantly, his legitimate claim of decent from the Ganwa royalty may have served as a unifying factor 
in a country that was destined to become very ethnically divided. 
Rwagasore's death marked the beginning of a crystallization of ethnic identity among Burundian elites. 
The Rwandan revolution and the establishment of a ruling Hutu government in Kigali also served, for 
both Hutu and Tutsi elites, as a demonstration of what could potentially happen in Burundi. Majority rule 
with a distinctly Hutu government in place was a prospect looked upon favorably by Burundian Hutus and 
decidedly not so by Tutsis. An influx of Rwandan Tutsi refugees escaping from violent conflict poured 
into the Northern provinces of Burundi. These refugees, as many as 50,000 in number, directly spread 
ideas of ethnic hatred in Burundi that could not help to fan the flames of a rising sense of an identification 
based upon ethnicity in Burundian elites. 
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In 1963 and 1964, soon after independence, the Tutsi and Hutu elite were jockeying with the monarchy 
(made up of the 'Ganwa') for control of both the government and the UPRONA party. (Burundi was 
created as a constitutional monarchy at the time of independence from Belgium in 1961. UPRONA was 
the dominant political party.) The intrusion of external cold war factors tipped the balance of power to the 
Tutsi with the "Congo Rebellion" in Eastern Zaire. The Chinese wished to use Burundi as a base to 
transfer ammunitions into Zaire. In exchange, they agreed to provide financial support to the Tutsi elite in 
Bujumbura. Tutsi refugees from Rwanda also entered into the equation because they wanted to use 
Burundi as a "safe-haven" from which to wage a war against the Hutu government in Rwanda. Rwandan 
Tutsi thus had a vested interest in helping the Tutsi in Burundi to gain power over both the Hutu and the 
Royal Crown and they soon became pivotal in the events that would unfold. 
On January 18th, 1965 a Rwanadan Tutsi shot Burundi's Hutu Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe. 
The event sparked outrage amongst the Hutu elite. The monarchy, sensing its legitimacy quickly slipping 
away, called for general elections to be held for both a new Prime Minister and National Assembly. The 
Hutu emerged from a legislative victory in May of 1965, capturing 23 out of a total of 33 seats in the 
National Assembly. Hutu elites naturally expected that a new Hutu Prime Minister would be placed into 
power. Instead, the monarchy selected a famous "Ganwa," Leopold Biha, to the position. Meanwhile the 
government, increasingly controlled by the monarchy, decreed that the number of communes (subsets of 
provinces) would decrease from 181 to 78 and that the elected leaders of the communes (most of whom 
were Hutu) would be replaced by functionaries appointed by and responsible to the court. This blatant 
attempt to concentrate and increase power into the hands of the ruling monarchy was not well received by 
either the Hutu or Tutsi elites. 
Hutu elites responded in anger with an attempted coup against the ruling monarchy in October of 1965, a 
response that was to prove disastrous for them later. The coup attempt failed and troops loyal to the 
Crown regained control as the King and his courtiers fled to Zaire in panic. Hutu elites were then accused 
by the Tutsi of being disloyal to the government and attempting to establish a Hutu revolution similar to 
what had unfolded in Rwanda. Thousands of Hutus were killed in the purges of the army and the 
government that followed. All Hutus with any political standing were killed, and with the monarchy in 
exile, power came to rest exclusively with the Tusti elite. 
The repression was brutal, resulting in at least 5,000 Hutu civilians being killed, mostly in the provinces 
of Bujumbura and in neighboring Muramvya. Surprising though it seems now, most of the rest of the 
country remained relatively calm, and relations between Hutu and Tutsi were fairly peaceful. The fighting 
among the "elite" for power seemed to have little impact on the day to day lives of Burundi's rural 
population. In the urban areas, by contrast, polarization around ethnic identity was fairly complete. 
Besides the complete elimination of the first generation of Hutu leaders, one other notable effect resulting 
from the failed coup was the extreme weakening of the monarchy. The Court and most "Ganwa" were still 
in exile and it was not until March of 1966 that the King decided to entrust power to his son the Prince 
Charles Ndizeye. The reign of the new king, crowned Ntare, was to be a short lived five months. The 
Tutsi led government and military moved against the new king while he was away in Zaire celebrating the 
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first anniversary of President Mobutu Sese Seko's rise to power. 
The abolition of the monarchy following the Tutsi led coup in 1966 probably sent the final blow to 
national unity in Burundi. In Burundi, in contrast to Rwanda, the ruling monarchy class or "Ganwa" had 
always served as a unifying factor for Hutus and Tutis. Both groups, although occasionally in direct 
conflict with the monarchy, generally acknowledged the perceived legitimacy of Ganwa rule. The Crown 
had thus served as an intervening factor in diminishing Hutu and Tutsi perceived ethnic differences. 
The First Republic
The new Tutsi led government, known as the First Republic, was led by President Michel Micombero. 
President Micombero was a Tutsi of the Hima clan from the south of the country, Bururi. He filled his 
government with his fellow clansmen. Of the seventeen military officers in his newly formed National 
Revolutionary Council (NRC), 8 were from Bururi and only 3 were of Hutu origin. The National 
Assembly was abolished and a military rule established. The UPRONA party was called upon to be the 
"unifying force" for an increasingly divided Burundian society. 
The new government, despite its rhetoric, was hardly democratic and far from a "unifying" force. The 
struggles that were to follow stemmed from a conflict between Tutsi and Hutu, but also between Tutsi and 
Tutsi. Different Tutsi clans, based both on regional and historical kinship lines, struggled for control of 
the state. The threat of Hutu insurrection, with the example of Rwanda ever present in their minds, was 
often used as a tool by the ruling government to bring any potential Tutsi competitors for power back into 
line. Specifically, reference to the 'Hutu peril' as used by those from the South to accuse competitors from 
the North as being too 'soft' on the Tutsi-Hutu 'problem.' As Muramvanya was the site of the deposed 
King, Tutsi from this region were also accused of seeking to re-establish the monarchy, which supposedly 
could not happen without Hutu support. Purges of the army and government of 'Hutu elements' continued. 
A particularly harsh repression began after an accused Hutu rebellion plot was "uncovered" in 1969. 
Whether or not there was any basis for the charge is unclear, as there was no documentation, but the state 
sanctioned killings that resulted certainly were clear. What few Hutu remained in the government were 
clearly "tokens" and the remaining Hutu elite began to feel increasingly insecure. 
In the same way that the Hutu "problem" was related to intra-group conflict among the Tutsi, similarly, 
Hutu insurrection in Burundi was always preceded by perceived weaknesses in the ruling government. 
Hutus sought to exploit the opportunities they saw in the deepening rift between Tutsi elites from the 
North (Muramvanya) and those from the South (Bururi). Violence erupted full force in Burundi in 1972 
after just such an attempt by Hutus to wrest power from the increasingly brutal Tutsi regime. The Hutu 
insurrection occurred in April of 1972 after the well publicized and much discussed trials of several 
Muramvanya Tutsi and Ganwa by their Southern Tutsi rivals from Bururi. The Hutu uprising began in the 
south of the country in Nyanza-Lac when Burundian Hutus invaded from across the border of Tanzania. 
Assisted by Zairean troops, Hutu insurgents attacked the military outposts in Nyanza-Lac and Rumonge. 
Simultaneous attacks also occurred in Cankuzo and Bujumbura. In Rumonge and Nyanza-Lac, Hutu 
began to slaughter every Tutsi in sight. Most of the victims were civilians and estimates are that as many 
as 3,000 Tutsi were killed. Also killed were any Hutu that attempted to resist the slaughter. 
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The official interpretation of the insurrection varied widely. Some claimed that it was a plot by the former 
ex-king Ntare, who had returned to Burundi from Zaire, and, it was claimed, had plotted with foreign 
mercenaries to reinstate the monarchy. Others claimed that official high-ranking Hutus had collaborated 
to finance a rebellion. The historical facts hardly matter, as the repression that followed the insurrection 
made enemies both of the suspected 'monarchists' and the Hutu officials. They were, in fact, accused of 
plotting together. In the slaughter that followed, Hutus throughout the country were executed in large 
numbers. The ex-king Ntare also was summilarily executed. The bloodbath was carried out over several 
months in a chilling and systematic manner. In an effort to wipe out the Hutu elite entirely, every Hutu 
male with any education at all was accused of conspiracy against the government. In a call to "rise up 
against the python in the grass" Tutsi were advised to slaughter all Hutu males down to even the grade 
school level. 
"Army units commandeered merchants' lorries and mission vehicles, and drove up to schools, 
removing whole batches of children at a time. Tutsi pupils prepared lists of their Hutu classmates 
to make identification by officials more straight forward."
In many areas of the country, Hutus fought the rebels alongside of the Tutsi, only to be later slaughtered 
in turn. If anything served to cement the hatred of Hutu for Tutsi, it was this systematic execution that 
took place throughout the country. Never again would the political struggles of the elites be seen by the 
rural population as irrelevant to their lives. The scale of the killings varies. Some conservative estimates 
say 100,000 people, others claim the number is closer to 200,000. In addition, at least 150,000 Hutu fled 
Burundi to neighboring Tanzania and Zaire to live in exile. 
The systematic nature of the killings can probably only be understood by noting the cycle of fear by now 
implicit in the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi. Many Tutsi saw the elimination of the Hutu as the 
'final solution' necessary to protect their well-being. As had happened in the South, they feared a slaughter 
of every man, woman, and child of Tutsi origins. This fear was compounded by the anti-Tutsi violence 
that shaped Rwanda's history from 1959-1962. The Tutsi elite hoped to not only eliminate the perceived 
immediate threat to their well being, but also to inspire fear and terror that would be remembered for 
generations to come. It should also be noted that, although most of the victims were Hutus, many Tutsi 
were killed as well. Particularly targeted were any of the remaining Muramvanya Tutsi accused of 
monarchism. Many Tutsi also died attempting to protect their Hutu friends and neighbors. 
While not all Tutsi were involved in the genocide, many clearly benefited from the deaths. Transfer of 
property to Tusti seems to have been a major inducement to violence in some areas. Those killed were 
robbed of their money, personal belongings, lands, and livestock. 
After this ethnic cleansing, the only 'elites' in Burundian society were of Tutsi origin. A strict rule of 
'Kirundization' of the schools was instituted whereby it was against the law to teach French in all 
government schools. This effectively served to prevent Hutu children from learning the language of 
governance, restricting it to the realm of the wealthier and ruling Tutsi. Because admission to higher 
levels of education was predicated upon a knowledge of French, Hutus were effectively blocked from 
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rising to positions of prominence in society. The army became even more Tutsi dominated, to the extent 
that nearly 100% of the recruits and officers were Tutsi. 
The Second Republic
On November 1, 1976, Burundi's state structure underwent another profound change with the coup d'etat 
placing into power Lt. Col. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza. The Second Republic was a time of consolidation of 
Tutsi rule and an attempt to codify into the national law and discourse an official view of 'National Unity,' 
meant to restore the moral legitimacy of the state. The official view of history propagated by the 
government at this time was mostly an attempt to legitimize Tutsi rule through the ruling UPRONA party. 
Hutu were almost entirely excluded from political participation. By late 1987 only 2 seats out of 65 in the 
Central Committee of Uprona's party were held by Hutus. To prevent claims of ethnic favoritism or 
discrimination in educational or public life, the Second Republic simply banned the public discussion of 
ethnicity. Anyone publicly referring to Hutu or Tutsi ethnic identities was charged with inciting 'racial 
hatreds' and arrested. Individuals were issued identity cards that had to be carried with them at all times. 
Rural Hutu were, for a time, organized into "villages" in a nationwide campaign of "villagization." 
Ostensibly to increase agricultural yields in a "development scheme," the move was, in reality, an attempt 
to exert greater control over the Hutu communes. The project ultimately failed, but it is an example of the 
lengths to which the Tutsi dominated regime went to officially denying the real motives for its actions. 
Divisions and cleavages within the ruling Tutsi hegemony would once again lead to a renewed cycle of 
violence in Burundi. This time the church played somewhat of a role in the ensuing violence that was to 
come. The Catholic Church, as well as several Protestant denominations, had been establishing schools 
and organizing community-based projects for rural Hutu. These activities threatened to undermine the 
carefully constructed power structures that the Tutsi rulers had created. In addition, the UPRONA party 
leaders remembered the crucial role of the Catholic Church in the "emancipation" of the Hutu masses in 
Rwanda in the 1950s. Several Church affiliated leaders also began to speak up for Hutu labor groups and 
(illegal) political parties. 
The state responded by severely restricting the activities of churches in the country. New rules were made 
restricting the appropriate days for worship and meetings. Religious broadcasts were banned and foreign 
missionaries were expelled. Religious primary schools were closed in 1977 and all religious secondary 
schools were closed in 1986. Informal 'catechism schools' organized for Hutu school children by the 
Catholic Church were also forbidden. Some 220,000 children were denied basic schooling in this manner. 
By 1987 the government had expelled approximately 550 foreign missionaries from the country. 
Increasing levels of church-state antagonism, including arbitrary arrests of several Catholic clerics, 
aroused the attention of the international community. Belgium reviewed its technical assistance program 
to Burundi in light of the human rights abuses surrounding the Church. The French also began to take 
notice. Suddenly the antagonism of church and state began to threaten a large amount of foreign exchange 
currency. In addition, several high ranking Tutsi were affiliated with the Catholic Church. The usual and 
continued nepotism and corruption of the regime also made it vulnerable to challenges of its authority by 
other Tutsi elites. The 'trigger event' of the coup of 1987 appears to have been the early 'retirement' of 
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several officers in the military due to economic austerity. One batch was dismissed in 1986, with another 
to follow in 1987. The members of this group, who saw no other options for employment in the civilian 
sector, orchestrated the bloodless coup d'etat of September 3, 1987. 
The Third Republic
The Third Republic was established with Major Pierre Buyoya as the new President of Burundi. Like his 
predecessors, President Buyoya was a Tutsi from Bururi and so much of the state's apparatus remained in 
place. Important changes were beginning, however, first with the repeal of restrictions on the Church, and 
second, with the release of several hundred Hutu political prisoners. Hopes were raised among the Hutu 
population that real change and political liberalization was in order. Student strikes were held and mainly 
Hutu students participated. Hutu were said to be engaging in clandestine meetings in the North with Hutu 
from Rwanda. Ethnic tensions increased and minor conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi began to occur 
throughout the country. The growing tension and anxiety on the part of Hutus was based in part on fears 
of a repeat of the 1972 massacres. 
Tensions were highest in the North in Ntega, Ngozi Kirundo. Proximity to Rwanda also played a role as 
there were many Tusti refugees living in the two provinces. Coffee was the main economic support for the 
region and the drop in world coffee prices in the mid 1980's heavily impacted this region. Many Hutu 
producers reaped large losses. Competition for scarce social service resources (schools, health care, etc.) 
in the region also heightened tensions. When a confidential document was discovered that showed that the 
central government in Bujumbura had requested Kirundo primary schools to report their ethnic 
breakdown of students, tensions flaired. In a climate where any mention of ethnicity was officially 
banned, the document seemed to support Hutu suspicions of admission requirements based on ethnicity 
designed to keep their children out of schools. Finally, local elections where the Hutus won 84% of the 
vote were seen to be meaningless in a context where the communal level administrator was appointed by 
the central Tutsi government. These so-called "sham elections" played a large role in exacerbating Hutu 
frustrations. As tensions began to mount the gendarmes were called in to patrol Ngozi, causing 
widespread panic among the Hutu peasants who remembered 1972 all too well. In Ntega, Reverien 
Harushingoro, a known Tutsi collaborator in the 1972 massacres, was seen showing groups of army men 
the way from hill to hill. This was the spark that set the killings in motion. 
On the night of August 14, 1988, a group of Hutu surrounded Harushingoro's house, clearly intending him 
harm. Harushingoro opened fire on the crowd, killing six people. Violence erupted and the Hutu killed 
Harushingoro and his family before fanning through the area killing Tutsi and burning their homes. Ethnic 
hatred caused a massacre of every Tutsi in sight and hundreds of civilian Tutsi lost their lives over the 
next few day. The army, of course, moved in to restore 'peace and order' and upwards of 15,000 Hutus 
were killed in retaliation. More than 50,000 Hutus fled to Rwanda to escape. Analysts agree that the fear 
of an apocalypse reminiscent of 1972 probably played a large role in the initial Hutu killings of Tutsi. The 
feelings of fear, related to earlier killings of Hutus, were sparked when troops began arriving in the area. 
Rumors, combined with the collaboration of Habushingoro in speaking with the army, led to the 
preemptive violence by Hutus. 
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Response to Massacres of 1988
The future of ethnic relations in Burundi was eerily predicted in the letter written by Hutu protesters to 
President Buyoya following the massacres: 
"Social injustices and inequalities are a reality which has been legitimized by the authorities . . 
Power in Burundi remains regional, clanic, and above all tribal, but in the meantime, 
unfortunately, the pie is getting smaller and smaller every day. . . Someday history will tell us how 
the events of Ntega and Maranga have deteriorated into a bloody conflict that spread to other 
communes. Although the story is now shoved under the rug by the media, the future will tell . . .' -
Open letter to President Buyoya by 27 leading Hutu intellectuals, 1988
The predicted violence did not happen right away, however. Compared to 1972, the difference in the 
regime's response to the massacre of 1988 was quite positive and dramatic. The difference was due in 
large part to international pressures. Unlike in 1972, when the U.S. and the world turned a blind eye to 
violence in Burundi, changes in international perspectives on human rights meant that the killings in 1988 
generated outrage on the part of the international community. The World Bank and the U.S. threatened to 
cut off financial assistance unless "national reconciliation" was achieved. International pressure did what 
it was supposed to do. On October 12, 1988 Buyoya agreed to a major reshuffling of his cabinet with the 
number of Hutu cabinet members increasing from 6 to 12. He also selected a Hutu to become Prime 
Minister. 
Under President Buyoya, Burundi was to undergo a period of increasing liberalization and integration of 
Hutu members within the government. These efforts culminated with the election in August of 1993 of 
the first ever Hutu President in Burundi's history, President Melchoir Ndadaye. This did not happen 
without struggle. The army continued to be dominated by Tutsi 'hard-liners' who wanted no part of 
democratization. Additionally, revolts by Hutu in November of 1991 in selected parts of the north of 
Burundi (Cancuzo and Cibitoke) were systematically repressed and several thousand Hutu were once 
again killed. President Buyoya also survived an abortive coup by Tutsi hardliners in March of 1992. 
The election held in August of 1993 pitted President Buyoya, a member of the traditional UPRONA party 
(primarily the party of Tutsi- but also claiming some Hutu who were encouraged by the liberalizing 
changes in the party) against the Hutu Melchoir Ndadaye, part of the FRODEBU party (Front de 
Democrates du Burundi) which came to represent the majority of Hutu in the country. The election was a 
landslide victory with FRODEBU clearly gathering the majority of votes. (See Map 4) President Buyoya 
stepped down gracefully and the Hutu people rejoiced at the fact that one of their own was in power. The 
rejoicing was to be short lived. In October of 1993 Burundi was once again thrown into the by now all too 
familiar downward spiral of ethnic violence and killing. 
Ethnic Violence Begins Again
The violence started when several units of the Tutsi dominated army stormed the Presidential Palace on 
the night of October 21, 1993, and abducted, and subsequently killed, President Ndadaye. They also killed 
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the President and Vice President of the National Assembly and three cabinet ministers. When news of the 
assassinations got to the communes, Hutu supporters of the FRODEBU party reacted with rage. Every 
Tutsi in sight, as well as Hutu UPRONA supporters, were seen as legitimate targets for attack. Tens of 
thousands of innocent Tutsi civilians lost their lives in fighting that was originally contained in the 
Northeast and Central parts of the country. Men, women, and children were hacked to death with 
machetes and Tutsi houses and fields were burned. The subsequent retaliation by Tutsi soldiers was 
equally horrific: entire Hutu communities were attacked by soldiers with machine guns. The coup of 
October 1993 ultimately failed but the damage had been done. An interim government ruled for a while 
and another military coup eventually displaced the ineffective 'transition government' in July of 1997. 
Burundi is now locked in civil war and has been since 1993. Burundi is ruled by a military-controlled 
dictatorship lead by former President Buyoya, who came once again to power in the coup of July, 1997. 
Recently, the government has taken to requiring Hutu to live in 'regroupement' camps in the interior of the 
country. This aids in solving the problem the army had faced in controlling the rural population over the 
past few years. "Hutu rebels" had continued to prevail in the communes and fight against the military, 
which controlled most of the towns. Conditions in the rural camps are said to be "horrific" in the words of 
one aid worker. The prevalence of disease and malnutrition is high. Sporadic violence continues 
throughout the country and several hundred people are killed every day. Very conservative estimates 
place the number who have been killed in the range of 160,000- 200,000 people. The conflicts in 
neighboring Rwanda and Zaire have also affected the situation in Burundi. Rwandan Hutus' systematic 
massacre of over 500,000 Tutsi has made many Burundian Tutsi reluctant to ever reconsider liberalization 
or democracy. They literally define the "problem" as a matter of Tutsi ethnic survival. The possibilities 
for a solution to the current crisis between Hutu and Tutsi seem limited at best and bleak at worst. 
The reasons that the Tutsi military ended Burundi's experiment with democracy in 1993 originate with 
two facts: 1.) Buyoya was planning to reduce the Tutsi presence in the military and to allow a more 
equitable representation of the population prevail, and 2.) Buyoya planned to return land to Burundian 
refugees who had fled Burundi in past years. The Tutsi hard-liners realized full well that the lands would 
come from current Tutsi occupiers and they felt that this was unacceptable. The actions of two units of the 
military were unfortunately enough to spark the violence that has consumed the country to this day. 
Hypotheses Linking Environmental Scarcity & Conflict in Burundi
It is clear that a multitude of factors were evident in the pattern of violence that has dominated Burundi 
since independence. A look at several trends over time in Burundian society, with the political situation as 
a backdrop, can perhaps shed some light on the situation. Several hypotheses of how conflict might 
interact with environmental scarcity in Burundi should be presented at this time. They include the 
following: 
Hypothesis #1: Hutu eruptions against Tutsi control were the result, at least in part, of 
increasing environmental scarcity due to both population growth and environmental 
degredation. Competition for these scarce resources forced Hutus to revolt against 
increasingly repressive Tutsi control. Revolts were "triggered" in part due to Tutsi 
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appropriation, through the mechanisms of the state, of those same scarce resources.
Hypothesis # 2: Conflict between Tutsi factions was a result of decreasing economic 
viability of the country's resource base due to environmental scarcity. Tutsi competitors 
viewed the state as a mechanism for gaining access to increasingly scarce resources, with 
the end result being violent conflict. 
Hypothesis # 3: Because resources were becoming increasingly scarce, episodes of killing 
by the Tutsi against the Hutu population were motivated in part by the Tutsis' desire to 
obtain access to Hutu resources.
The evidence in support of these possible hypotheses will be examined in the sections to follow. 
Population
Burundi is in the early stages of the demographic transition. While death rates from disease have fallen 
over the past 50 years or so, birth rates have not slowed enough to prevent the population from growing 
exponentially. This increase in population has contributed greatly to the pressures on the land. As 
mentioned earlier, Burundi is one of the densest nations in Africa at 230 people per square kilometer. If 
only arable land is considered, Burundi's population density approaches 551 people per kilometer squared. 
The trends in crude birth and death rates over the past fifty years in Burundi are presented in Chart 10. 
This has resulted in the exponential growth noted previously in Chart 1. Burundi's population growth 
trend best fits an exponential curve. If current growth continues, Burundi's population will approach 
12,000,000 by the year 2030. (See Chart 11). If this happens, Burundi will have a total population density 
approaching 470 people per square kilometer. Clearly Burundi must find a way to maintain a sustainable 
population by lowering its birth rate before this happens. To date, this has not been the case. Burundi's 
total fertility rate is very high at 6.8 children on average per woman. Both Burundi and Rwanda have had 
little success in lowering their fertility rates. As is evident in Chart 12, there has been little change in this 
rate since 1950. Today less than 1% of Burundian women say they use birth control at all. Changing this 
fact is crucial to Burundi being able to maintain a healthy population. The population is not divided 
evenly in Burundi. Map 3 shows population densities in Burundi by province. 
Agricultural Sector: Food
Burundi has been able to maintain increases in food production since 1961. Chart 13 shows the food 
production index for Burundi between 1961 and 1995. The index is based on 1979-1980 crop production. 
As is evident from the chart, production in 1994 was 30% higher than in 1979. Burundi also compared 
favorably with both the World and with Africa in terms of raising production levels. This growth was 
obtained primarily through improvements in agricultural practices, such as increased us of fertilizers. 
Chart 14 depicts the growth in total fertilizer consumption in Burundi. 
The growth in production is misleading, however, when you consider Burundi's population growth and its 
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relationship to total available land. Chart 15 illustrates the fact that almost all of Burundi's arable land that 
is currently being used for farming. As is evident in the graph, there has been almost no increase in arable 
or permanent cropland since 1969. Chart 16 shows the decreasing farmland available per person. The 
decline began in 1970 and has been dropping ever since. The net result is that per capita food production 
has also been steadily declining since 1979. (See Chart 17.) The precipitous drop in 1995 probably 
reflects disruptions in the agricultural season due to ethnic conflict. Burundi, although historically self-
sufficient in food, is becoming increasingly unable to feed its people. It is interesting to note also that 
although the world on a whole has been producing more food per person since 1979, Africa has done 
worse during that same time period. 
Agricultural Sector: Coffee
As noted earlier, coffee makes up 80-85% of Burundi's foreign exchange currency. The crop is also the 
main source of income for the majority of Burundians. Fluxuations in price or climate quality for growing 
coffee beans can seriously threaten Burundi's economy. The world price of coffee dropped in the 1980's. 
The effect of this drop is clearly apparent in Chart 18 which shows a steady but very slow growth in the 
GNP from 1980 through to the present. Charts 19 and 20, Gross Domestic Product Per Capita and Gross 
National Product Per Capita, both illustrate that the economy as well, did not keep up with the country's 
population growth. Since the early 1980's, the average Burundian has been getting poorer and poorer over 
time. There is little evidence to suggest, however, that environmental degredation led to decreased coffee 
production. Chart 21 shows the production of coffee from 1971 to 1989. Although coffee production has 
fluctuated over time, in response primarily to changes in world coffee prices, there is no evidence to 
suggest a trend of decreasing coffee production over time. 
Agricultural Sector: Cattle 
Cattle production is important culturally to many Burundians. Cattle in Burundi generally are not 
exported, they are stored as wealth or they are eaten at festivals, weddings, and parties. Chart 22 examines 
cattle stocks in Burundi since 1961. In 1980, total stocks of Burundian cattle started to decline rapidly. 
The reason for the precipitous decline in cattle production is unclear. The government of Burundi states 
only that "counts are inaccurate" and that "people seemed to be slaughtering more of their animals for 
cash." One possible explanation might be the decrease in available land as more marginal grazing land 
was converted to food production. Another possible theory might be that as coffee incomes dropped, rural 
farmers began relying on their cattle as a "saving account" to support them in hard times. The data could, 
however, simply reflect a change in reporting or data collection methods. The data are somewhat 
interesting but it should be noted that 98% of Burundi's total food supply comes from crop foods, and 
only 2% from cattle. Although cattle are culturally important to Burundians, the issue of cattle production 
is unlikely to have affected the majority of Burundian in the same manner that crop food production 
would have 
Fisheries 
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Fish are taken from Lake Tanganikya by Burundian fishermen at a fairly low rate considering the size of 
the population in Burundi. The data in Chart 23 shows a somewhat cyclic pattern to annual fisheries 
catches from the lake. There appears to be no evidence, however, that overall stocks have declined. Data 
from tow separate sources show very disparate findings, an illustration, perhaps, of the variability and 
inconsistency of the data. Fish are also not likely to play a large role in ethnic conflict in Burundi as they 
account for less than 1% of Burundian's food production or diet. 
Forests 
The final data I proposed examining showed that despite the fact that deforestation may be a problem in 
Burundi, it is one that happened well before independence. Forest cover is currently less than 2% of 
Burundi's land and it has stayed at that level for approximately the past 30 years. FAO data report that 
Burundi has approximately only 85,000 hectares of forest cover left, mostly in national parks that are 
poorly maintained and at risk for people seeking firewood. Changes in access to forest resources, 
however, are unlikely to have had much effect on ethnic violence in Burundi, as they have been low and 
relatively constant until quite recently. 
Conclusions 
The initial analysis showed that, if any renewable resources are likely to have played a part in Burundi's 
ethnic violence, that resource was access to land. The data also highlight the fact that population growth 
has played a tremendous role in environmental scarcity in Burundi. 
Conservative estimates for ethnic violence, when plotted against population growth as in Chart 24, and 
cropland per person, Chart 25, do appear to show a somewhat positive correlation between violence and 
scarcity of land. The sharp increase in population that began in 1970 corresponds with the sharp increase 
in violence noted in 1972. Additionally, there was a marked decrease in available cropland that 
immediately preceded the violence of 1972. 
What about the spatial data? Did violence occur in Burundi in areas where scarcity of land was a problem, 
or was there no association at all? Results from studying maps of outbreaks of violence in Burundi (See 
Map 5.) shows that in the earlier periods of violence, 1965 and 1972, there appears to be little correlation 
between where the violence began and where population densities were highest. In 1965, violence did 
erupt in the two most densely populated provinces, Bujumbura and Muramvya, but politics probably 
played a much greater role in this than environmental scarcity. Bujumbura was the capital city and 
Muramvya was the site of the deposed monarchy. In 1972, violence began when Hutus in exile from the 
repression of the late sixties attacked from across the border of Tanzania. The outbreaks of violence were 
initially focused, therefore, in the South and East of the country, areas with relatively low population 
densities. It should be noted, however, that the violence in 1972, although it began in the South and East, 
quickly spread to encompass all of Burundi. Some historical evidence indicates, moreover, that Tutsi were 
in fact appropriating land from Hutus during the massacres that occurred at this time. 
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In the more recent outbreak of violence, there appears to be a higher degree of correlation between 
violence and population densities. (See Map 6.) This higher degree of correlation in 1993 would be 
appropriate, given that over time land has become increasingly more scarce (as per capita land availability 
has decreased). In 1991, violence erupted to a smaller degree in Cankuzo and Cibitoke, areas with 
medium population densities. One more interesting correlation may be noted in Map 7, which shows the 
results of the Presidential elections of 1993. There appears to be a loose association between population 
density and discontent with the ruling UPRONA party. Those provinces with the highest population 
densities were also the ones most likely to register discontent with the status quo and to vote for the 
opposition party of FRODEBU. Map 8 displays population density, election results and violence on one 
map. 
I also studied a map of coffee production by province, as it has been suggested that in 1988 it was not, in 
fact, access to agricultural land which caused distress in Burundi's Northern regions, but in fact, declines 
in world coffee prices in the Eighties. The map presented shows that Burundi's two largest producers of 
coffee in 1988 were Karuzi and Kayanza, neither of which were the location of the outbreaks of violence 
in 1988. (See Map 9. ) Violence was most serious in 1988 in Kirundo and Ngozi provinces. It does seem 
probable to suppose, however, that decline in coffee prices in the Eighties, which led to governmental 
financial difficulties, was the cause of the Tusti elites fight for power and the Coup d'Etat of 1987 that 
placed President Buyoya in power. It was the "forced retirement" of several Tutsi military elites that 
sparked the coup. The uncertain period which followed probably contributed to the likelihood of violence 
and tension that resulted. Violence was highest, however, in areas where there was the most pressure for 
land. 
Based upon the small amount of evidence presented, therefore, I believe there is support for Hypothesis # 
1 and Hypothesis # 3, but not Hypothesis # 2. Most Tutsi were dependent upon the state for their income 
and resources. The financial viability of the state was and is dependent upon coffee production. Total 
production of coffee did not appear to be declining throughout the 1960 - 1993 time period. On the 
contrary, coffee production (See Chart 21), continued to rise throughout the 70s and 80s, although in a 
sporadic manner. The stagnation of income by the government, and hence the Tutsi, therefore, probably 
had less to do with environmental limits and much more to do with international market forces. 
Hypothesis # 1 and Hypothesis # 3 may also have both been salient possibilities for explaining the 
violence in 1988, 1991, and in 1993. In 1993 this is especially the case because the violence began when 
the government was in the process of handing both land and positions within the military to long 
neglected Hutus. As Homer-Dixon's theory correctly predicts, Burundi has experienced an increase in the 
amount of violence as environmental scarcity has grown. The theory also predicts the nature of the 
violence that plagues Burundi today. Violence in Burundi is diffuse and sub-national. It also resulted in 
first a decline in the ability of the government to control its territory and now an even greater 
militarization of political and social life in Burundi. 
V. Discussion 
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Policy Implications 
The results of this analysis highlight, I believe, a number of important issues in attempting to break the 
cycle of escalating violence in Burundi. The first notes the role that the international community can play 
in Burundi. The fact that democratization and liberalization happened in response to international pressure 
must not be forgotten. The international community has disassociated itslef from Burundi since the coup 
d'etat placing President Buyoya in power once again. Imports and exports from Burundi have been 
stopped. I believe that this strategy is misguided in light of evidence that economic deprivation is only 
likely to heighten tensions in Burundi. Coffee exports in particular should be resumed. 
The international community also, I believe, has a responsibility to actively prevent further tragedy in 
Burundi. It is not unrealistic to suppose that a similar level of violence to that of Rwand in 1994, where 
over half a million people were killed, might also happen in Burundi. An international peace-keeping 
force could prove invaluable in stopping the immediate violence from escalating. If Burundi's army 
continues to be controlled by the Tutsi, any future prospects for peace seem unlikely. Indeed, the 
prospects for peace decline with each new death. Violence and human rights abuses continue daily in 
Burundi and must be stopped by the international community if massive and large scale massacres are to 
be avoided. The fact that many Hutu males have been placed in "regroupement" camps by the army is 
ominous, especially in light of the 1972 massacres in Burundi. 
Long term solutions to Burundi's problems include an increased focus on holding those responsible for the 
killings accountable. An effort to improve the judicial system in Burundi is essential, and a public and 
honest accounting for past crimes is the only way to ensure futrue security and to build trust in the 
political system. 
An increased focus on population issues must also be incorporated to help solve Burundi's long term 
problems. Access to agricultural land is only likely to decrease, and ignoring the reality of demographic 
pressures is irresponsible. Efforts should be made to improve access to contraceptives as well as to 
improve the education of women in an effort to lower the very high fertility rates of Burundian women. 
Finally, improvements in agricultural productivity are essential for Burundi's long term stability. It is clear 
that Burundi will be forced to improve the productivity of the land if the country is to survive. Although 
some improvements, such as fertilizer use, have occurred, there is tremendous potential to be explored. 
Research is urgently needed to develop integrated, sustainable systems capable of producing greater 
yields from the land. This research should take into account the physical limits inherent in Burundi's 
climate and geographical location. 
Problems with the Analysis and Directions for Future Research 
The most serious problems with the analysis in this paper stems from the fact hat accurate information 
about violence in Burundi is difficult to obtain. There have been very strong incentives for the 
government of Burundi to hide evidence of massacres and deaths. The international community has been 
unable to document adequately even past abuses from 1972. More recent violence, because it is still 
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continuing today, poses its own problems in terms of locating accurate information. 
Information about ethnicity and access to property or land would also be invaluable in an expanded 
analysis of this topic. For political reasons, discussion of ethnicity was banned for many years in Burundi. 
It is only recently that the Tutsi elite have begun to speak about ethnic differences, usually in an attempt 
to defend the need for a Tutsi dominated army to "protect" them as a minority in a majority Hutu country. 
Further research would look at issues of land ownership in Burundi and specifically at transfers of land 
titles from Hutu to Tutsi or vice versa. 
Finally, although there does appear to be a correlation between environmental scarcity an the more recent 
violence in Burundi, it is difficult to prove causality. This problem was mentioned earlier in connection 
with Thomas Homer-Dixon's analysis of violence and environmental scarcity. Case studies of the 
correlation between environmental scarcity and violence are only ne first step towards proving the 
possible links. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________  
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The Urbanization Transition in Russia 
Seema Iyer 
  
Urbanization Transition Theory 
At the center of urbanization is the city, which is an ancient manifestation of cultural, political, and 
economic activity. Cities grow due to the positive feedback cycle of an increasing population requiring a 
variety of employment, social centers, and physical amenities, which in turn require a minimum population 
for sustainability. In western countries, relatively recent interjectors into this cycle of growth were mass 
production and the Industrial Revolution which transformed the city from an agricultural outpost to an 
economic entity in its own right. Classical, monocentric cities arose out of industrial necessity in the 19th 
century when proximity to both markets and raw materials were essential due to high transportation costs. 
Today in the developed nations, urbanization is no longer fueled by industrialization and no longer requires 
the concentration of households with employment centers. Yet, the phenomenon continues in industrialized 
countries and throughout the world, albeit with resoundingly diverse consequences. As one in a family of 
transitions, the urbanization transition behaves as a metaphorical petri dish by providing the physical space 
for the other transitions to grow and mature. Unlike its biological counterpart, however, the space itself is in 
transition, thereby altering the nature of the other transitions’ progression. Thus, in an effort to build upon 
the theory of population-environment dynamics, the urbanization transition must be dissected further into the 
transition of its spatial configuration. To clarify these distinctions, urbanization can be conceptually defined 
as the conversion of agricultural land for commercial, industrial, or settlement purposes. The spatial 
configuration of the urbanization can be either centralized, having a well-defined focal point, or 
decentralized, having multiple focal points or an even distribution of activity. The purpose of this study is to 
identify a possible temporal hierarchy between the spatial patterns of urban areas and the conditions under 
which one configuration may transition to another. 
The existence of concentrated or diffused urban areas is primarily dependent on population movement. 
Migration patterns within a country are influenced by mobility via transportation networks and employment 
opportunities within the economic system, both of which are intricately related to the political infrastructure. 
Since the US has been politically constant for the past two centuries, the spatial transition among and within 
urban areas can be used as a barometer for countries experiencing political upheaval. The general trend 
nationally is of the spread of urban areas from the coastal metropolises of Los Angeles and the Boston-
Washington, DC corridor into the less monolithic towns of the south and southwestern heartland. Locally, 
suburbanization around metropolitan areas has significantly encroached into the agricultural hinterland of 
each city not only due to the general population increase but also due to an out-migration of households and 
businesses from the center. This mode of development was facilitated by an extensive transportation 
network of railways and roadways, which has rendered the cost of mobility negligible. Slightly less 
obviously, an increased accumulation of national wealth has brought urban amenities such as electricity, 
communications, and even cultural variety to the rural areas so that differences between the two lifestyles 
have become more subjective. The decentralization of urban areas in the US, however, is dependent on the 
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historical precedent of the centralized cities. This means that diffusion has not sprouted spontaneously but 
has occurred because of spatial adjacency to other urban areas. 
From Czarist Russia to the Russian Federation 
Urbanization in Russia lies in stark contrast to the transitions in the US and the remaining western world. 
The fundamental difference in the nature of the population movement dictated by the ideological agenda was 
translated into a different spatial path. In order to understand how such extreme political and economic 
experimentation could have occurred in Russia, at least a cursory overview of the nation’s history is 
necessary to provide insights regarding the Russian people and their relationship with their government. 
Russia’s predecessor citystate, Muscovy, came into existence in the 14th century and was ruled by the 
despotic Romanov dynasty until 1917. The fact that one family ruled the country for more than 500 years 
differentiates Russia from most other countries around the world. Unlike its European neighbors who had 
emerged from the Middle Ages by the 15th century, Russia existed as a feudal state until 1863. Population 
movement was severely restricted as serfs were indentured to the land for life. Contemporaneous with the 
abolition of slavery in the US in 1861, the reigning Czar’s decree to eradicate serfdom was not instigated by 
an uprising of the peasantry but instead was in response to international pressure. Unfortunately, many 
policies were implemented, similarly to the antebellum Jim Crow laws in the US, to insure that the serfs had 
very little de facto freedom. Since the peasants were not granted the right to own the land they had been 
cultivating, many began to flee to the cities due to the lack of opportunities in the rural areas. In order to 
appease the grumbling landowners, an internal passport system was quickly developed to curb migration. In 
fact, railroad development was not a national priority during this time specifically to hinder population 
movement. Russia remained an agrarian society throughout this time, but the inequality between the rural 
and urban regions became extremely acute. 
While the intricate factors that lead to the "Red" Revolution in 1917 are beyond the scope of this paper, the 
fact that the Marxist-Leninist movement was distinctly urban-oriented is relevant to understanding the nature 
of the subsequent urbanization that occurred within the newly-formed Soviet Union. The government that 
eventually usurped power from the Romanovs had a philosophy regarding the 19th century capitalist city that 
was heavily influenced by the Communist Manifesto, written by Marx and Engels in 1848 decrying the 
degradation of the proletariat in large, industrial cities. The irony of the situation lay in the fact that Russia 
was an agrarian society at the time of the Revolution, and urban squalor was not nearly at the level of other 
European metropolises. Yet, the new leaders believed that industrialization was the wave of the future and 
would legitimize the new communist state to the rest of the world. The aggressive pursuance of economic 
development via industrialization was largely responsible for an explosion of urban growth (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Level of urbanization by major world regions based on an urban definition of 20,000 or over. The level of 
urbanization at the time of the 1917 Revolution was much less than in the rest of Europe but the subsequent rate of 
increase for the Soviet Union was significantly faster than in any other region. 
(Source of data: Lewis, Rowland p. 171) 
With the desire to circumvent the urban degradation suffered by European cities, Soviet leaders incorporated 
the Marxist doctrine of equality into the distribution of urban life and urban land. Policies were designed to 
promote regional equality by eliminating the distinction between "town and country". As almost all of the 
urban growth occurred under socialism, the spatial manifestation of Marxist-Leninist ideals created a 
fundamentally new social geography based on an evenly dispersed population and the development of small- 
to medium-sized cities. With a centrally planned economy, it was theoretically possible to manipulate 
populations in accordance with state objectives. In order to redistribute the population, migration from the 
largest urban areas to under-populated areas was directly or indirectly encouraged through the creation of 
industrial cities in remote and/or rural areas. Borrowing a tool from economics, the degree to which Soviet 
policies achieved population dispersal can be determined. The Lorenz curve and the Gini concentration ratio 
are used in combination to measure the state of inequality using the cumulative percentage of population and 
the cumulative percentage of some economic indicator (see Figure 2). In a study done by Demko and Fuchs 
(5, p. 56), a demographic indicator was used over time to determine trends in urban concentration or 
deconcentration. The Gini index was calculated for the economic regions of the Soviet Union (see Figure 3) 
using the formula 
, 
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where M is the mean size of all urban centers C. If G = 0, this implies total dispersion of the urban 




Figure 2: The Lorenz curve plotted in relation to the line of "equality". Typically, the curve is a discrete function as 
opposed to continuous, since data is collected as a series of points.  
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Figure 3: Gini indices of the concentration of urban areas by economic region and total of the Soviet Union. 
Source of data: Demko/Fuchs p. 63 
The figure shows that in spite of an initial increase in the urban concentration due to industrialization, 
intervention efforts to diffuse the urban population regionally did affect the index nationally. Urban 
concentration west of the Urals and specifically in the Northwest (St. Petersburg) dramatically declined, 
whereas in West and East Siberia the urban concentration increased. 
The notion of an optimal city size was widely accepted in the Soviet Union as an essential element of urban 
policy. Beginning in the 1920s, cities with 50,000-60,000 people were considered ideal because large 
enough for economic sustainability yet small enough for the fostering of communal allegiances. However, as 
resources were solely being funneled to the urban areas, people in the rural areas were attracted to them by 
the mere expectation of better opportunities. In order to hold the cumulative processes of urban growth and 
high rates of labor turnover in check, Stalin introduced the propiska system in the 1930s, reminiscent of the 
internal passport issued during the Czarist era, which remained in effect until 1992. As the population 
continued to grow, redistribution became more and more difficult, and so the urban planners simply 
increased the acceptable population for a city. By the mid-50s the figures ranged from 150,000-200,000, and 
by the mid-60s, the figures moved to the 200,000-300,000 range. The only two cities with over a million 
population in 1917 were Moscow and St. Petersburg, and despite planners’ visions and efforts, the 
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proportion of urban dwellers in cities with more than a million increased greater than in any other city size 
group (see Figure 4). By 1991, over two dozen cities existed with more than one million inhabitants. 
 
Figure 4: Percent of urban population living in each city size group. Although contrary to the central planners 
intention, the percentage living in cities of one million or more grew dramatically. 
Source of data: Bater, p. 139 
As mentioned previously, conversion to an industrialized society was effected by the creation of cities that 
were locationally in accordance with the precepts of Marxist geography. The employment opportunities 
within the urban areas were generated by the central government based on their logistical relevance to the 
national socialist economy, which was practically synonymous with the military economy. The war 
economy was propagandized for the "unobjectionable" pursuit of the union of the world’s workers but 
furtively sought to establish the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and beyond. The rationale for locating 
military towns in the remote, hidden areas of the Urals served the dual purpose of promoting national 
security and dispersing the population. But, paradoxically, many towns within European Russia itself were 
militarized as well. The distinction between militarization and industrialization is vague due to 
interconnectedness of the military and civilian economies. For example, in 1990, 100% of all sewing 
machines, television sets, radios, videocassette recorders, cameras, and chain saws in the country were 
produced in a defense complex (Gaddy, p. 20). The non-defense single-enterprise town, defined as a city 
with population 100,000 or more where 30% of the population are employed in one enterprise, became 
prevalent in the Soviet Union. The economy of scope is a concept that describes the conditions under which 
one firm will produce two outputs at a lower cost than would two separate firms. Soviet planners employed 
this concept to the process of planning itself; the agglomerate allocation of publicly owned resources within 
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each city possessed an economy of scope over more discrete allocations. Many towns were placed in areas 
without regard to the location of factor inputs or potential markets for outputs so that an efficient 
transportation system was essential for successful economic integration. While a concerted effort was 
implemented to create extensive road, rail, and waterway networks, the extreme weather conditions east of 
the Urals rendered large expanses of land accessible only by air. The network for the various modes of 
transport was developed in series, as opposed to in parallel, which meant that if one link along a travel path 
broke down, there was no alternative route to continue towards a destination. 
The human topography inherited by the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992 
was a piecemeal dispersal of isolated urban areas. The economic foundation that united the areas and 
supported their existence has swiftly collapsed. During the first few years of the transition from a planned to 
market economy, urban areas have declined due to a net natural decrease of the urban population 
compounded by a net urban out-migration (Rowland). Disaggregating the data, however, reveals that while 
some towns are declining or disappearing altogether, others are increasing in population. The decline of 
cities within 50 miles of Moscow has been referred to as Viennaization, the decline of a city that no longer 
serves as the capital of an "empire". The majority of declining towns are very small urban centers, 
particularly noticeable in the string of towns created along the Trans-Siberian Railroad and Baikal-Amur 
Mainline, which are both in terrible states of disrepair. Disappearing towns are both small in size and 
relatively newly-formed, which means, relating back to the positive feedback cycle for urban growth, that a 
sufficient stock of people had not yet accumulated in these cities to overcome the negative feedback of out-
migration. As Figure 4 shows, the percentage of urban population has increased since 1992 in cities with 
populations between 100,000 and 999,999. Within this category are the secret military towns, located 
primarily in the Urals, which were previously closed to the general public. These cities had a higher standard 
of living and higher wages both regionally and nationally and employed an extremely educated workforce. 
Due to the sensitive nature of the missile and nuclear bases around which these cities were built, 
international funds have been invested into these towns thereby building an economic base and attracting 
people from the rural areas. 
Moscow 
The spatial configuration of urbanization within the city boundary is dependent upon the micro-level 
interaction over space of housing, employment opportunities, and transportation networks. Prior to 1992, 
central planners controlled the construction of housing and transit systems and created the jobs, thereby 
actively configuring the socialist city. A marked difference between capitalistic and socialistic cities lies in 
the nature and intensity of land use. In the Soviet system, political and bureaucratic power governed the use 
and quantity of land consumed. As cities expanded, new rings of development were added to the periphery 
of the existing city. Within each concentric ring, land use reflected the demography, technology, and 
resources at the time when the ring was developed. For example, except for Moscow’s historic city center, 
the Kremlin, all urban growth occurred after 1917. A ring of industrial development approximately 5-7 
kilometers from the center was built in the 1920s (see Figure 7c). Housing was assigned based on 
availability, and as the population continued to grow, land for the construction of new settlements was 
allotted beyond the industrial ring and successive residential rings. In a market city, changing land prices 
exert pressure simultaneously in all area of the city, which can provide powerful incentives to recycle 
already developed land in the inner rings when the existing use is not economically optimal. For households, 
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the cost of housing was uniformly low in proportion to household income (2%), and transportation costs 
were constant regardless of the distance from the urban center. One of the preliminary steps along Russia’s 
road to a market economy is the privatization of stated-owned goods and services. Of all the economic 
resources switching over to private ownership, the one acutely altering the landscape within cities is the land 
market itself. In a market economy, housing prices and transportation costs vary over distance and therefore, 
constitute the most important factors determining quantity and location of land consumed for housing. In 
order to anticipate the consequences of introducing demand-driven housing prices into Moscow, the 
following model of basic residential choice in a city with land markets isolates the effect that distance has on 
the rent and quantity of housing. 
Assumptions for the model (Fujita):
1.  The city is monocentric; it has a single pre-specified center of fixed size called the central business 
district (CBD). All job opportunities are located in the CBD.
2.  There is a dense, radial transport system. It is free of congestion. Furthermore, the only travel is that 
of workers commuting between residences and work places.
3.  The land is a featureless plain. All land parcels are identical and ready for residential use.
Let: z = composite consumer good (numeraire) 
H = housing quantity (floor space) 
Y = income per unit time 
r = distance from CBD 
R(r) = unit price of floor area at r 
T(r) = transport (commuting) cost at r 
 
Then the residential choice of the household can be expressed as the following utility function: 
, subject to z + R(r)H = Y − T(r) 
where r ≥ 0, z > 0, H > 0 (i.e. both z and H are essential). 
Further assumptions on the utility function:
1.  well-behaved utility function in terms of strict convexity
2.  increasing transport cost
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3.  differentiable where
> 0, > 0, and > 0 
Housing bid-rent function 
Bid rent is a theoretical concept that describes a household’s ability to pay for land under a fixed 
utility level. The market rent structure of a city arises from the interaction of many households. 
Define bid rent as the maximum rent per unit of land that the household can pay for residing 
at distance r while enjoying a fixed utility level u. Then, mathematically
 
where  represents the rent per unit of land at r. Solving for z using the equation for the 
indifference curve yields: , solve for z ⇒ z = Z(H, u).
Thus, the unconstrained maximization problem becomes: 
 
The solution to this problem yields the optimal floor space H(r, u) which is called the bid-max lot 
size. Through an application of the envelope theorem, the rate of change of bid rent with respect to r 
can be calculated as (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Bid rent decreases with distance Figure 6: Floor space increases with distance 
  
Using economic concepts regarding the nature of the demand for housing, the rate of change of the 
bid-max lot size with respect to r becomes  (see Figure 6). Roughly, population 
density is the inverse of the bid-max lot size function, therefore, the population density curve 
decreases in r similarly to the bid rent function. 
 
For a household to attain a particular utility level, both of the conditions for bid rent and bid-max lot size 
must be hold true; a household will be equally happy choosing commuting a farther distance to the 
employment center as long as the rent is cheaper and the living space is greater. The eventual equilibrium for 
this model occurs when the utility among all residents is equal throughout the city. This means that there is 
not incentive to move within the city because of the tradeoffs between commuting costs and rent for housing 
closer or farther from the center. While the initial assumptions may appear too hypothetical for the model to 
apply to a real life situation, the conditions in Moscow, a representative socialist city, are not too far 
removed. Since job density continually increases with proximity to the center, Moscow an be characterized 
as being monocentric (see Figure 7b). The metro system, which is the primary mode used for commuting, 
can be characterized as a dense, radial transport system. Located in the heartland of European Russia, 
Moscow’s growth is unencumbered by political or natural boundaries, so that for land use purposes, it can be 
considered a featureless plain. 
 The actual situation in Moscow as of 1992 shows that housing space is greatest in the center, and while a 
rent gradient does not exist, the population density increases with distance from the center (see Figure 7a). 
So the spatial configuration transition in Moscow began as a centralized urban area in 1917 but transformed 
into a decentralized megalopolis by 1992. The key difference between Moscow and decentralized cities in 
the US (Detroit for example) is the centrally located employment.  
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Figure 7a: Gross population density in Moscow (1992). 
  
 
Figure 7b: Job density in Moscow (1992). 
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Figure 7c: Job density in Moscow (1992). 
Source of data (a-c): Bertaud/Renaud, p. 141-145 
Other transitions 
Certainly many other transitions have generally affected the urbanization transition in Russia, but the 
demographic and bureaucratic transitions specifically influenced population movement, which is at the root 
of determining the spatial configuration within and among urban areas. Demographically, the urban 
population has risen at nearly the same rate as the total population since 1950 (see Figure 8).   Trends in 
Urban and Rural Population in Russia 
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Figure 8: Possible trends of urban and total population in Russia projected to 2002. The rate of total population 
increase has been projected to slow down (log. Total population) because of the current negative rate of annual 
increase. The low rate of birth seems to be temporal, however, while Russia progresses through its economic 
transition. The rate of population increase is more likely to continue relatively linearly. 
Source of data: WRD 
The population movement appears to be shifting both nationally and locally. Aside from the large-scale 
emigration beyond Russia’s borders, the remaining population seems hesitant to migrate internally due to the 
physical and psychological dislocation between the different regions within Russia. Additionally, the lack of 
free-flowing information regarding potential employment opportunities hinders people from risking a long-
distance migration for fear of the unknown. As of 1992, the only regions experiencing net in-migration (1-
2%) were the southern European Russia and the northern Caucasus. The advantages readily apparent to these 
areas are the existence of undeveloped land already equipped with a physical infrastructure, access to the 
Black and Caspian Seas, and a warmer climate. Population shifts in and around the larger cities are also 
occurring. Since the emergence of property markets in 1992, the price gradient for housing seems to be 
downward sloping from the center of the city, based on the analysis of initial sales of apartments in Moscow 
[Bertaud/Renaud]. The trend seems to be conforming to the model, which could imply that the population 
density curve is rotating, i.e. sloping downward from a peak in the center. 
The communist government’s regulatory policies over population movement were directly responsible for 
creating the vast, decentralized settlements in Russia. Seen in a broader historical context, the control 
imposed by the Soviet era bureaucracy was very similar to level possessed by the Czarist regime it 
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overthrew. The Russian society has historically passed from one totalitarian leader to another. In fact, the 
cycle for the bureaucratic transition has passed through extreme peaks and troughs in intensity during this 
century alone (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9: Hypothetical comparison of the bureaucratic transition in Russia and the US. For example, the two low 
points in Russia’s trend might correspond to the anarchy after the 1917 Revolution and the general lawlessness since 
1992. US peaks might correspond to the eras of the New Deal and Great Society. 
However, reversion to a authoritarian government would not be surprising even today. Long periods of time 
of democratic rule in Russia simply do not exist. Even further back into Russia’s history, the Romanov era 
was preceded by the occupation of Ghengis Khan’s Golden Horde, two centuries of notorious subjugation of 
the Slavic people. 
Implications and recommendations 
Returning to transition theory, the trajectories of several, fundamental transitions are simultaneously 
undergoing rapid changes in Russia. Predictions about the changing spatial configuration of urban areas 
during this critical stage of the broader transition may help pinpoint policies for stabilizing the other 
transitions. While a definite conclusion about eventual stasis is naïve at best, some features of the current 
pattern may suggest characteristics of future urbanization. Firstly, Russia population will remain 
predominantly urban not only because the built environment already exists but also because they have 
moved sufficiently far away from their agricultural roots. Also, while out-migration from some areas east of 
the Urals will exceed any other part of the country, the Siberian region as a whole will remain populated 
because of the vast amounts of untapped, natural resources that are much sought after by the international 
world. 
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A comparison of Russia’s transition to the barometer transition in the US also identifies distinguishing 
characteristics of possible outcomes. Via two divergent paths, the urban areas in both the US and Russia 
have decentralized spatially, however, the key difference between the configurations lies in the 
implementation of Marxist social geography in Russia. Equality based on the concentration of urban areas 
should have been normalized in some way by the physical geography, which is inherently unequal. Today, 
agglomerations of artificially created urban areas are not locationally continuous in Russia, and they are 
even more disconnected due to the insufficient physical infrastructure. Transportation costs are now an 
enormous factor in determining location for industry, retail, and housing. When this was true in the 
developing countries, urban areas developed centrally. The pattern of migration over short distances 
suggests that smaller towns may be collapsing into adjacent or proximate larger towns. Larger does not 
necessarily imply more populated. Migration will occur to areas with employment opportunities, and the 
lands west and east of the Urals provide different economic possibilities. European Russia has the 
geographic advantage over Asian Russia in terms of proximity to potential international trade markets and a 
well-networked transportation system, but the eastern frontier possesses unfathomable resources for the 
creative mind. Within the cities experiencing in-migration, housing, employment and commercialization 
should be intertwined instead of developed into separate rings around the center. For example, the industrial 
rings around the Kremlin should incorporate more housing so that people can have access to residences 
closer to the center. Of course, the environmental realities of the area might make the site inappropriate for 
housing. Therefore, new businesses should be encouraged to locate where the population is densest—the 
periphery. For cities experiencing out-migration, the "white elephants" of development will not be 
maintained unless there is an economic incentive to do so. 
In order to institutionalize the current democratic and economic reforms, true political authority should be 
regionalized throughout Russia so that people are enfranchised to create their own destiny. In terms of future 
research, it would be interesting to watch as regions politically break free from the center and start 
developing their own vision.   
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Prospects for Agricultural Sustainability in the Red River Delta of Vietnam 
Daria Kim
Preface  
The Red River Delta of Vietnam is an area of dense human settlement and intensive land use. In the past, the region’s 
villagers have been able to increase production sufficient to cope with increased population. Whether further increases in 
population can be supported by the land and whether current high levels of production can be sustained are questions 
which have yet to be answered. This paper attempts to answer these questions in the specific context of an agricultural 
village, Nguyen Xa, in the densely settled Red River Delta province of Thai Binh.  
Nguyen Xa was selected because it represented the extreme case of population pressures on natural resources in Vietnam. 
This paper will draw upon fieldwork jointly conducted in 1991 and 1992 by researchers from the Southeast Asian 
Agroecosystem Network (SUAN), the Program on Environment at the East West Center, the Southeast Asian 
Agroecosystem Network (SUAN), Center for Natural Resources Management and Environmental Studies at Hanoi 
University, and Hanoi Agricultural University.  
This paper will be comprised of three different sections: the first section will focus on presenting an introduction to the 
region and providing specific information relevant to the understanding of this paper; the second section will present the 
village of Nguyen Xa, and briefly discuss certain key issues that might contribute to our analysis of the region’s 
sustainability; the last section will explore the issues of rural development in the Red River Delta, and how Nguyen Xa’s 




The country of Vietnam is located in the southeastern region of the Indochina 
peninsula, bordered by the South China Sea. It occupies a space of 331,668 square 
kilometers, and has a north-south distance of 1,650 kilometers. Vietnam is 
composed of hills and densely forested mountains, with mountains occupying 40 
percent of the country, hills 40 percent, and forests 70 percent. The north consists 
of the highlands and the Red River Delta; the south is divided into coastal 
lowlands, the central mountains, and the Mekong River Delta.  
Vietnam has a tropical monsoon climate, with humidity averaging 84 percent 
throughout the year. However, because of differences in latitude and the marked 
variety of topographical relief, the climate tends to vary considerably from place 
to place. During the winter or dry season, extending roughly from November to 
April, the monsoon winds usually blow from the northeast along the China coast 
and across the Gulf of Tonkin, picking up considerable moisture; consequently the 
winter season in most parts of the country is dry only by comparison with the 
rainy or summer season. During the southwesterly summer monsoon, occurring 
from May to October, the heated air of the Gobi Desert rises, far to the north, 
inducing moist air to flow inland from the sea and deposit heavy rainfall. (Library 
of Congress Web Site, 1985)  
Annual rainfall ranges from 120 centimeters to 300 centimeters. Nearly 90 percent 
of the precipitation occurs during the summer. Temperatures range from a low of 
5°C in December and January, the coolest months, to more than 37°C in April, the 
hottest month. Seasonal divisions are more clearly marked in the northern half 
than in the southern half of the country seasonal temperatures vary only a few 
degrees, usually in the 21°C-28°C range. (Rambo, 1993)
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Figure 1.1 Country of Vietnam
  
Vietnam’s current population is 78.4 million with an 
average population density of 220 persons/km2. The 
life expectancy rate is about 67 years, the literacy 
rate is 87 percent, and the per capita GNP is US 
$230. Vietnam provides elementary education for 9 
million children and basic family planning services to 
about 15 million women. There is a 54 percent use 
rate of contraceptives by married women which is a 
remarkable drop in fertility rate in the last 2 years. 
(See Figure 1.2) Despite the fertility drop, the annual 
growth rate is still 2.1 percent. According to 
conservative estimates, there will be approximately 
80 million Vietnamese citizens by the year 2000, 
with the Word Resources Database estimating the 
population to be 82 million. (Xenos, 1993)
  
  
Family planning has been actively pursued as a national policy since the early 1960s, and the province of Thai Binh 
especially has pursued this with enthusiasm. Contraceptive information is available in health clinics which are open to 
both men and women, and there are also media campaigns offered through various organizations in the village. Table 
1.1 shows that province wide, 66% of the current female population in 1990 were acceptors of various planning 
methods, versus 43.9 percent of the national level. Thi Xa is the provincial capital and it has the highest percentage 
of acceptors. And Dong Hung, where Nguyen Xa is located is slightly below the provincial average. (Xenos, 1993) 
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The Red River Delta, a flat, triangular region of 3,000 square kilometers, is smaller but more intensely developed and 
more densely populated than the Mekong River Delta. (See Figure 1.3) This region was once an inlet of the Gulf of Tonkin, 
but since has been filled in by the alluvial deposits of the river system over a period of a millenium, and it continues to 
advance one hundred meters into the gulf annually. (Neher, 1995)  
The Red River Delta climate is tropical monsoon, and has two distinct seasons: rainy and dry. The rainy season lasts from 
April to October with 80 – 100 days providing around 1450 – 1650 mm of rainfall during the season. The dry season is 
from November to March with 40 days providing almost 150 mm of rainfall during the season. Average humidity is 82 – 
88 percent and the potential evaporation is between 900 and 1000 mm/yr. The total average radiation is 120 kcall/cm2/yr 
with the yearly average temperature registering around 23 degrees C. 
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The Red River Delta is comprised of six provinces: Hanoi, Hai Phong, Ha Nam Ninh, Ha Son Binh, Hai Hung, and Thai 
Binh. These six provinces can be further subdivided into three topographic regions as follows:  
1.  The Midlands – a region of low hills and mountains which make up the land borders of the delta. The soils of these regions 
are fertile but the land is seriously eroded because of high rates of deforestation. 
2.  The Delta Plains – the flat plains made up of alluvial depositions from the Red River and its tributaries. These soils are also 
highly fertile, but alluvial deposit rates are lowering because of the limiting influences of the dyke system. Nguyen Xa in the 
Province of Thai Binh is located in this area. 
3.  The Coastal Regions – has the youngest alluvial soils, but is currently experiencing alluvial deposits and sea encroachment. 
(Le Trong Cuc, 1990) 
The Red River Delta region of North Vietnam, which encompasses the Midlands to the north of the delta has a total area 
of 17,321 square kilometers . Although the delta makes up only 5 percent of the total area of Vietnam, its population makes 
up 21 percent of the country’s total. Currently, 83 percent of its 13.6 million inhabitants live in rural areas with the 
average density in the low lands of the delta at about 923 persons/km2 . The average growth rate in the entire delta region is 
1.7 percent with Thai Binh registering the lowest growth rate at 1.4 percent. (Xenos, 1993)  
The hydrology of the Red River Delta is dominated by the Red River system and the Thai Binh River System. The Red 
River’s flow is high and carries with it rich alluvium. The Thai Binh River’s capacity on the other hand is not as rich, with 
a lower amount of potassium than that of the Red River, with higher acidity. Flooding is still the most frequent hazard in 
the area but the extensive dyke system used to control water flow has created a control mechanism for this. Years of 
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continued alluvial deposits along the walls of the dykes has raised the water level during the rainy seasons several 
meters higher than surrounding delta plains. Thus flooding remains a very real threat. (Patanothai, 1996) 
  
Almost all of the cultivated 
land in the Red River 
Delta is used to grow rice 
with a small proportion of 
the land used to grow cash 
or other crops. (see Figure 
1.4) There are two distinct 
rice crop seasons in North 
Vietnam: Winter/Spring 
and Summer/Autumn. In 
addition to the rice crops, 
farmers have also used 
periods between the 
seasons to grow a variety 
of additional crops, winter 
tropical-derived crops 
(maize, soybean, garlic) 
and late winter temperate 
zone-derived crops 
(potato, cabbage, wheat). 
Thus, farmers have been 
able to take advantage of 
all the possible agricultural 
niches and conditions to 





II . Nguyen Xa   
Nguyen Xa farmers have been involved in intensive rice cultivation for hundreds of years. Because of a variety of factors, 
including location, elevation, and soil composition, Nguyen Xa has a history of consistently producing some of the highest 
yields in the Red River Delta. Over the past 50 years, Nguyen Xa farmers have been able to keep ahead of growing 
population pressures by achieving a nearly fivefold increase in annual rice yields whereas population had tripled. In order 
to understand how farmers were able to attain this achievement, we must look at the chronology and evolution of 
agriculture and how it contributed to current production in this region. (Patanothai, 1996)  
Historical development of agricultural production in Nguyen Xa can be divided into four periods: The French Period (1935 
– 1954), The Land Reform Period (1956-1957), The Cooperative Period (1958 – 1982), and the Contract Period (1982 – 
present). The French Period was marked with a high degree of tension. Thai Binh Province was the site of a French 
military camp, and Nguyen Xa became a battleground between the French and the Viet Minh forces. The French marched 
against the farmers of Nguyen Xa three times, once on February 17th, 1950, and two additional times that same year, on 
August 19th, and the 29th. In all about 92 Nguyen Xa villagers gave their lives defending their community from the French. 
(Patanothai, 1996)  
During the French Period, double cropping of rice was possible in certain fields in Nguyen Xa, although the second crop 
was usually lost to flooding. Traditional varieties of rice were grown with little use of fertilizer. This period is marked with 
a high degree of tenancy: 70% of the village farmers either rented their lands from village lords or worked on them as hired 
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hands. Yields from this period range from 1.7 to 1.8 t/ha. (Patanothai, 1996)  
The Land Reform Period followed the Viet Minh victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and Ho Chi Minh 
initiated land reforms in the northern part of the country including the Thai Binh Province of the Red River Delta. All land 
was confiscated by the government and redistributed to the residents of the village, the former tenants and landless 
workers. Manure use increased during this period, fields were better managed, and the yields increased to 1.9 to 2.2 t/ha.  
The first Cooperatives were formed in 1958, and all farmers of the newly redistributed land had to turn them over to 
Cooperative control. During the Cooperative Period, members were placed in local production teams which managed 
specific activities. In addition to the rice production teams, Cooperatives also formed pest and disease teams, irrigation 
teams, and animal husbandry teams.  
Several key things happened during the Cooperative Period which resulted in substantial increases in rice yields. New 
varieties were introduced by the government, along with fertilizers, and management practices. In addition, canals and 
dams were completed and equipped with electric pumps, which greatly increased water control and resulted in yields of 2.8 
to 3.6 t/ha by 1960. These new varieties were shorter in duration, and therefore opened up the possibility of a third crop for 
the Nguyen Xa villagers. (Patanothai, 1996)  
By 1982, Nguyen Xa began to decentralize agricultural production by offering short term (one to two year) contracts to 
specific families within the Cooperatives. These households were given an allocated parcel of land, and a yield/production 
quota based on the analysis of the soil potential. The tax was based on this quota, and not on the actual yield, which gave 
villagers an incentive to exceed the quota assigned to them. Eventually the contracts were extended to five years (1986), 
and then up to fifteen years (1992) which gave farmers an even greater vested interest in not only increasing current yields, 
but in the long term sustainability of these yields. In addition, farmers began to recognize that the key to balancing 
agricultural production was population growth. (Xenos, 1993) 
  
Nguyen Xa is a 
village of the 
Dong Hung 
District which is 
a part of the Thai 
Binh Province. 
Thai Binh’s 
density is the 





levels of urban 
Hanoi and Ho 




(see Figure 2.1) 
The province 
also registers 
one of the lowest 
growth rates, 
birth rates and 
death rates, and 
its growth rate is 
lower than the 
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national 
intercensal rate 
of 2.1 percent. 
  
Thai Binh’s steady decline in birthrate and death rate is due, in large measures to government policies and actions 
on demographic change, including the following important policies:  
1.  Very effective public health and mortality control, including control over episodic mortality. 
2.  A recent effort to advance the ongoing fertility decline by vigorously linking childbearing to land allocation and various 
state services. 
3.  Attention to permanent out-migration to the south or New Economic Zones (NEZs) to improve the population/resources 
balance. (Xenos, 1993) 
Dong Hung District is near the geographic center of Thai Binh Province, and its population density of 1122 persons/km2 
is similar to the provincial average. Nguyen Xa, with 1620 persons/km2 has the highest population density of all the 
Dong Hung villages with one of the region’s lowest birth and death rate. (Xenos, 1993) 
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Nguyen Xa has a 
population of 6,512, which 
includes teachers, and 
officers who are assigned 
to the region, but who are 
currently not Figure 2.2 
Nguyen Xa Land Uses 
registered as residents. 
The village has a total 
surface area of 430 ha, 
which places the 
population density of the 
village to be over 1600 
person/km2. This is higher 
than the provincial 
average of 1065 persons/
km2, and higher than the 
district average of 1,122 
persons/km2. Of the total 
surface, more than 25 
percent of the land is used 
for non-agricultural 
purposes such as roads, 
canals, housings, and 
gardens. Thus the 
population density of 
cultivated land is 2030 
persons/km2, which means 
that each hectare must 
support 20.3 people. This 
represents only 490 m2 of 





The farmers of Nguyen Xa Village practice a refined and intensive form of rice cultivation and the community exhibits a 
high quality of life despite the strong population pressure on land resources. Rice production provides employment to 
the majority of the village population regardless of the economic status a household might hold. The rice crops do not 
generate income because villagers generally consume a large proportion of the rice they produce and often have little left 
after agricultural taxes (in the form of rice) have been collected. Thus, in order to cover shortfalls, households generally 
require an additional source of income to cover expenses during emergencies. (Patanothai, 1996)  
Livestock raising is an important component of the livelihood structure of the residents of Nguyen Xa. Even though 
animal husbandry is not extensive or large scale, the majority of the households in the village raise pigs for the sale of 
meat, and most importantly, for manure to put on the rice fields. At the present, pig raising is not considered a 
profitable venture by most households because they are only breaking even. But the value of pigs to agricultural 
production, however, is high since they provide manure for the rice fields, which not only increases the productivity of 
crops but also reduces costs in terms of purchased fertilizers. Poor households with fewer pigs also derive less manure 
for fertilizers, which, in turn, may lead to lower rice productivity. (Bouahom, 1993)  
Most households in Nguyen Xa also maintain homegardens, although they are small and not extensively planted. 
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These families with the homegardens sell fruits and vegetables at the market in Nguyen Xa. Households can also 
supplement their income with fish grown from shared communal fishponds, although, once again, the income from 
the fishpond is low. This all means, in general, that the culture in Nguyen Xa is predominantly one of subsistence 
agriculture, and that the economy is still immature and has room for growth. (Patanothai, 1996)  
Therefore rice, the staple food of the Vietnamese is the most important crop in the Red River Delta. The majority of 
the cultivated area is devoted to rice, and wherever possible, it is given priority over other crops. Historically, because 
of physical, social, and economic conditions, Thai Binh Province, in general, and Nguyen Xa Village, in particular, have 
been intensive rice cultivation areas. (Patanothai, 1996)  
For the past 10 years, the average rice yields in Nguyen Xa have been increasing, and yields are higher than the average 
yields for the district and the province as a whole. In 1990, productivity was 6.45 t paddy/ha for the spring crop and 4.68 
t paddy/ha for the fall crop (See Figure 2.3). The average yearly production was over 10 t paddy/ha, one of the highest yields 
of rice in the Red River Delta. There are several factors which accounts for this high productivity:  
1.  Water - The availability of year-round water and the ability to control water levels are major factors in the 
high productivity of this system. 
2.  Fertilizer - The high production is due to widespread use of heavy fertilizer (chemical and manure) and 
pesticides. 
3.  Labor - Farmers are well informed about agricultural processes, and there is excess labor in Nguyen Xa. Thus, 
farmers are able to put more labor into the same amount of fields. 
4.  Rice varieties - Experimenting and adapting new and different varieties of rice has allowed farmers to keep 
production of rice high. 
5.  Government Policies - Policies increasing technological inputs into rice production ensures high and relatively 
stable productivity. The government was also responsible for an efficient water control system, the promotion 
of new improved rice varieties, and made chemical fertilizers and pesticides easily available to farmers. 
(Patanothai, 1996) 
What is the possibility of increasing the current production yields? In order to answer that, the CERES – Rice 
Simulation Model, was brought in to simulate potential yields for the spring and winter rice crops. (Godwin, 1990). 
These maximum yield experiments found that the current Nguyen Xa rice variety, CR203 was currently producing 80% of 
the maximum yields simulated in the model. To accomplish four fifths of near optimal production is an incredible feat for 
the farmers of Nguyen Xa and to increase such a yield would require either new rice varieties or different weather 
patterns. (Patanothai, 1996) 
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This high production is not stable however and as Figure 2.3 attests, yields seem to have reached their plateau and have 
started to decline, although the time period considered is rather short for any conclusive analysis. There are several reasons 
that might account for this decline:  
1.  Pest outbreaks - Contributed to several decreases in potato and rice varieties. 
2.  Climatic change - Especially temperature decrease in the winter, was responsible for the major reduction of 
yields in spring 1991. 
3.  Rice Variety Yield Fluctuations. (Patanothai, 1996) 
Flooding was not a factor in the recent decreases in yields, neither was rainfall or sunlight. There was a surplus of 
wage laborers to cover productions, thus employment or lack of human resources were not the reasons for the poor 
results. Nutrient recycling (which we will explore in the next section) is still highly efficient. Thus, it would seem that 
rice varieties, and its resistance to adverse is conditions are the primarily causes for recent poor performances. Still, 
the instability of these high productions have raised issues of concern about long-term sustainability of existing resources. 
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Can farmers maintain as high a level of yields in the future as they did in the past? In order to answer this question, it 
is important to look at the nutrient recycling system of Nguyen Xa, and to identify areas where nutrient depletion might 
become a problem or current practices might not be sustainable. (Patanothai, 1996)  
Nguyen Xa is located in the alluvial soils region of the Red River system with long-term rice cultivation. The latest soil 
survey, recorded in 1992, had the following soil types:  
1.  Old alluvial soil inside the dike system with clay horizon 
2.  Old alluvial soil with spotted or ferralite horizon. 
3.  Recently deposited alluvial soil with uniform horizon. 
4.  Alluvial soil with sandy horizon 30 – 40 cm below the surface. 
5.  Alluvial soil with acid sulphate horizon. (Patanothai, 1996) 
The soil texture in Nguyen Xa can be grouped into two main categories: light loam, and moderately heavy loam. The 
second category is the predominant type and is suited for rice cultivation. Soils in the high spots are generally lighter in 
texture and are suited for tuber and other winter crops. (Patanothai, 1996)  
95% of the soil in Nguyen Xa is acidic, and about 41% have a pH lower than 4.5 (see Table 2.0). Consequently, 
lime application is a common practice with a lot of farmers. In addition, 84% of the soil is also highly organic due to the 
heavy use of manure, available phosphorus is low, and exchangeable potassium is low. (Patanothai, 1996) 
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Table 2.1 shows comparisons of the chemical properties of Nguyen Xa soils measured in 1992 and the corresponding 
values measured in 1985. For pH value, comparison of the 1992 and 1985 data indicates an increase in soil even though lime 
is commonly used and the high pH of the irrigated water should have neutralized the soil to some extent. This increase in 
soil acidity might be attributed to the release of acid substances from manure and crop residue, which are used at high 
rates, and from the application of chemical fertilizers. (Patanothai, 1996)  
In addition to the overall increase in soil acidity, there is a trend which shows that fields that were strongly acid in 
1985 declined in soil acidity. A possible explanation might be selective application of a high rate of lime only in strongly 
acid fields but not in fields with less acidity. (Patanothai, 1996)
  
Despite the fact that Figure 2.4 shows 
that all the nutrients (except for 
Potassium) within Nguyen Xa show 
positive balances, it is not clear that 
these nutrients will remain in balance. 
Nitrogen and Sulfur are soluble and are 
expected to be lost through drainage. 
Phosphorus, Calcium, and Magnesium 
are immobile and are expected to stay in 
the field. The accumulation of Calcium 
and Magnesium is beneficial because it 
could lower the pH of the soils in 
Nguyen Xa, but the loss of Potassium at 
its current high rate will affect the 
sustainability Nguyen Xa’s current rice 
production. If farmers in Nguyen Xa are 
to maintain their current yields, they 
must address the current loss of 
Potassium, and the accumulation of the 
remaining nutrients, which, if left 




Sediment is a source of nutrients that enter the Nguyen Xa Village Agroecosystem through flooding and irrigation water. 
Once, villages had been subjected to annual flooding which was probably a source of incoming nutrients. Now, with the 
dyke system of the Red River Delta, flooding is largely no longer a threat, and the source of nutrients is also lost. Currently, 
the only source of sediment is irrigation water, which loses a lot of its sediment load before it even reaches the fields.  
The sediment of the Red River is very rich and its pH varies between 7.0 and 7.4. The following is the breakdown of 
the available nutrients in the sediment load from the Red River:  
1.  Available Nitrogen 0.5 mg/100 g solid 
2.  Phosphorus 1.17 mg/100 g 
3.  Potassium 1.06 mg/100 g 
The sediment deposition rate is 80kg/ha/yr, which means that the amount of nutrients added to the fields are estimated to be:  
1.  Available Nitrogen 0.04 kg/ha/yr 
2.  Phosphorus 0.09 kg/ha/yr 
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3.  Potassium 0.08 kg/ha/yr 
In other words, the current nutrient flow into the Nguyen Xa system is negligible with the bulk of new nutrient deposits 
coming from fertilizers (chemical or manure). However the irrigation water to Nguyen Xa does play a very important role 
in maintaining the pH levels of the fields which are highly acidic from heavy fertilizer application. (Patanothai, 1996)  
Although Nguyen Xa is not a completely closed system in terms of nutrient flows, it has a high degree of internal 
recycling. The principle nutrient inflows are atmospheric nitrogen carried in by rainwater, or fixed by nitrogen fixing 
plants (like Azolla), sediments from flood waters or irrigation, and fertilizers. The amount of nutrients that come in from 
rain, the river, or green manure is negligible and chemical fertilizers are probably the major sources of nutrient inflows into 
the village systems. (Patanothai, 1996)  
The major outflows is through rice grain, and pigs sold out of the village. Other outflows are considered small. Under 
the situation of limited land and intensive cropping, Nguyen Xa has created a very elaborate plan of nutrient recycling and 
just about everything is recycled back to the field in one way or another (See Figure 2.5). With these practices, farmers 
have been getting high crop yields. The question though is whether these high yields can be maintained over time 
especially with the its current rate of growth. (Patanothai, 1996)
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III. Conclusion   
This study found that the villagers of Nguyen Xa were producing enough food to meet their subsistence requirement, and 
even a small surplus to sell, despite the fact that they had only 490 m2 of cultivated land per person. The villagers were able 
to accomplish this by focussing on producing consistently high yields that would more than meet their subsistence needs. 
On average the farmers yield over 10 tons of paddy per hectare per year, and this production rate has remained consistent 
for the last 10 years. Because the farmers are producing 80% of the maximum yield as currently defined by the CERES 
Rice Simulation Model, to increase the yield rate would be a difficult feat.  
The farmers have been able to meet their subsistence requirements by taking steps to ensure minimal population stress 
on natural resources:  
1.  They’ve enthusiastically followed family planning policies which lowered the villages overall population 
growth. 
2.  Used locally adaptive rice varieties. 
3.  Created a carefully controlled irrigation system. 
4.  Maintained a highly efficient nutrient recycling system. 
Despite the best efforts of farmers to maintain soil fertility, the studies show that soils in Nguyen Xa are becoming 
increasingly acidic, and that Potassium loss is incredibly high. These changes will result in declining yields in the long term. 
At the same time that the sustainability of the soil is threatened, continued population growth threatens to outstrip the ability 
of even the best-managed system to provide subsistence needs. As the CERES Rice Simulation Model shows, there is 
very little room for increased performance, even though the population is growing at over 1.5 percent a year. (Rambo, 1996)  
Population Control is certainly an important factor in the management of population stress on natural resources but 
the government programs currently in operation have already brought the population growth down to a very impressive 
rates. Encouraging out migration is an alternative but will not provide a complete solution. Newly relocated residences 
moving to marginal agricultural regions do not have the agricultural experience or community and governmental support to 
eke out a subsistence in a different agroecological niche. Thus, current government efforts to relocate residences to 
New Economic Zones (NEZs) have met with only limited success and the program experiences a high degree of return rate. 
(Le Trong Cuc, 1990)  
Then what are the alternative solutions to the current situation in Nguyen Xa? Besides population control, and increasing 
rice yields, diversifying sources of employment and income will result in less reliance on the wet rice culture of 
North Vietnam.  
Traditionally, agriculture has remained the main occupation for many households in Nguyen Xa , but in more recent 
times villagers have supplemented their rice income with employment from subsidiary enterprises. engaged in 
subsidiary enterprises ranging from making sweets, liquors, pressed ham, and tofu; dealing junk and scraps, working 
in construction, carpentry, rice mills, glass manufacturing. These activities have been increasing and have generated income 
to the villagers. In fact, income from these activities has become the major part of family income many households. They 
have both positive and negative affects on agricultural production:  
●     Positive – There would be more investment in pig raising, which increases manure, provides less stress on 
land and less emphasis on growing a third crop. This will slow down nutrient depletion and allow the land to 
replete itself. In addition, subsidiary enterprises provide more generic market oriented skills which would 
encourage out-migration and less reliance on wet rice cultivation. 
●     Negative – Less time is spent on crop production and declining interest in maintaining good agricultural land 
management. 
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Agricultural Diversification is another alternative to wet rice cultivation practices. Encouragement to diversify products 
has come in the form of a resolution from the 7th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam. They want the 
policy of local food self-sufficiency to gradually shift toward utilizing the comparative advantage of each 
agroecological region. In other words, farmers who take advantage of the agroecological diversity of each region will be able 
to optimize production of the region’s suitable agriculture. (Jamieson, 1992)  
If the agricultural potential of the country is realized then this will create favorable conditions for specialization, and facilitate 
a market-oriented approach. There will be less reliance on rice as subsistence agriculture, and the exchange of goods 
among different regions will encourage more rapid economic growth and can result in more efficient production of 
each region’s products.  
Unfortunately, such an approach will take time and considerable momentum. Because the villagers in Nguyen Xa 
are traditionally rice cultivators, there is a general resistance to diversifying their agricultural potential. In addition, because 
the rich alluvial soils of the Red River Delta is a region that is conducive to rice production, Nguyen Xa might very 
well become a center of specialized rice production for Vietnam. If this is the case, and the population stress continues to 
grow, then in order to support themselves, the villagers of Nguyen Xa must find alternatives to their current reliance on wet 
rice cultivation.  
There is a additional alternative to solving this population stress, and that is to reduce dependency on rice production 
by encouraging alternative sources of income as a supplement. The problem with this approach is that in order to be 
successful at transitioning over to a market economy from subsistence agriculture, villagers must once again be willing to 
train for new practices. We see that some farmers are already supplementing their incomes through animal husbandry, 
fishing, and food processing, although income from these activities are very minimal. Traditionally villagers have 
been resistant to market adoptions of small scale non-farm activities, but the villagers in Nguyen Xa do not seem to reluctant 
to engage in off-farm occupations to earn cash.  
The most likely approach to the current situation in Nguyen Xa is that a combination of different solutions and policies 
is needed to address the growing population stress on the village’s natural resources. Population control must remain a 
high priority, with an eye out to possibly increasing current rice yields through the introduction of new rice varieties 
or practices. But villages must address the growing soil acidity and loss of important nutrients from the region. In order 
to provide less stress on natural resources, diversification of agriculture and increased participation in subsidiary activities 
seem to be the only solutions which will not only help keep population in check (by providing incentives for out migration) 
but allow for long-term land use sustainability. Thus, only a combination of policies and approaches will help Nguyen Xa 
cope with long term population pressures, and allow for a successful transition into a less dependent wet rice society.  
Because the future welfare of the Red River Delta’s Population so depends on the functioning of agroecosystems like that 
of Nguyen Xa, the solutions we create may be useful and portable enough to apply to the Red River Delta region as a 
whole. Thus, the study of Nguyen Xa is important in determining regional policies, and moving the culture towards 
less reliance on wet rice cultivation and subsistence agriculture, in addition to providing less stress on current natural 
resources. Nguyen Xa is a classic case of intensive land management to meet population stress. The insight we gain 
with Nguyen Xa is important in our ongoing analysis of the region’s long term sustainability.  
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Deforestation in Eight Southeast Asian Countries:




Environmental destruction is not new to the developing Southeast Asian communities. Deforestation, or 
the loss of forest cover, is happening at an alarming rate in these countries as the population increases 
rapidly. The increasing population is accompanied by an increasing need for agricultural land. As a 
result, much land is deforested by slash and burn cultivators. In these developing countries, the nature 
preserves drawn on map are overrun by local communities whose need for subsistence overwhelms 
attempts to protect wildlife or the native forest. In addition to loss of forest land due to conversion to 
agriculture, many forest trees are over-harvested or illegally cut, resulting in less stock and inadequate 
reproduction. Since forest products are an important export commodity for many of these countries, loss 
of forests results in decreases in revenue for the country. Consequently, some countries such as Thailand 
and the Philippines have become importers rather than exporters of forest products. 
My paper will have four sections. Section one will discuss the extent of deforestation in these eight 
countries and its effects. The second section will explain national policies adopted by these countries to 
limit deforestation and its effectiveness. A model of sustainable deforestation in Thailand will be 
discussed in the third section and then, applied to the other seven countries. Finally, in section four 
sustainable environmental polices will be recommended. 
1. Extent of Deforestation. 
Population and deforestation  
In 1995, Asia has 60.5% of the world’s population. Although Asia has the highest recorded population 
(3,458,000, 000) in 1995, it does not have the greatest annual rate of increase. Africa’s annual rate of 
increase (2.8% between 1990 and 1995) is higher than Asia’s annual rate of increase (1.6%). However, 
Asia faces many environmental problems such as deforestation because of its high population. 
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Figure 1. Population of major areas and regions. Source: 1995 United Nations Demographic Yearbook. 
Of the eight countries that were examined in this paper, Indonesia has the greatest rate of population 
increase (figure 2). Indonesia is home to more than half of that region’s population. Although the rate of 
population increase is not as high as Indonesia, the other seven countries are also increasing steadily. 
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Figure 2. Estimates of Midyear Population (in Thousands) for Eight Southeast Asian Countries. Source: 
1996 UNESCO Statistical Yearbook. 
One way to measure a country’s development is by its GDP. Generally, the higher the GDP, the more 
developed the country. With this in mind, the eight countries show signs of development because their 
gross domestic products have increased (figure 3). Malaysia has the greatest GDP. Thailand has the next 
greatest. The remaining six countries, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Vietnam, Philippines and Myanmar, 
also have growth in GDP. 
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Figure 3. Gross domestic product: per capita for eight Southeast Asian Countries. Source: National 
Accounts Database of the Statistical Division of the United Nations Secretariat. 
GDP is the result of many kinds of economic activities, such as agriculture production, mining and 
quarrying industries, manufacturing, electricity, and construction. If the agricultural sector (which 
includes agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing) contributes most to the country’s GDP, then a 
growth in GDP could reflect an increase in deforestation. 
In two countries Myanmar and Vietnam, the agricultural sector contributes more than half of total GDP 
(figure 4). This large percentage for Myanmar and Vietnam indicates that the economies of Myanmar 
and Vietnam are dependent on agricultural production for succuss. The percentage that the agricultural 
sector has contributed to the total GDP has increased for Myanmar during the period of 1985 and 1992, 
whereas for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam this percentage has remained 
stable. Although the percentage has not changed significantly for these latter countries, the percentage of 
agricultural contribution to total GDP is high. For Indonesia and the Philippines the percentage has been 
25, and for Thailand it has stabilized to about 15. The large percentage indicates that agricultural 
production is important for both domestic consumption and export. 
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Figure 4. Gross domestic product by kind of economic activity (agriculture, hunting, fishing, and 
forestry) at current prices. Source: National Accounts Database of the Statistical Division of the United 
States Secretariat. 
There could be a correlation between the increase in gross national product and the decease in forest 
cover. To validate this assumption, there must be an increase in the agricultural sector in GDP and the 
increase must be extensive rather than intensive. In other words, the increase in the agricultural sector 
must be the result of land expansion instead of increasing the net yield per land. 
Deforestation Patterns  
Indonesia has the greatest total land area (Map 1). Thailand and Burma come next in scale of land forest 
area. Vietnam and the Philippines follow behind these two countries. 
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Map 1. Total land area for Eight Southeast Asian Countries. Source: Summary of the Final Report of the 
Forest Reserves Assessment 1990 for the Tropical World, Food and Agriculture Organization, March 
1993. 
In the eight Southeast Asian countries, a large percentage of their total land area is covered by forests. In 
four Southeast countries, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Indonesia and Malaysia, more than 50 percent of their 
total land area is covered by forests (Map 2). The other four, Myanmar, Philippines, Vietnam and 
Thailand have greater than 25 percent of their land area covered by forests. The high percentage of 
forest cover indicates that the potential for agricultural production, commercial logging, land clearings 
for cultivation and settlement, and uncontrolled fuelwood collection in these countries is also high. 
There is a great amount of forest land to be depleted. 
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Map 2. Forest Cover (1990) (% of land area). Source: Summary of the Final Report of the Forest 
Reserves Assessment 1990 for the Tropical World, Food and Agriculture Organization, March 1993. 
Deforestation is high in countries with large total land area. Because Indonesia has the greatest total land 
area, it plays a key role ocncerning the future of forests in Asia. While Indonesia has the largest forests, 
it also poses the largest deforestation (Map 3). 
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Map 3. Annual Deforestation for Eight Southeast Asian Countries. Source: Summary of the Final Report 
of the Forest Reserves Assessment 1990 for the Tropical World, Food and Agriculture Organization, 
March 1993. 
Although Indonesia has the highest annual deforestation of all eight countries, the rate of deforestation is 
much lower than Thailand’s and the Philippines'. To determine which countries have the greatest amount 
of forest loss over the years, the change in deforestation over a ten year period was calculated. Four 
countries that have lost a considerable amount of land loss from 1980 to 1990 are Myanmar, Thailand, 
Malaysia and the Philippines. The percentage in forest area decrease over the ten year period is high in 
these four countries (map 4). This is especially true for countries with large-scale domestic forest-based 
industries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia. 
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Map 4. Percentage of Forest Area Decrease in Eight Southeast Asian Countries Between 1980 and 1990. 
Source: Summary of the Final Report of the Forest Reserves Assessment 1990 for the Tropical World, 
Food and Agriculture Organization, March 1993. 
Over the ten year period, forest area has been reduced in Thailand by 28.9% and in the Philippine by 
28.8%. The rate of deforestation for Thailand and the Philippines are both 4.0 x 10-2. Malaysia follows 
behind with its forest area reduction at 18.4%. Vietnam and Myanmar are also close behind, with forest 
area reduction at 14.2% and 12.2% respectively. 
Reasons for Deforestation  
The biggest threat to the forests is commercial logging, land clearings for cultivation and settlement, and 
uncontrolled fuelwood collection. High population density has contributed not only to destructions of 
forests by land clearings for cultivation but also overharvestings of forests for fuelwood. 
In countries where a majority of the total population lives in rural areas and still earns a living 
principally on agriculture, such as in Thailand, agricultural products have been the major export earners 
for the past two decades (Phantumvanit, 10-15). Agricultural productions have increased significantly in 
other Southeast Asian countries as well (figure 5), such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and Vietnam. There is a projected increase for all eight countries. As the demand for land to grow cash 
crops increases, deforestation will increase. 
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Figure 5. Agricultural Production (all commodities). Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (Rome) in Statistical Yearbook, fortieth issue. 
In order to increase agricultural output, there is expansion of cultivated areas rather than increase in the 
net yield per unit area of land area. As stated earlier, the increase in agricultural production is the result 
of extensive cultivation rather than intensive cultivation. This encroachment upon forest areas for 
cultivation is a major cause of deforestation. The situation is made worse by the decline in land quality. 
Consequently, some crop yields have shown a downward trend over the past five years in both irrigated 
and rain-fed areas because of soil degradation and poor management (Phantumvanit, 14). 
Another cause of deforestation is the increased demand for fuel wood. In the three years since 1991, 
when the prices of most agricultural commodities have been stable or have fallen, the price of tropical 
timber has risen by more than half (Lumpur, 38). As the demand for fuel wood increases, deforestation 
will worsen. Annual fuel wood demand is estimated to be 15.1 million cubic meters, in comparison with 
the total sustainable supply of 6.3 million cubic meters (Phantumvanit, 14). If the economies of 
Southeast Asia continue to grow at their fast rate, the rates of consumption of forest products and 
services will also increase. This will be a problem for fuelwood production in plantations in maintaining 
a natural forest cover in the region. Consequently, deforestation will cause the Southeast Asian countries 
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to be importers rather than exporters of forest products. Latin America will become the new exporters 
(figure 6) as the region’s dominance in the world trade of tropical hardwoods decline by the end of the 
century because of the depletion of timber resources. 
Figure 6. Projected Exports of Logs and Processed Wood. Source: Granger 1987. 
Other causes of deforestation include illegal logging by both loggers and farmers. When logging, 
although it is generally called "selective logging," is conducted with destructive methods involving 
heavy machinery, damage occurs to the logged area. The logged areas are not regenerated and soon 
abandoned by settlers, who entered the logged areas and burn down the remaining forests for farmlands, 
plantations, and building sites, because they have poor soil and cannot be used for long-term farming. 
Logging reduces the productivity of agriculture and fisheries over wide areas, robbing the environment 
of its capacity to sustain future generations ("Wasteful Japan," 43). In many cases of excessive and 
destructive logging, governments have allowed unsustainable logging in order to encourage the timber 
trade, support industry or earn foreign exchange for economic developing. 
Effects of Deforestation  
Although deforestation is the result of small scale decisions such as subsistence farming, ranching or 
lumbering for profit, consequences of deforestation are on the large scale such as alteration of 
hydrological patterns, effects on global climate, or reduction of biodiversity (Katzman,827). 
Soil erosion, frequent floods, droughts, and forest fires are the local results of this loss of tropical forest. 
Without the protection of trees, exposed topsoil is easily eroded away by wind and rain. The erosion 
sparks floods and mud slides and the silting of rivers. 
Secondly, tropical rain forests are home to over 80,000 different species of plants and 20 million species 
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of animals. The loss of species is accompanied by the diminishing of the genetic pool. In addition, 
forests are a source of valuable products such as rattan, bamboo, natural rubber, and medicinal plants. Its 
disappearance also translates into the loss of cure. 
Lastly, deforestation can lead to global warming. The increase in carbon dioxide and other gases from 
industries causes global warming through the greenhouse effect. Trees, as the biggest plants, play a 
crucial role in maintaining the earth's oxygen/carbon balance. They take in carbon dioxide and give off 
oxygen. Burning trees contribute to the greenhouse effect by emitting carbon dioxide. These burned-out 
forests can no longer remove the carbon dioxide ("Saving the Rain Forests," 11). 
National Policies Adopted by Countries and Its Effectiveness. 
Malaysia and Indonesia  
When the international communities have placed a limit on imports of tropical hardwood, Malaysia and 
Indonesia have led a counterattack. In Malaysia, lobbyists who were hired by the timber trade argued 
that limits were another form of protectionism designed to keep the poor countries poor. They argued 
that when rich countries want to negotiate agreements to limit deforestation, they express no interest in 
how temperate timber is grown. In other words, rich countries did not want to help pay for the expenses 
of reforestation. 
The Malaysian government has allowed the police and army to round up illegal loggers and to impose 
much higher fines. In Indonesia, the government requires those who are granted logging concessions to 
replant where they fell. Both countries have also imposed a ban on log exports. Although these actions 
may suggest that the government is trying to curb illegal logging, this is really not the case. These 
actions disguise their economic interest. Both governments want to create an industry that uses the wood 
on the spot rather than one that simply sells the unprocessed logs. By processing the timber on the spot, 
they squeeze Japan's wood processing industries and attract Japanese investments for themselves. 
These two countries also used certification, a process which cuts out middlemen and puts timber 
importers in close touch with producers. By certifying that logs have been produced by sustainable 
methods of forestry, these two countries are taking a short-cut to moral high ground because certification 
might improve forest management and ensure that the government gets its proper share of logging 
revenues. Without certification, there is a risk of losing market share in Europe and America, which are 
the main markets for the high-value timber products. Although some may be reluctant to pay extra, 
timber producers could still gain, according to rough sums by World Bank economists. They reckon that 
this, plus regaining those lost green markets, might eventually bring producers an extra $100m-120m a 
year in revenues. The Indonesian forestry ministry has already established a group to study the 
possibilities of eco-labeling and Malaysia is also beginning to investigate certification.(The Economist, 
39) 
Since the government of Malaysia and Indonesia own the forests, they are able to increase their own 
political power by distributing concessions to certain groups. When concessions to exploit the forests are 
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issued to the holder, they are usually too short and this gives them no incentive to conserve resources. 
To avoid this, the government might auction concessions with a reserve price that reflects the cost of 
replacement. The chance of this actually happening is rare because concessions are important for 
political alliances. It is reported that timber magnates pay small sums to the officers and evade quotas, 
levies, and rules ("Trees Not Timber," 36). 
Philippines  
Philippines have banned the export of logs (at the start of the Aquino administration in 1986) and sawed 
lumber. Extensive illegal logging and exports, nevertheless, systematically undermine these measures. 
Price-fixing schemes, which prevent the producer countries from gaining the proper economic benefit 
from timber exports, also undermine these measures ("Wasteful Japan," 43). 
Laos  
To address the rapid destruction of Laos' forests, the Lao government held Laos' first National 
Conference on Forestry where they issued a resolution that sets forth strategic directives to manage Laos' 
forests and identified urgent measures to protect these forests. Subsequently, they issued a decree which 
entrusted the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry with protecting the forests and discussed land use by 
villagers, as well as conversion for development in the form of roads, mining and construction for 
hydroelectricity. A national logging ban was subsequently issued in 1991 that prohibited tree felling for 
the sale of wood as raw material or as construction material, and only allowed processed wood to be 
exported. 
Thailand  
Thailand in the 1950s had adopted a national policy which stipulated that 50%, later changed to 40%, of 
the national area was to remain under forest (Hirsch, 171). It halted legal logging since the decision in 
1989 to cancel all concessions. 
It has also mounted a national campaign in response to illegal logging. Log poachers include 
innumerable subsistence farmers who find illegal logging more economically rewarding than other 
alternative means of employment (Phantumvanit, 15). 
Although farmers occupy and work this previously forested land or forest reserve land, they are in a 
marginal position economically, ecologically, and politically because they have no legal title to it. 
Without proper land titles, they do not have incentives to invest in their farms. They also face obstacles 
in applying for loan credits from any formal financial institutions. Lack of access to credit as a result of 
inability to provide collateral in the form of land title means that farmers do not have the means to make 
improvements. Consequently, they have abandoned their older cultivated land for new land because they 
cannot get money for fertilizers and other items. The latter reason is the more important factor inhibiting 
sustainable management of land in forest reserve areas because most farmers working the land, despite 
the insecurity of forest reserve status, regard it as their own in much the same way as do those with legal 
title (Hirsch, 171). Problems of tenancy and landlessness will increase as the population and ensuing 
intensification of agriculture increase (Phantumvanit, 14). 
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Although all such land is state land, policy practices lead to ambiguity over legal status of forest reserve 
land. The Lands Department of the Ministry of the Interior collects agricultural land taxes on this land, 
and these tax receipts are used in place of land titles between farmers and in negotiations with state 
authorities when prior occupancy needs to be established. The government has been in the past reluctant 
to move settlers off the land in fear of alienating those who are among the poorest of Thailand's rural 
poor. In addition, forest settlement has been the principal means of agricultural expansion at a national 
level and of peasant household strategy at a local level. The Public Welfare Department, Agricultural 
Land Reform Office, and a host of other agencies has granted legal tenures to many of those who in the 
past illegally occupied forest reserves. Thus, many expect that "sitting tight" will be enough to 
eventually achieve such legal status (Hirsch, 171). 
The government has attempted to rehabilitate the forest itself by implementing programmes that reforest 
encroached forest reserve land, mainly with fast-growing species. These programmes include 'forest 
villages,' where farmers are moved off their land and hired full time to plant trees and social forestry, 
where agriculture is supplemented by reforestation on private and community woodlots. The emphasis is 
on privatizing reforestation, which involves the granting of 30-year leases to concessionaires on forest 
reserve land. The state land under lease to concessionaires is often alienated from poor farmers who 
have been working the land for a number of years. As a result, many reforestation schemes have led to 
confrontation between local people, state officials, and private concessionaires. 
To solve the problem of land tenure in forest reserve area and to stabilize forest reserve areas so that 
poor farmers do not encroach on forested land, the Thai government implemented the sor tor kor, or 
usufructory license in 1982. It grants limited land rights (such as the right to occupy and farm up to 2.4 
hectares of forest reserve land for an initial period of five years) to the more than one million families 
occupying forest reserve land illegally. This length can be extended if certain rules are adhered to. 
However, these farmers are called squatters and have had few rights under law. They can be subject to 
arrest for oppositions to various government schemes, nominally on the charge of forest encroachment. 
They are also required to give up some land because their average farm size is about 5 hectares. The 
strict plot limit is inadequate to make a livelihood under existing practices. Surplus land is then 
reforested with the participation of usufructory license holders. The license is passed on to descendants 
but is not sold or used as collateral with commercial banks. Other problems include that ambitious 
targets have not been met. By 1985, only 1 million hectares had been licensed, which represents 
approximately one-tenth of denuded land. Lastly, the assumption that land will not be brought and sold 
is false. Tax receipts are used instead of title deed because there is little perceive risk for large 
landowners who purchase land from small landowners, and for creditors who wish to foreclose on 
informal loans (Hirsch, 171). 
Model of Sustainable Deforestation in Thailand and Its Applications. 
One succussful project of sustainable deforestation that was established by the Forest Industry 
Organization in Thailand in 1967 was the Forest Village System. The program promoted 
commercialization of timber harvest, reforestation, and forest research. It attempted to solve the 
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problems of land degradation, lack of land for peasants, and the need for reforestation of valuable timber 
species. By combining subsistence and commercial agriculture with reforestation, the program created 
new forest villages for the growing rural population with limited income opportunites. It achieved its 
objective of settling landless people and assuring a source of labour for plantation work. 
By implementing the Forest Village System, the seven countries would stop the migration of the 
landless who have encroached on forest lands and intensified shifting cultivation. This program will not 
only prevent them from degrading their forests, but will also prevent them from crowding out forest-
dependent communities from their traditional forest farming land. This will prevent violence between 
the two groups in the long run because the forest-dependent communities will not feel that their rights, 
identity and culture have been endangered by the landless farmers. 
The participants of this Forest Village System will now have incentives to harness and manage the 
renewable and reproductive capacities of forest resources because they are resettled on a permanent 
basis. They are working on their own land. Supplied with facilities such as health clinics, schools, and 
agricultural credits and other forms of economic and social assistance, they will be content with the 
system and will want to give up their nomadic existence. While rehabilitating degraded forest reserves 
and increasing the timber production in these areas, they also improve their standard of living. 
Recommended Environmental Policies. 
If the current rates of deforestation continue, WRI predicts that by the year 2000, the 33 net exporter 
countries will drop to below 10, and export earnings will shrink to about US $2 billion at current prices. 
This prediction is being manifested in two countries: Thailand, who has gone from an exporter to an 
importer, and the Philippines, whose timber trade is down to a trickle. 
In response, the international community’s has responded by creating two global initiatives: the 
International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO), which attacks the problem through the logging 
industry, and the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP), a task force made up of the United Nations 
Development Programme, the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the World 
Resource Institute. Funds to these initiatives and investments designed to slow the rate of deforestation 
have doubled in the past three years to US $1 billion, but the rate of deforestation has never been greater. 
Tropical deforestation is closely related to the development policies of tropical nations and the weak 
legal restrictions in developed countries such as Japan and Thailand. Japan, the greatest importer of 
world tropical timber, imports most of the wood in the form of raw logs, not processed wood products 
("Wasteful Japan, 43). Developed and developing countries, whose excessive demand for tropical 
timber, must help solve the problem of tropical deforestation. For instance, the Japanese government 
recently had a basic policy regarding the conservation of tropical rain forests, and the Japanese timber 
industry has expressed no support for these changes. So far, for example, the Japanese industry has taken 
a negative position on the European Industry's proposal to impose a levy on imports of tropical timber 
and to use the proceeds to promote sustainable forestry projects through the International Tropical 
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Timber Organization ("Wasteful Japan, 43). 
My proposals require participation from both developed and developing countries. They are as follow: 
1. Governments of both developing and developed countries must conduct a wide ranging reform of its 
basic policies on trade, investment, corporation conduct, the domestic consumption of timber products, 
and foreign aid instead of settling with a handful of small-scale tree-plantation projects such as those it 
has been promoting. 
2. Developed countries should reform its foreign aid policies, which has been directly and indirectly 
linked to tropical forest destruction, such as construction roads, dams, port facilities, and large-scale 
agricultural schemes. a. They should also stop all official and private financing of projects for which the 
World Bank and other development organizations have canceled loans or grants as a result of the 
project's potential for environmental destruction. The construction of roads in or through forest lands by 
legal concessionaires, public highway departments and other public investment programs (dams, 
railways) provides increasing to forest lands. Instead, they should introduce an environmental-impact 
assessment system, including alternative proposals, for all foreign-aid projects that could have a negative 
impact on the environment and on the local societies of the recipient countries. 
3. They should also establish a committee of government agencies, the timber industries, and non-
governmental organizations to formulate a plan for conserving tropical forests. 
4. Lastly, they should establish a domestic and international code of conduct for forestry operations, as 
well as regulations that restrict the trade and use of tropical timber to supplies obtained, with proper 
management, from sustainable sources (Wasteful Japan, 43). 
The underlying theme is that the developed and developing countries must recognize the economic basis 
of these decisions and change the incentive structure that generates them (Katzman, ). In particular, 
producer countries should increase the price of timber products to reflect their replacement cost rather 
than their extraction costs and create financial incentives for conservation. They should should 
reevaluate land-use decisions (because they have undervalued their forests and thus, must change their 
policy accordingly, especially those agreements that regulate the timber industry). To meet the demand 
of forest products on a sustainable basis without destroying forest, more efficient wood extraction and 
processing techniques can be practices. Increasing the use of wood substitutes should also be 
encouraged. On the other hand, consumer countries must subsidize forest preservation or revamp the 
timber trade and increase prices because these tropical countries need timber export earnings, land to 
plant cash crops and land to settle rising populations. Producer countries do not have the luxury to leave 
their remaining forests untouched because the land transformed to other uses can provide cash, jobs and 
a home (Hirsch, 171). 
Conclusion 
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Although Southeast Asia forests are currently able to supply growing demands for both domestic 
consumption and export, they will not be able to retain this exporting position in the future as their forest 
reserves get depleted. This region as a whole faces a widening deficit between production and 
consumption of traditional forest products. In conclusion,these eight countries, Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, created large-scale forest 
domestic forest-based industries that promoted economic development but simultaneously decreased 
their high forest covers. Clearly, deforestation was essential to that country's socio-economic 
development. 
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Introduction 
In 1989 the fall of communism marked the end of one of the most dramatic vestiges of World War II. Plans to reunite 
the democratic government of West Germany and the collapsed communist government of East Germany began 
immediately and were realized on October 3, 1990. Since that time, programs have been introduced to successfully 
integrate the radically different approaches to environmental and land use planning taken by both countries. While other 
eastern bloc countries have split (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) the Germany Democratic Republic (GDR) is the 
only country to have immediately merged with a western nation. Has this jump-start helped or hindered this former eastern 
bloc country and, more specifically, how has land development and the ecosystem been effected by reunification? 
Estimates show that in the early 1990s more money was given to East Germany for reconstruction than the seven eastern 
bloc countries combined (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia). Yet, while 
East Germany has been pumped with money (particularly support from West Germany), economic and environmental 
recovery has taken much longer than expected. The slow process of reform has been most likely caused by the difficulties 
of introducing a free market into the region, pressures for economic growth, the cost of environmental cleanup and 
the psychological change involved in restructuring a country. While the gap between the east and west is not getting smaller, 
a similar pattern is repeating itself within the former GDR. The new Länder (East German states) differ greatly in the rate 
in which they are progressing. While some areas are improving slowly, others are heading toward mounting instability. 
Poor environmental conditions, few jobs and poor housing coupled with a slow reform process have caused migratory 
patterns which flow solely from east to west. 
Reunification increased West Germany’s land area by 43 percent and population by more than 16 million. This increase in 
land and population has put a tremendous stress on West Germany for it inherited a country that had virtually 
ignored environmental and infrastructure concerns for approximately 40 years. Spatial development in the east has an 
impact on future economic trends and influences regional labor-markets, patterns of migration and transportation, 
and environmental sustainability. As stated in a 1996 report by the European Commission: 
While spatial policies cannot promote economic development directly, they can lay the grounds for growth and equal 
living conditions by providing the territory of the new German Länder with the appropriate intra- and interregional links, 
by increasing the attractiveness of regions or by establishing a balanced spatial distribution of functions.
In order to entice developers and industries to move into the east, the West German government must first rehabilitate 
the environment and improve the existing infrastructure. This process is not only time consuming but also extremely 
costly. While the government must boost economic development in the east by attracting diverse markets, they are 
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also confronted with the problem regulating land use. Rapid, unchecked growth will not only hinder future 
economic development but also destroy the natural environment. This paper will examine how well and to what extent 
the government has proposed to solve this mounting problem. 
German Planning, 1923-1945 
While this report proposes to concentrate on post-WWII German land use planning, it is also important to examine 
the historical foundation of 20th Century German planning. Planners did not begin their work in 1945 from a blank slate. 
In fact, reconstruction planning, which began during and before the rise of the Third Reich, still impacts planning today. 
Around the turn of the century, German planning focused on controlling the dynamic urban environment. Major 
themes dominated planning including town extension plans, and the garden cities movement. Latter, during the pre-war 
period, themes of "Blood and Soil"— the slogan that gave rise to the Nazi party—also infused planning policy. This 
prevalent sentiment supported urban developments which enabled every German citizen to be in harmony and in contact 
with the German natural environment. Consequently, antiurban, anti-industrial themes encouraged new developments 
in previously non-developed areas. Older inner cities were virtually ignored; it was often assumed that in order to change 
the existing urban fabric a major catastrophe, such as the Hamburg fire of 1824, would first need to take place. It is 
also important to point out that in many European and American cities public health concerns fueled the antiurban 
movement. Industrialization brought with it crowded tenement housing in urban areas that were plagued with health and 
safety problems. 
In the 1930s the Nazis rose into power and instituted radical changes in all areas of life. In many design fields, including art 
and architecture, practitioners were kicked out of positions and replaced with Nazi sympathizers. This was not necessarily 
the case in urban planning. In this field the planners were given full reign of the urban design process, and asked to 
create dynamic and grand cities. Many planners did not turn down this offer. Through financial and legal support, and 
non-democratic means, the Nazi party decreed various planning policies. In 1943 massive Allied air raid attacks put a stop 
to these elaborate ideas and a new type of planning emerged: reconstruction planning. 
Between 1943 and the end of the war, planners became specialists in wartime efforts related to reconstruction planning. 
For example, a national association of experts on rubble cleanup was created (Deutsche Studiengesellschaft 
für Trümmerverwertung) to give advice on cleanup and potential future uses for rubble. As cities were bombed, damage 
was assessed by the amount of rubble in cubic meters remaining after the attacks. Leading the charge was the city of 
Berlin where rubble estimates were approximately 55,000,000 cubic meters. To place this into perspective, the city of Köln 
had half this amount of rubble and estimates indicate that if the rubble were placed on a field 100 by 40 yards, the pile 
would be almost 4.5 miles high. These figures show not only the massive devastation to German cities, but indicate the 
work needed for rubble removal, rebuilding of cities and restoration of destroyed public utilities. Planners became experts 
in how to turn rubble into urban form and advised city officials to use the rubble to create amenities like new parks or 
prepare the ground for airports. 
German Planning Systems, 1945-present 
In 1945 the Allies swept all major Nazi leaders out of office. Ironically, many German planners were allowed to remain in 
their positions under Allied supervision. There is no question that planners, having gained extensive experience between 
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1933-1945 in reconstruction planning, were now the experts in the field. As planners began to rebuild the West German 
cities, plans focused on reducing high density inner-city developments, moving people to carefully planned suburbs, 
and providing them with green spaces for recreation. Zoning was implemented to clearly separated essential urban 
functions such as housing, industry and commerce. Only latter did planners realize that reducing urban populations in 
city centers resulted in areas that were lifeless in the evenings and on weekends; while modern high-rises at the city 
edge surrounded by green fields were isolated and sterile. 
East German cities, on the other hand, did not experience the same growth patterns as West German cities after WWII. 
East German planning was controlled by communist politics and theories. One central agency made uniform planning 
decisions for the entire country. Unlike their western neighbors, market forces did not drive development and 
planning. Western policies attempted to lower housing densities in inner cities, while communist governments tended 
to concentrate populations in urban areas near industry and jobs. Although large housing high-rises were sometimes built in 
the GDR on a city’s periphery, the development of open space did not occur at the same rate as in the west. Regulated 
housing markets, low rents in urban areas, and relatively few owner-occupiers in the environs of the towns created a low 
degree of suburbanization. Map 1 compares open space and settlement structures in the former GDR to those in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). East Germany’s settlement structure left more open space than in West 
Germany (although it should be pointed out that the ratio of land to inhabitants is higher in West Germany). Another 
factor which must be considered in this urbanization pattern is the lack of available automobiles and poor transportation 
routes in thee. These two items combined made it hard for people to commute from a suburban area to an inner-city job. 
Current Land Use Planning Structures 
The German constitution distinguishes three tiers of government power: national, the Länder (States), and local. When it 
comes to German land use planning the federal government’s role is to make regulations and guidelines within a 
legal framework. The federal government cannot influence specific development plans, thus it is up to the Länder to decide 
on an overall scheme for their state. The municipalities then are allowed to create more specific and detailed land-use 
plans based on the plan of the Länder. Two strong features dominate German land use planning: a strong legal framework and 
a decentralized decision-making structure. 
Once the federal government has set up the legal parameters, each municipality must create a Flächennutzungsplan 
(regional plan) outlining the intended land uses for the area. It is then up to each locality to establish a more specific plan 
called the Bebauungsplan (master plan) for the area. The master plan cannot deviate from the regional plan and once it 
is created it is considered law. As a way of ensuring conformity to the plans, permission must be obtained from 
the municipality for development projects of any kind including renovations, additions, and new construction. It is 
almost unheard of for building permits to be granted which do not conform to the plans. 
This West German planning system has been applied in the new Länder. Because the new Länder were not under the 
same planning structure, many cities do not have the master or regional plans necessary to control growth. Thus, the 
West German system is being applied with small modifications to allow for flexibility. For example, developers can be 
granted the right to build even if there is no local master plan in existence. Under these terms the developer must commit 
to preparing an overall development plan and must promise to finance the infrastructure needed for the development. 
The municipality also has the right to accept or reject the plan. While this process was intended for areas in the new Länder, 
it has now been applied in some western German areas as well providing a new solution to the lengthy process of 
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development in Germany. It is necessary to allow for flexibility in the former GDR, yet it is arguable whether or not 
these flexible policies should be extended to the areas of the former FRG where land use plans already exist. 
Furthermore, while the new Länder need to catch up economically to the western Länder, these flexible policies have 
allowed for rapid, unchecked growth. 
The Environment 
Environmental policy closely follows the structure of German land use planning: the federal government defines the 
legal framework by establishing environmental laws, and the Länder and municipalities are relied upon to implement 
these regulations. The Länder are also responsible for establishing the objectives for all sectors of land-use and 
environmental planning. 
The Unification Treaty of August 31, 1990 created ambitious conditions for improving environmental health. Article 34 
states:  the new Länder must protect the natural living conditions of the population in observance of the principle 
of precautionary action, the Polluter-Pays Principle (PPP), and the principle of cooperation, and to promote the uniformity 
of the ecological living conditions at a high level, however at least equivalent to that reached by the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
An interesting component to this treaty is the PPP clause. Under German law whomever contaminates a site is responsible 
for the cleanup. However, in many cases the Länder, particularly those in the former GDR, have been left with the burden 
of paying for the proper management and treatment of sites. As the new Länder have not had enough money to cover 
the cleanup of land, the federal government has stepped in and insisted that the buyer bear a certain proportion of the costs 
of cleanup. But, in an effort to promote development in the new Länder, laws have been created which release a new 
owner from liability if damage occurred before July 1, 1990. Consequently, in theory the developer should be paying half 
the cost of cleanup, but in reality most investors pay 10% and the federal government the remainder. 
The Situation of Soil and Water 
The environmental damage left in the eastern bloc countries is merely a reminder of the communists’ abuse of the 
physical environment and their failure to approach environmental policy with the same enthusiasm with which they 
attacked economic growth. While all types of environmental hazards can affect population movements, soil and 
water contamination are significant indicators for the built environment. 
A 1991 survey of the new Länder showed that there were at least 47,000 contaminated sites (CS). Contaminated sites often 
can not be built upon until the site is cleaned and rid of the environmental hazards. Over 40 percent of eastern Germany’s 
land surface is expected to be contaminated. Under the communist regime environmental regulations were nonexistent 
thus, industrial sites contributed high loads of heavy metals and other toxic chemicals, while agriculture practices damaged 
soil and water resources through improper use of liquid manure, fertilizers and pesticides. Map 2 shows a clear north/
south divide in the eastern states in terms of land use. Where most of the southern part of eastern Germany was geared to 
such industries as metal works, mechanical engineering and chemicals, the north was primarily agriculturally oriented. Table 
1 provides a breakdown of the labor force in percentages by state for these industries. It is clear that the northern part of 
the country focused more on agricultural production than the south, yet it is also evident that industry dominated all of 
East German production. Russian military bases also contributed to high pollutant loads on the land and in the water, 
file:///C|/545/1997/sca/DOCUMENT.html (4 of 20) [6/18/2008 10:23:00 AM]
University of Michigan, NRE 545, 1997 Monograph
and unlike industry and agriculture, military bases were spread almost evenly throughout the country. 
Table 1:  Percentage of workforce in the Agriculture and Industrial Sectors in the GDR, by Land  
  
Agriculture Sector Industrial Sector






source: Commission of the European Communities. Community Support Framework, 1991-1993 Federal Republic of Germany 
 
In the late 1980s Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR were considered the worst polluters in the eastern bloc due to their 
use of coal-based energy and the concentration of heavy industry in lower Silesia, northern Bohemia and 
Saxony. Consequently, the area where the three countries meet was coined "the Black Triangle". East Germany also had 
its own regional industrial triangle which formed around the Halle-Leibzig-Cottbus area. Map 3shows the type 
of environmental damage the country is experiencing; East Germany’s industrial triangle clearly suffering the most. Ninty-
five percent of all industrial discharges received inadequate treatment contributing to high loads of heavy metals and 
other toxic pollutants in the soil. 
Agriculture and industry are not the only areas that contribute to high soil and water pollution. Inefficient waste water 
treatment plants have been sited as great contaminators in East Germany. Poor infrastructure, such as leaky pipes, 
contributed to the pollution levels by allowing untreated or poorly treated water to seep into the water table. The new 
German Länder are said to have the lowest potential water supply in Central Europe due to untreated water: 9.6% of 
the population is supplied either intermittently or permanently with low quality water. 
Eastern Europe represented the extreme end of the environmental scale in terms of environmental controls. Policies were 
never in place to prohibit environmental damage in these countries. As Alan Berner commented in an article in the 
Seattle Times, "if East Germany did not exist, environmentalists would have to invent it. It is Brand X, the perfect contrast 
to demonstrate the dangers of ignoring growing pollution." Yet, the irony is that while western countries complained 
and pointed their fingers at eastern block contamination and pollution, they too contributed to it. For example, when the city 
of Hamburg ran out of space to dispose of their sewage, industrial and domestic waste their solution was to import it to 
East Germany. In their haste to export more than 500,000 tons of waste a year they forgot to mention that it contained 
dioxins, one of the most deadly substances know. Clearly, West German consumption contributed to East 
German environmental deteriorated. 
Russian Military Sites 
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Along with agricultural and industrial contamination, Russian military sites have proved to be major environmental 
liabilities for the new Länder. Approximately four percent of the total land in the former GDR was used for Russian 
military purposes. Map 4 shows the ratio of military installations to total land area by state. While there has been a recent 
trend to market the land for future development, land brokers have had a hard time selling the areas. Many Russian 
military personnel pulled out of East Germany as late as 1994. Up until that time westerners were denied access to examine 
the bases. Thus, three years ago, when Russian troops departed, the ramifications of environmental neglect were seen in 
full view. Highly contaminated military equipment and ammunition were found in most sites along with dilapidated 
buildings and infrastructure dating back to the Prussian area. Many buildings used by the Prussian army and then the Nazis, 
and were also occupied by the Russians. 
The implications of these sites for the new Länder are important in terms of land use. The bases contain major 
environmental hazards, require extensive and costly cleanup and, unless they can be cleaned, represent unusable 
land. Brandenburg has the highest percentage of military sites. Estimates show that approximately 247,000 acres of 
military installations exist in this state. Some of the posts have been sold to investors and will be used for future 
developments, others are being slotted for future German military use. Yet, while many redevelopment plans have 
been proposed most cases are dropped when cleanup estimates are assessed. 
Positive Trends 
During the past 20 years many damaged ecosystems have proved they can regenerate if environmentally friendly practices 
are followed. The Rhine River provides an example of this theory. The Rhine was a highly contaminated river, but 
West German environmental policies markedly decreased its pollutant levels (Table 2). Pollution levels of East 
Germany’s Elbe river in 1988 match those of West Germany’s Rhine river in the 1970s. The linking of East and West 
Germany will promote a new transition period for eastern Germany. As environmental policies take shape, the ecosystem 
will likely begin to revive. While the results of this process will not be seen overnight, it is likely that many eastern 
German ecosystems can be regenerated and stabilized near their original state. 
Table 2:  Pollution on the Rhine and the Elbe, 1978 and 1988  




Volume of flow m3/s 874 2,455 2,836
Ammonium mg/l 1.79 0.88 0.29
Nitrates (NO3-N) mg/l 4.92 3.74 3.90
Phosphorus mg/l 0.56 0.63 0.30
Mercury mg/l 0.63 0.28 0.21
Cadmium mg/l 0.37 0.23 0.13
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Source: OECD Environmental Performance Reviews, p. 86
Another positive trend in East Germany is that large parcels of the country are in good environmental condition with a 
rich diversity of species. This is a result of the relatively sparse and highly concentrated populations, and poor 
traffic infrastructure that did not allow for easy inner-country travel. The "no mans land " separating East and West 
Germany, along with state-owned hunting grounds created many natural untouched habitats. After reunification an 
emphasis was placed on preserving natural spaces, and by 1990 Nature Conservancy land increased in the new Länder 
from 0.98 percent of the total land to 2.5 percent of the total. 
Economics 
Communist polices toward housing and all types of business development has implications on present-day land 
development. While postwar West Germany development took place within the parameters of a market economy, the story 
of East Germany is different. Soon after WWII market forces in eastern Germany lost their importance as the government 
took over economic policies. The abolition of private ownership was the main program driving communist policies. 
Today, privatizing all former GDR companies is a major governmental thrust. 
German reunification and the exposure of the East German economy to world has produced a profound adjustment period 
in the German economy. In terms of business investments which would bring in money for skilled labor, investors 
increasingly ‘go further east’ to save on labor costs. East German wages have been raised to the level of wages in the west, 
thus giving them higher wage rates than their former communist neighbors to the east. At the same time housing stock 
and infrastructure have not caught up to western standards. These two issues—housing and wages—have been major 
inhibitors for investors looking to relocate in the eastern part of the country. It is in instances such as these where East 
Germany has not benefited from unification with the west. 
Further exacerbating this problem is the fact that between 1990 and 1993 business registrations decreased and business 
closures increased. The data available through the first five months of 1993 show that a degenerative ratio gets stronger 
through time (Figure 1). For example, in 1990 closures represented about 10% of registrations. This figure increases to 
a approximately 56% in 1992, and 62% between January and May 1993 alone. The breakdown in jobs has resulted in a 
drastic loss of employment. Unemployment in the new Länder rose to more than 1 million in the end of 1992, representing 
an unemployment rate of 16.5% where it remained through part of 1993. In fact, all of the economic sectors, except 
for building and construction, have witnessed job losses. 
Figure 1:  Registration and closure of businesses in the new German Länder, 1990-1993 
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source: European Commission study, p. 5 
Privatization 
In spatial terms, privatization of state-owned enterprises influences investor's willingness to relocate business in the 
former GRD. In 1989 the State Trust Agency (Treuhand) was established to begin privatizing state-owned enterprises in 
the former GDR. By April 1992, 7,100 of the 11,500 enterprises existing in the new Länder had been privatized. While 
this accomplishment and many others can be applauded, two items have dimmed the achievements of the Treuhand: 1) 
they have inherited lots of debt; and 2) many of the newly privatized enterprises are not able to fulfill commitments to 
the Agency in areas such as jobs preservation. 
Spatial Change in the new and old Länder
 
The desire for economic progress plays an important role in German land development. In post-WWII Germany an 
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economic upswing occurred when the cities experienced growth outside the Altstadt (old city). For example, the town 
council of Hassfurt, West Germany designated the outer regions of the city as commercial zones. Car dealerships were 
among the first to move to these areas, followed by gas stations and in the 1970s other retailers. Inexpensive land helped 
to promoted this type of greenfield development. Today the outcome of this trend is that large retailers and supermarkets, 
often discounters, are interspersed between German towns. Germans refer to these commercial type strips and 
their architectural style as "little Americas". The implications of this type of growth are significant. Not only do these 
new developments demolish existing land, but funding and land resources are spent on new infrastructure and 
road construction. 
Today the new Länder are mimicking West German growth patterns. When the Wall fell, western chains were convinced 
they would have an easy time establishing businesses and making a profit in eastern bloc countries. High demand, 
lax enforcement of building codes and zoning, and little local opposition reinforced these theories. The unstoppable spread 
of retailers has created developments on what is known as greenfields, which consist of large malls located 
between communities. Often community governments in the east have bowed to development pressures in order to 
please voters and raise revenues. 
Demand and market forces have continued to lead growth patterns. At the time of reunification the density of retail facilities 
in a typical East German city was half that of other German cities. In the city of Hildburghausen, a former GDR city, thirty 
new enterprises were established by August 1991. Even more dramatic was the increase in retail space which doubled in 
this short time from 5,000 sq. meters, to 10,000 sq. meters. Exacerbating this rapid development are laws created to 
provide incentives for German investors to write off 50% of their additional investment beyond the purchase price of the 
land. Map 5 shows how the city of Hildburehausen is being reshaped because of rapid growth on the periphery of the city. 
Not only will the growth build on existing green space, but the cost to the government and citizens for infrastructure to 
these areas will be enormous. 
Contributing to eastern Germany’s spatial change are commuting patterns. According to a survey done by the Institut 
für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (IAB) in May 1992, 63% of Germans living in the 
new Länder commuted to western Länder. More significant are the distances commuters were willing to travel to reach 
places of work. Along the East German border many of the commuters live and travel from 40 to 60 km one way. 
As transportation systems are improved and built in the east, more land and autos will be in demand. 
The states in the former East Germany are experiencing different rates of progress. The northern most state of 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania is experiencing the most severe structural problems among the new Länder. Its weakness 
lie in the fact that it had traditionally high shares of farming and low shares of manufacturing compared to other 
Länder. Uneven regional distribution of industrial locations coupled with poor internal transportation infrastructure has 
also posed a disadvantage for the state. Job losses in the farming and fishing industries, and collapsed industrial sites have 
left this state with the highest rate of unemployment in all of Germany. The job sector is not diverse and thus, 
alternative employment opportunities are not available in this area. On the other hand, Saxony has a diversified economy 
with an industrial sector characterized by large-scale enterprises and the industrial sector evenly distributed throughout 
the region. The transportation links in this area have been considerably updated since reunification. The difference in these 
two states points out some of the internal stress the former GDR Länder are experiencing in terms of economic and 
spatial growth. 
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Population 
Since the 18th Century, European population has increased primarily as a result of natural population growth, specifically 
births rapidly exceeding deaths. By the end of the Second World War, birth rates in Europe began to drop below the 
death rates, signifying what has been described as a "second demographic transition, very different from the first". As 
Maria Carmen Faus-Pujol states, "rather than an increase in population, this is characterized by stabilization or even a 
reduction of the population, and the demographic factor responsible for this trend is the fall in the birth rate." The birth rate 
in Western Europe was the lowest of any major bloc in the world in the beginning of the 1990’s. 
Germany (both east and west) has been experiencing this post-WWII population decline, particularly in the last thirty 
years. Significantly, Germany has one of the slowest growth rates in all of Western Europe (Map 6). While some argue that 
a transition is occurring where all western, industrialized countries will start to experience negative growth rates, others 
claim that it can no longer be said that the countries are converging on a common growth rate pattern because of the 
varying social and economic conditions in each country. If the first hypothesis is true, it can be assumed that Germany 
is reaching a demographic transition stage sooner than other European countries. Otherwise it can be assumed that 
German population increases are purely a factor of social, cultural and economic change. Whatever approach is taken, it 
can not be denied that Germany has a decreasing population trend. The country’s slow population growth rate can be 
explained by industrialization, urbanization, high amounts of educated women in the work force, and low birth and high 
death rates. Attitudinal changes, such as secularization, egalitarianism an emancipation, are also often cited as contributing 
to this change. 
It is important to note that of all the European countries, including the former east bloc and Russia, the only other 
countries experiencing a negative or even growth rage are Bulgaria and Hungry (Map 6). It is interesting to note 
that Germany’s economic and population structures are much different from Hungry and Bulgaria. While the countries 
are relatively close in proximity and are experiencing the same population trends, their negative feedback indicators may not 
be similar. Hungary has experienced a transition in the last decade that reflects its population decline. A gradual shift 
towards older ages coupled with high death and low birth rates has driven this pattern. Contributing to the high death rates 
in this country is the poor health care system. It is stated that mortality rates for middle-aged men in Hungry are possibly 
the worst in the world. Bulgaria, on the other hand, has experienced a population change that has favorably more women 
than men (in 1995 the ratio was 1,041:1,000). Also compounding their population decline is the considerable rate 
of emigration. Between 1989 and 1994 450,000 people left Bulgaria. Despite a relative lull, estimates show that 
currently nearly 25,000 continue to emigrate every year. David Coleman also points out that, "in view of the 
political uncertainty and serious economic disruption these countries have undergone, this (low fertility) is hardly 
surprising; the least developed areas and those undergoing the most radical change, have shown the greatest decline". 
The decline in population growth experienced in the whole of Germany began in the mid 1970s. Starting in 1950, 
population increased at a rate of less than one percent per year (Appendix 1). Looking at the population growth 
graphically (Figure 2), one can see that growth has been extremely slow (data in this series is both East and West 
Germany combined). As previously stated, post-WWI European countries experienced low growth rates. The 1950s and 
1960s data relay the short baby-boom in West Germany, but then the population begins to level out again only to drop in 
the mid-1970s. Figure 2 shows a slight rise in the population after 1984 (perhaps explained by economic boom or 
immigration patterns) only to increase by approximately .5% every year. While this data shows a minor increase, similar 
data sets show decline or stabilization in the population structure (Figure 3). 
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Figure 2 
 
source: WRD, see Appendix 1 for calculations 
Figure 3 
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source: Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 1996 
 In Figure 3 a decline and perhaps slight stabilization can be seen. Given this information, Figure 2 also calculates two types 
of population projections: linear and polynomial. The linear equation accounts for population increases, while the 
polynomial projection mimics a declining population. It is interesting to note the R2 factor in both projections, specifically 
that the polynomial projection has a higher R2 than the linear (linear, .814; polynomial .9558). If the linear projection is 
correct, Germany’s population will be around 90 million by 2025 while the polynomial projection predicts a population 
of around 65 million. Interestingly, UN population projections predict German population at a high of 76,566,000, and a low 
of 66,062,000 by the year 2025. 
Another way to examine the population trends in Germany is to divide the data by East and West Germany. Figures 4 and 
5 show the birth and death rates compared. In the GDR almost consistently since the 1970s deaths have outweighed or 
almost matched births. On the other hand, West Germany has experienced an almost even equalization of the populations' 
birth to death rates. In terms of demographic transitions this data proves that the GDR is still experiencing a transition 
and perhaps will level out to the population levels of the west. The FRG, on the other hand, has experienced almost 
consistently even birth to death rates. As the new Germany stabilizes socially and economically their population rates 
may change. It is my conclusion that population rates will continue to decline slightly or remain constant. 
Figures 4 and 5 
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source: Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 1996 
Eastern Germany 
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Since the Second World War fertility patterns in the former eastern bloc countries have developed somewhat differently 
than those in the west. Specifically, countries in eastern Europe did not experience the same baby boom period in the 1950s 
and 1960s (see Figure 4). As David Coleman points out, "in these countries the general transition to very low fertility, 
and major fluctuations such as the ‘baby boom’, which might have occurred under a post-war free market system, have 
been retarded or suppressed by various aspects of the communist system." Specifically, limited autonomy and spending, 
little satisfactions outside the family and limited access to contraception are some the issues cited. Stress on the 
population, specifically the post war period of the 1950s and the closing of East Germany to the west in 1961 could 
also account for this dip in population. 
Communist regimes depended on high growth rates as a means to support economic prosperity. As a way of promoting 
higher birth-rates many countries offered positive incentives in the form of financial assistance to families with children, 
or bonuses such as year long maternity leave for mothers. Nonetheless, in the 1970’s deaths outweighed births, and in 
the 1980s the crude numbers are almost equal. Some of the negative feedback indicators that contributed to this decline 
were political instability and upheaval, women joining the workforce, urbanization, poor housing stock, poor living 
conditions and minimal outmigration. 
Rapid urbanization is often cited as an indicator for population decline. Table 3 cites how the trend in higher 
urbanization patterns can be a factor contributing to lower growth rates. 
Table 3:  Urban Population and Live Births, 1960 and 1985  
  
1960 1960 1985 1985
Percent of Population in Urban areas Live Births per 1000 Percent of Population in Urban areas Live Births per 1000
GDR 72 17.0 77 13.7
Czechoslovakia 57 15.9 74 14.5
Soviet Union 50 24.9 66 19.4
Poland 48 22.6 60 18.2
source: GDR and Eastern Europe–A Handbook, p. 272
While the GDR has experienced the highest percentage of urbanization, it had the lowest birth rates of all the eastern 
block countries. These numbers are indicators of how interrelated urbanization and birthrates are for various countries. 
After the fall of the Wall, population in eastern Germany experienced large numbers of outmigration caused by labor 
markets, economic and social factors in the east. Between 1989-1992, each state in the new Länder lost over 1 million 
people. Map 7 shows the internal migration patterns from 1989-1991. This map clearly depicts the one-way migration 
patterns from the east to the west. Yet, it should be stated that compared to natural population movements, outmigration plays 
a diminishing role in eastern Germany’s population development, and has continued to decline since the fall of the Wall. 
A more significant population change factor is the drop in the net population. As stated in a 1996 European Commission 
study, "since the breakdown of the former regime the number of live births has drastically decreased by almost half 
and stabilized at this low level." Figures 6 and 7 break down East German population by State, and clearly depict 
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how outmigration, and birth and death rates of each eastern German state figure in to eastern German population loss/gain. 
Figure 6 
Natural population movements and migration in the new German Länder, 1990 and 1991 
 
source: European Commission Report, pg. 32 
Figure 7 
Live births in relation to mortality in the new German Länder, 1990 and 1991 
 
source: European Commission Report, pg. 32 
This decrease in population growth might be explained by the fact that many people migrating out of the country are 
younger people looking for work. Older portions of the population, those people that have lived in a city for decades, may 
not have the means or desire to move away. Thus, an older population is left in the country, which statistically means 
greater deaths over births. 
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Case Studies 
Berlin 
As a future and once former capital, Berlin has always been a center for commerce, government and living. In many ways, 
East and West Berlin reflect on a micro-scale the events occurring in land use development in other parts of 
Germany. Investors saw great opportunities in Berlin with the fall of the Wall. Estimates for services demanded in the east, 
as well as speculations on whether the government would reclaim Berlin as the capital of Germany, became motivating 
forces for developers. These factors coupled with the fact that the city (both east and west) did not have a comprehensive 
land use plan encompassing both areas compounded land development plans. Until 1994, when the official post-
reunification land use plan was approved, there were no legally binding laws prohibiting building in the area of former 
East Berlin and in the no man’s land which made up the buffer area between the two cities. Thus, the first years after the fall 
of the Wall Germany’s detailed land use planning structure fell apart. 
Much of the land interests focused in East Berlin and in the areas around the undeveloped "no mans land" between east 
and west. Investors jumped at any opportunity available to buy-up and develop these areas, and many pressed their plans to 
be passed believing it was not politically or economically feasible to wait for a uniform land use plan to be 
developed. Consequently, before the master plan of 1994 was completed, quick land use decision in the west were made in 
the Berlin Senate, while in the east a Federal Building Code was created to restrict rapid building by predicting how closely 
a new development would exist harmoniously within the immediate surroundings. These two mechanisms were able to be 
kept many projects at bay. 
Plans for new and improved retail space in the east became a hot topic among investors and developers. Statistics show 
that when the Berlin Wall fell, 78 % of all shopping floorspace was in the western sector, thus developers immediately 
jumped in and added more retail space to the city’s eastern side. Today retail outlets have been augmented in the core area 
of East Berlin, yet current trends show that Berlin city authorities want to plan "polycentral" shopping areas. This trend 
will speckle shopping centers throughout the city and surrounding areas, rather than reinforcing the traditional single city 
center structure found in older European cities. The concern with this trend is that it conclusively has pulled economic 
growth away from the center city. 
Another important land use development pattern to consider in Berlin is the tradeoff between office and industrial 
space expected to occur in the next few years. As the federal government moves to Berlin, industry is expected to leave 
the city. Between 1961 and 1989 West Berlin was a heavily subsidized city. Industries that located in West Berlin were at 
a disadvantage because of their distance from markets in the west, thus subsidies provided incentives for these companies 
to stay in the city. Today subsidies are available to industries that wish to move outside the city and into the territory of 
the former east. According to a survey carried out by the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung in 1992 10% of 
all companies active in Berlin intend to relocate to out of town areas around Berlin/Postdam. The movement of 
these companies into the Brandenburg countryside will mean heavier traffic patterns as well as environmental damage as 
new growth envelopes existing land. 
Office space and housing have become another key factor in spatial development. With the seat of the government moving 
to Berlin, it is estimated that by the end of the decade 108 million square feet of new office space will be added to Berlin 
alone. Housing shortages, exploding rents and property prices, and poor quality housing stock in the east are expected to 
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push development further into the periphery of the city. 
The problem with trying to control both the industrial and housing growth is that there is no regional oversight board. When 
it comes to Berlin, the principles of post-war West German land use planning fall apart. Berlin is an island in the middle of 
the state of Brandenburg. The municipalities in Brandenburg, exercising their new powers, want development in their 
areas. Enticing developers to come is not hard: planning permissions in these areas of the east are easier to obtain than 
in Berlin. American style megamarket developments are already appearing in these areas. 
Policy Recommendations 
When evaluating the present prosperity gap between eastern and western Germany, and in light of recent economic 
figures, many assume that the new Länder will not match the standards of living of the old Länder any time soon. 
Some estimates project that this equalization will take place at the earliest by 2005 while others believe that eastern Germany 
is doomed to have a sluggish economy which will never catch up to the west. Nonetheless, policy trends will surely try 
to remedy this situation through interventions which seek to: 1) decrease deficits; 2) cleanup and improve the environment; 
3) reform administrations; and, 4) invest in infrastructure. 
The Case for Regional Planning 
Regional planning is a vital tool that can be used to assist in German spatial planning. Regional planning should be 
established at three levels: 1) within the Länder between the various municipalities; 2) among the Länder; and 3) 
between Germany and their neighboring countries particularly Poland and the Czech Republic. By establishing economic 
and environmental goals and objectives, all three areas of regional planning could be used to reduce environmental 
degradation and increase efficiency in development. The border areas in eastern Germany near Poland and the Czech 
Republic are of particular importance because of the immediate necessity for environmental cleanup and 
improved transportation. 
It is critical that policy makers and planners focus on the entire country of Germany, both east and west and not isolate 
certain areas for development and improvement. Much attention has been placed on the growth and development cycles 
around Berlin and on the border of the former FRG and GDR. Yet, this emphasis ignores other areas in the east. Clearly, 
while situations in the new German Länder may seem uniform they are "by no means homogeneous." Each state and 
region differs greatly in terms of locational advantages and development potentials. For example, the border areas 
between eastern Germany and Poland and the Czech Republic are suffering greatly. German border cities loose jobs to 
the cheaper labor markets of their eastern neighbors. This pattern further depresses cities in this area. Compounding 
this problem is the poor transportation infrastructure leading to the western part of the country. Ultimately, further 
outmigration occurs leaving eastern cities more deserted and depressed. 
An emphasis must also be placed on equalizing spending on German cities. While environmental cleanup and 
economic development in the east is crucial, it is important to recognize that problems of deforestation and growth still exist 
in the western part of the country. Critical to this concept is the reality that land in both the east and west is being developed 
at a faster rate than the population is growing. This American pattern of land development has significant 
implications. Germany must use caution when allowing developments to pop-up in the East. Although economic 
development is crucial, it would be more progressive and future-oriented for policy makers to insist on redeveloping 
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existing space. The German government has initiated policies that encourage investors to rehabilitate buildings by giving 
tax benefits that allow investors to deduct renovations in full from taxable income within 10 years. But as Helmut 
Fleischhauer, real estate broker for in Hameln Germany pointed out, it is a real problem to get buyers excited about houses 
that are rundown to begin with. The competition is the greenfields that are considered more scenic, often less costly and 
easier to develop. 
It is likely that policy makers will decide to create stronger transportation routes, which in turn will increase eastern 
German land value. Major routes will most likely be placed from larger western German cities (München, 
Hamburg, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart) to the main major eastern German cities (Berlin, Rostock, Dresden, 
Leipzig, Erfurt/Jena). While transportation infrastructure is necessary, it is important to keep in mind how these transit 
routes might affect eastern German cities. It will be crucial to make sure these cities in-between don’t merely become 
transit routes but instead destination points for commerce and living. One idea would be for the country to create 
a transportation master plan which would strategically place all future major transportation routes. 
Depending on the urban planning policies and strategies of the new German Länder the Russian military bases can be 
viewed as long-term deficits or locational assets. Planning measures can be initiated to clean sites through a phased plan 
over time, thus saving on cost. Also, land that is not highly contaminated can be made into regional parks with restored 
natural ecosystems. 
Retail stores has continually led development in the new Länder. While it is important to have solid retail industries, 
Germany must pay attention to small businesses being shutout by this growth and must promote a diversity of business 
and industry to move into the areas. While retail is an important aspect to an economy, it is also a "soft" industry that is 
easily effected by any type of recession or economic slump. Thus, strong industries, which desire a skilled-workforce, 
should be enticed to move into the areas. Already the development frenzy has left many cities in the East with an over 
supply of retailers. The German Retail Association estimates one square meter of retail space is needed for every resident of 
a city. Yet, in many cities in the east the ratio of retail shops to inhabitants is well over 1 square meter per person. 
Implications  
Since the end of the Second World War, Germany has been a leader in architecture, urban planning and environmental 
policy, striving to create unique and feasible environmental alternatives and technically innovative ways of living. 
This tradition has given rise to great experiments in architecture and planning: the Werkbund, the Bauhaus, the 
Siedlung developments and the post-war international building exhibitions. Strict environmental clean-up policies as well 
as leading political parties like the Greens have been upheld as examples for countries around the world concerned with 
their ecosystems. Do current post-reunification trends indicate that this legacy is about to end? 
Land use patterns in both the east and west are mimicking American style, suburban growth. While Germany has strict land 
use regulations, the chaos following the fall of the Wall and the desire for improved economic conditions in the east have 
led into development patterns which may hurt German cities in the future. Development patterns indicates that land 
is increasing at a much faster rate than population growth. In a recent article Robert Geddes writes:  
  
American city-regions’ population growth is now dramatically outpaced by their geographic growth…While Chicago grew 
4 percent in population, its urbanized land increased 46 percent. Even places that were declining in their population 
file:///C|/545/1997/sca/DOCUMENT.html (18 of 20) [6/18/2008 10:23:00 AM]
University of Michigan, NRE 545, 1997 Monograph
were simultaneously growing in their urban area; Cleveland, for example, had a population decline of 8 percent, while 
it expanded geographically by 33 percent.  
 
It is evident that this pattern is being duplicated in the eastern part of Germany. While the population declines in that the 
five East German Länder, construction is cited as the only sector to experience economic growth in the east. It is clear that 
East Germany seeks to bring economic development into their cities they exponentially increase their land 
development. Germany, a much more densely populated country than the United States, must consider the growth 
problems occurring in the US and in other countries and learn from these mistakes. Loss of green space, and detraction 
of economic development in older inner cities, increased traffic patterns and higher rates of environmental pollutants are 
only some of the repercussions of this type of rapid land development. 
The process of German reunification has reached a critical stage. The regional disparities between eastern and 
western Germany are still enormous in terms of standard of living, employment, business activity, infrastructure 
and environmental conditions, with the people in the east undergoing grave social hardship and problems. The transfer 
of capital to the new German Länder, which is meant to spur their economy and to promote the convergence of 
living conditions in the two parts of Germany, places a heavy burden on the old Länder. Yet, while Germany is concerned 
with the rate in which economic conditions in the new Länder are catching up to the old Länder, they are allowing 
land development to rise at a faster rate than the population is growing. While the country historically has had relatively 
strict land development guidelines, they have allowed these rules to be flexed for the new Länder. If Germany wants to keep 
its position as a leader in the field of environmental policy and planning, and if the country is concerned with future 
growth patterns and the affects on the environment, they need to examine their current policies and create a vision for 
future land use and environmental planning. 
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I. Introduction 
General Circulation models have predicted a two degree increase in global temperatures by the end of the next century 
caused by an expected doubling in atmospheric carbon dioxide (Jetten 1996). If global warming occurs, increased 
temperatures may have tremendous implications for viral diseases whose vectors are sensitive to climate changes. One 
disease implicated, which is thought to pose the greatest threat in the case of global warming in North America (Shope, 
1991), is dengue fever. Dengue fever is transmitted by Aedes aegypti, a vector whose rates of viral infection vary with 
climate conditions (Reiter, 1988). It has been predicted that global warming may shift the distribution and frequency of 
dengue, with dire consequences to public health in the areas affected (Patz et al., 1996). To develop a more accurate 
prediction of possible future scenarios, this study evaluated retrospectively the relationship between morbidity 
incidence attributed to dengue fever in Trinidad and Tobago and local variation in temperature and precipitation. This 
study analyzed weekly dengue morbidity data from the country of Trinidad and Tobago and monthly precipitation 
and temperature data from the Port of Spain, Trinidad for a nine year period (1982-1990).  
II. Objectives 
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The main objective of this study was to determine retrospectively, whether there was a temporal pattern of association 
between weather variables and dengue fever morbidity rates. Because mosquito density, activity, and survival is related 
to various weather conditions, there may be a correlation between dengue incidence and weather patterns. However, it 
is uncertain whether temperature or precipitation will be the strongest predictor of dengue incidence, or whether a 
more predictive relationship exists when both are taken into account. The time lag between weather patterns and 
possible increases in dengue incidence is also uncertain. The various components of the time lag include the period 
of embryonic development of the mosquito, hatching time, the adult and sexual development period of the mosquito, the 
time before the first blood meal, the extrinsic incubation period, the time before the next blood meal in which the 
mosquito passes the infectious virus, and the time before the appearance of clinical manifestations of dengue fever (Table 1). 
It has been found that the development of the dengue virus in the mosquito, the extrinsic incubation period (EIP), will 
range from seven to twelve days depending on ambient temperature (Watts, 1987). It has also been determined that the 
period between infection and clinical manifestations of disease in humans ranges from four to six days (Pan American 
Health Organization, 1994). It is therefore assumed that a time lag of at least eleven and perhaps as much as eighteen days 
will be found. However this may be a very conservative estimate as it does not take into account the life cycle and 
development of the mosquito which varies according to ambient weather conditions, the availability of food , and larval 
density in the container in which the mosquito is breeding. Hatching of the mosquito varies dramatically according 
to precipitation and humidity; a dry period may mean the mosquitoes will delay hatching for more than a year (Pan 
American Health Organization, 1994). The delayed development could potentially provide a much greater time lag 
than expected, possibly a time lag of greater than a year. However, because such long dry periods do not occur in Trinidad, 
a time lag of less than one year is more likely. The goal of this effort was to evaluate whether a temporal association, 
possibly with a time lag, exists between weather variables and disease incidence.  




Dengue fever is caused by a virus from the family Flavviviridae; four serotypes are distinguished by serological 
methods, dengue-1, dengue-2, dengue-3, and dengue-4. All four serotypes have been found in the Americas, however 
only serotypes 1, 2, and 4 circulated in the period focused on for this study (1982-1990). The virus is transmitted primarily 
by the Ae. aegypti mosquito to the human host. Ae. aegypti is a highly domesticated mosquito, breeding in 
freshwater containers stored for drinking and bathing. Because severe frost and cold weather kills adult mosquitoes and 
eggs, dengue is currently restricted to the region between thirty-five degrees north latitude and thirty-five degrees 
south latitude. The clinical manifestations of dengue can range from a minor fever, often with flu-like symptoms, to 
severe Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever (DHF) and Dengue Shock Syndrome (DSS) that may result in death. Between 
250,000-500,000 cases of the severe DHF/DSS form occur yearly throughout the world and case fatalities can reach forty 
to fifty percent if not treated with fluid replacement therapy (Gubler, 1994). The relationship between weather patterns 
and dengue transmission is multifaceted involving both the mosquito life cycle and viral replication requirements. It has 
been determined that warmer temperatures reduce larval size of Ae. aegypti which results in a smaller adult size (Rueda, 
1990). Smaller adult female mosquitoes have been found to feed more frequently to nourish their developing eggs 
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(Reiter, 1988) which increases the probability of transmission. The positive relationship between biting rates and 
temperature has been supported in field studies in Bangkok (Pant, 1973). A second consideration in viral transmission is 
the EIP. A study by Watts et al. (1987) determined that the EIP is heavily contingent upon temperature; the EIP for Ae. 
aegypti decreased from twelve to seven days when mosquitoes were kept at 32-35 degrees instead of 30 degrees Celsius. 
These results imply temperature induced variations in the vectorial efficiency of Ae. aegypti may be a significant 
determinant of the annual pattern of dengue that Watts et. al. found in Bangkok. Research by Koopman et al. (1991) 
also supports the theory that dengue transmission frequency relies upon climatic conditions. His study concluded that 
median temperature during the rainy season was the strongest predictor of infection. High temperature was responsible 
for greater transmission rates by reducing the period of viral replication in mosquitoes. It has been found that 
increasing precipitation may either increase or decrease dengue incidence rates. It has been proposed that human vector 
contact may be enhanced during periods of high rainfall (Gubler, 1994) because mosquitoes may become less active. In 
this scenario they are more likely to stay indoors where their probability of survival is higher and their contact with humans 
is greater. However, many scientists have found an inverse relationship between incidence rates and rainfall. In his 1938 
study, Soper found that low rainfall in Brazil results in more water storage containers in the home and therefore more 
Ae. aegypti in residential areas. The implications of global warming on dengue transmission has been modeled by Martens 
et. al. (1997) who found that the transmission potential of dengue may be highly sensitive to climate changes. They 
predicted that transmission should be particularly sensitive to warming in higher altitudes and in areas which are currently 
at the periphery of endemic transmission. Jetten and Focks (1996) have also developed a model of the influence of warming 
on the intensity and distribution of dengue throughout the world. Using a simulation model projection, their results indicate 
that the current warming prediction of two degrees by 2100 may result in an increase in the latitude and altitude range 
of dengue. They also concluded that the duration of the transmission season could increase in temperate locations. As yet, 
there has been no study published of actual case data that seeks a retrospective statistical association between weather 
variables and dengue incidence. Studies of dengue in the past have not looked at weather factors independently, nor have 
they looked longitudinally at how these factors may affect morbidity rates. My study is intended to evaluate the 
relative importance of temperature and precipitation rates to transmission using long-term case data from the islands 
of Trinidad and Tobago.  
IV. Data 
Monthly mean precipitation and temperature data were collected from the Web Page of the National Climatic Data 
Center (http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/ghcn/ghcn.html). While Tobago did have its own weather station located at Crown 
Point Airport, this data was unavailable therefore all weather information came from the Piarco International Airport 
in Trinidad. The mean temperature and precipitation were used, as opposed to either the minimum or maximum 
temperature, because it has been found that incidence rates of malaria are most closely related to mean temperature at 
lower altitudes (Loevinsohn, 1994). Because the disease etiology of malaria is somewhat similar to that of dengue (they 
are both diseases carried by mosquitoes whose living and breeding conditions are contingent upon the ambient 
environment) and because Trinidad is at an elevation of twelve meters, I chose the mean temperature and precipitation 
values. However, it is important to note that malaria and dengue are differentiated by difference species of mosquito 
vectors, entirely different infectious parasites, and different patterns of breeding and development of the vectors. Therefore, it 
is possible that minimum and maximum temperatures may be useful in predicting a relationship between weather variables 
and morbidity rates. The weekly incidence rates of dengue in Trinidad and Tobago were obtained from Dr. Wilson of 
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the University of Michigan Department of Epidemiology. Because data from Trinidad alone was unavailable, I used 
the coalesced data which included morbidity from both Trinidad and Tobago. The weekly rates were converted to 
monthly rates, assuming that whatever fraction of the week was ascribed to one of two months, if it was a week split 
between two months, a similar proportion of incidence was given.  
V. Qualitative Description of the data 
The nine year period of monthly temperature data varied less that 4 degrees Celsius. A seasonal distribution of maximum 
and minimum temperatures exists; annual maximum temperatures were usually observed in the months of May 
through September, and annual minimum temperatures were found in either December or January (Graph 1).   
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Annual precipitation over the nine years varied considerably (Graph 2). In general, January through April was a period of 
low precipitation, but the remainder of the year was less consistent with a maximum yearly temperature varying by month 
each year. Four months had unusually high levels of precipitation, June 1983, July 1984, August 1984, and October 1988, all 
of which were greater than 30 centimeters, and could be considered outliers.   
  
   
Morbidity data over the nine year period indicated no apparent seasonal distribution (Graph 3) Each year had a different 
month with a maximum of morbidity cases. Outliers for morbidity are considered months in which the number of cases 
was greater than 50 and include November 1986, and January, February, March, and July of 1990.   
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There was no visible relationship between morbidity and temperature over time, nor was a temporal relationship taking 
time lags into account apparent (Graph 4). The periods of high incidence occurred at any point in the year during the nine-
year period and did not appear to be associated with either high or low monthly temperatures.   
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There appeared to be no visible relationship between morbidity and temperature during the nine-year period, nor did any 
time lags between precipitation and monthly morbidity seem apparent (Graph 5).   
  




To determine the most appropriate model to demonstrate the possible relationship between morbidity due to dengue 
fever weather variables, several approaches were undertaken (Thesis1-Thesis 3). Thesis 1: Four separate models were tested 
to determine the most appropriate one: a linear model, an exponential growth model, an autoregressive model with a time lag 
of one month, and an exponential growth autoregressive model with a time lag of one month. I conjectured that the 
relationship between the variables may not be linear and thought it best to try both the linear and exponential models with 
a time lag of one month. To determine the most appropriate model, a regression was run for each of the situations to find 
the amount of error explained by each model. Also to determine the robustness of the models, the F statistics were 
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calculated, as were their corresponding p-value. Because one of the assumptions of multiple regressions is that errors of 
the variables are not related to one another, the Durbin Watson statistic was calculated to determine possible serial-
correlation. To test the null hypothesis that neither precipitation nor temperature were related to morbidity rates, the t-
statistic was calculated with its corresponding p-value. Finally, an equation for the line of each model was determined. 
Results of Thesis 1: The results of the four models showed no statistical significance for each model, nor were any of 
the variables alone statistically significant. The Durbin Watson statistic indicated that there was serial correlation between 
the variables as might be expected between temperature and precipitation which often affect one another. Because a 
linear relationship with time lags is more likely than an exponential relationship, I chose to retain the linear model for 
the remainder of the tests. Thesis 1a: To determine whether a better model might be achieved if the outliers were removed, 
the previous four models were tested after removing monthly records in which either the morbidity was greater that 50 or 
the precipitation was greater than 30. Because there were no outliers for temperature, no temperature records were 
removed. Results of Thesis 1a: The results of the four models with the outliers excluded showed no statistical significance 
for each model, nor were any of the variables alone statistically significant. The Durbin Watson statistic indicated that 
there was serial correlation between temperature and precipitation. Thesis 2: The linear model was retained because 
although no statistically significant relationship exists without a time lag or a time lag of only one month, a likely 
relationship may exist with a time lag of up to one year. To determine if such a relationship is a possibility, the 
dependent variable was lagged against the two weather variables by each month for up to twenty-four months. Results 
of Thesis 2: Several statistically significant relationships were found during this test. First, the model with a time lag of 
six months was statistically significant with an F statistic equal to 3.935, corresponding to a p-value of .0234. To reject the 
null hypothesis that there was no statistically significant relationship between incidence and the weather variables, the p-
value had to be .05 or less. The R-squared value was .0889 which indicates that 8.89 percent of the error is explained by 
the model. Temperature, with a t-value of 2.64 corresponding to a p-value of .0098, was statistically significant, 
while precipitation was not a statistically significant parameter. To reject the null hypothesis, that there was no 
statistically significant relationship between temperature or precipitation and incidence, the t-values for either of the 
weather variables had to be greater than 1.96 with a corresponding p value of .05 or less. The correlation between 
temperature and precipitation was positive, with a value of .2504, and the correlation between precipitation and 
temperature was negative with a correlation value of -.0239. The Durbin Watson statistic indicated that serial-
correlation between the two independent variables was occurring and had a value of 1.735 ( a value of 2 indicates that there 
is no serial correlation). The equation for this model is -142.26 = 5.83 Beta 1 - .196 Beta 2 + error term. The other 
two statistically significant models were at lags of thirteen and seventeen months, which is too long a period to represent 
an actual relationship and is likely an artifact of lagging the model for too many months. Because long periods of 
desiccation do not occur in Trinidad, it is most probable that the existing lag is less than one year. Neither of the models 
were more statistically significant than the model with the six month lag. At the lag of 6 months the F value was 3.211 with 
a corresponding p-value of .0459. The R-squared value was .0789 indicating that 7.89 percent of the error is explained by 
the model. Temperature, the only statistically significant variable for this model, had a t-value of -2.52 with a corresponding 
p-value of .01. In this model, temperature was negatively correlated with morbidity with a correlation of -.279 and 
precipitation was positively correlated with morbidity with a correlation of .0197. The equation for this model is 261.81 = 
-9.963 Beta 1 + .1098 Beta 2 + error term. The other model with a statistically significant relationship which is likely an 
artifact of lagging for too many moths is found at 17 months. The F value for this model was 4.059 with a corresponding 
p-value of .02. The R-squared value was .1001 indicating that 10.01 percent of the error is explained by the 
model. Precipitation, the only statistically significant variable in this model, had a t-value of 2.77 with a corresponding p-
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value of .007. Precipitation was positively correlated with morbidity with a correlation of .319 and temperature was 
positively correlated with morbidity with a correlation of .065 in this model. The equation for this model is -39.36 = 1.53 
Beta 1 + .76 Beta 2 + error term. Thesis 2a: To test whether temperature as the only independent variable would create a 
better model, regressions were run of temperature against morbidity lagging the variables up to twenty-four months. Results 
of Thesis 2a: Two statistically significant relationships were determined. At a lag of six months, the model was 
statistically significant with an F statistic of 5.887 and a corresponding p-value of .0173. The R-squared value was .0627 
which indicates that 6.27 percent of the error is explained by the model. The t-value was 2.426 with a corresponding p-
value of .0173, indicating that the variable is statistically significant. A positive correlation between temperature and 
morbidity was found with a correlation value of .2504. The equation for this model is -96.67 = 4.05 Beta 1 + error term. 
The second statistically significant relationship was found at a time lag of thirteen months which, as explained previously is 
too long a period to represent an actual relationship and is likely an artifact of lagging the model for too many months. In 
this regression, the F statistic was 6.84 with a corresponding p-value of .0106. The R-squared was .0779 indicating that 
7.79 percent of the error is explained by the model. The t-statistic was -2.616 with a corresponding p-value of .0106. There 
was a negative correlation between precipitation and morbidity with a correlation value of -.279. The equation for the line 
is 257.24 = -9.4 Beta 1 + error term. Thesis 2b: To test whether precipitation as the only independent variable would create 
a better model, regressions were run of precipitation against morbidity lagging the variables up to twenty-four months. 
Results of Thesis 2b: There was one statistically significant relationship between precipitation and morbidity at a time lag 
of seventeen months. However, this is likely an artifact of lagging the variables for too many months. In this regression, the 
F statistic was 9.047 with a corresponding p-value of .0036. The R-squared was .1016 indicating that 10.16 percent of the 
error is explained by the model. The t-statistic was 2.008 with a corresponding p-value of .0035. There was a 
positive correlation between precipitation and morbidity with a correlation value of .318. The equation for the line is .21 
= .778 Beta 1 + error term. Thesis 3: Because it is possible that precipitation and temperature have different time lags 
when affecting morbidity, two models were tested using both independent variables at different time lags. Because the 
time lags for temperature of six and thirteen months and the time lag for precipitation of seventeen months were 
statistically significant, the models used first a lag of six months for temperature and seventeen months for precipitation, 
and then a lag of thirteen months for temperature and seventeen months for precipitation. Results of Thesis 3: Neither 
the model nor the independent variables were statistically significant for both models tested. The Durbin Watson 
statistic indicated that serial correlation was occurring between the variables. These results suggest that either the variables 
are interacting with one another or the time lags chosen are too great to indicate a real relationship.  
VII. Equations for Each Model 
Thesis 1: Full dataset 
●     linear model
 
MORBID = alpha + (Beta1)(Temp) + (Beta2)(Precip) + error term 
●     exponential growth
 
log(MORBID) = alpha + (Beta1)(Temp) + (Beta2)(Precip) + error term 
●     autregressive (lag = 1)
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MORBIDt = alpha + (Beta1)(Tempt-1) + (Beta2)(Precipt-1) + error term 
●     log autoregressive (lag = 1)
 
log(MORBIDt )= alpha + (Beta1)[log(Tempt-1)] + (Beta2)[log(Precip t-1)] + error term
Thesis 1a: Deleting observations where Morbidity > 50 and Precipitation > 30 
●     linear model
 
MORBID = alpha + (Beta1)(Temp) + (Beta2)(Precip) + error term 
●     exponential growth
 
log(MORBID) = alpha + (Beta1)(Temp) + (Beta2)(Precip) + error term 
●     autregressive (lag = 1)
 
MORBIDt = alpha + (Beta1)(Tempt-1) + (Beta2)(Precip t-1) + error term 
●     log autoregressive (lag = 1)
 
log(MORBIDt )= alpha + (Beta1)[log(Tempt-1)] + (Beta2)[log(Precip t-1)] + error term
Thesis 2: Full dataset 
●     Lagging the dependent variable and running a linear model on the lagged dataset.
●     Lags ran from 0 thru 24
 
MORBIDt = alpha + (Beta1)(Tempt-1) + (Beta2)(Precip t-1) + error term
Thesis 2a: Full dataset 
●     Lagging the dependent variable and running a linear model on the lagged dataset.
●     Lags ran from 0 thru 24
 
MORBIDt = alpha + (Beta2)(Temp t-1) + error term
Thesis 2b: Full dataset 
●     Lagging the dependent variable and running a linear model on the lagged dataset.
●     Lags ran from 0 thru 24
 
MORBIDt = alpha + (Beta1)(Precipt-1) + error term
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Thesis 3: Full dataset 
●     Lagging the dependent variable and running a linear model on the lagged dataset.
●     Lags were 6,13 for precip. and 17 for temp
 
MORBIDt = alpha + (Beta1)(Temp t-1) + (Beta2)(Precipt-1) + error term
VIII. Discussion 
There are two models which show the greatest likely relationship between weather variables and morbidity due to 
dengue fever. Both of the models at a time lag of six months, with temperature alone and with precipitation and 
temperature together, were statistically significant and appear to be the best models. The model did not greatly improve 
when temperature was considered alone, therefore both models are considered appropriate in explaining the 
association between morbidity and weather. Because the time lag is six months, it suggests a seasonal relationship which 
may be discerned through further research. As yet, my work has some errors which can be overcome with more data and 
more time. It is possible that although there were one hundred and eight data points and a minimum of twenty data points 
is necessary for a statistically significant relationship to be found, more data points are needed. Errors could also have been 
due to the fact that the weather data was from Trinidad alone while the incidence data was from both Trinidad and Tobago. It 
is possible that the weather in Trinidad is not reflective of that in Tobago. Also, the method of changing weekly incidence 
data to monthly incidence data may have induced errors. It is likely that although a certain fraction of a week belongs to 
one month, the corresponding fraction of incidence does not also belong to that month. For example, there may be an 
outbreak in one month and not the next, which would mean an unequal division of incidence for a week split between those 
two months. Lastly, the small amount of serial correlation between temperature and precipitation indicate that these 
two variables are affecting one another which may reduce the robustness of the model. To correct some of these problems 
a longer period of time should be analyzed, the data should be given in monthly form for all variables, and all data should 
be given from one locale. Also, using the minimum and maximum temperatures in place of mean temperature may reveal 
a more predictive relationship.  
IX. Conclusions 
The statistical procedures suggest that there is a statistically significant relationship between temperature and incidence 
rates given a six month time lag. The results indicate that it takes six months for environmental conditions, as measured 
by temperature alone, to affect dengue incidence. This may be due to temperature’s influence on the life cycle of a mosquito 
or viral replication rates. The higher temperatures may reduce the larval size of mosquitoes, which results in smaller adults 
that need to feed more often. Higher temperatures may also speed up the EIP causing greater rates of transmission. Because 
the time lag for these to occur is nebulous due to the variable nature to the mosquito life cycle, it difficult to verify how 
these factors can be ascribed to the six-month time lag found. A small negative correlation of precipitation with incidence 
was detected, suggesting that precipitation six months prior to reporting dengue may reduce incidence rates. This may be due 
to a variety of factors. Either high amounts of rain flush out larvae, thereby reducing rates or low amounts of rain requires 
more water to be stored which will increase incidence rates. In either situation an inverse relationship is observed 
between precipitation and incidence rates. However, because no statistically significant relationship of precipitation 
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with incidence was found, precipitation did not actually influence incidence, only a negative correlation between the 
two variables can be alluded to.  
X. Public Health Implications 
Because this study indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between dengue incidence and temperature at 
a six month time lag, there are both present and future public health implications. The present implications of this study 
suggest that disease prevention and surveillance measures should focus on the temperature six months prior to determine 
the risks of increased transmission for the present time. The future implications of this study are more uncertain. Because 
a positive correlation of temperature with incidence was found, global warming is likely to have an impact on dengue 
fever, increasing the disease’s range and the number of infected individuals. To mitigate future impacts both 
disease surveillance and control are necessary. Disease surveillance should include both passive and active 
surveillance. Passive surveillance would require dengue be a mandated reportable disease that would be recorded in 
all hospitals and clinics. Active surveillance includes providing a laboratory-based surveillance system which would 
give public health officials precise information about periods of increased dengue activity. One active surveillance 
measure suggested is the creation of diagnostic centers in sensitive geographic regions bordering endemic zones (Patz et 
al., 1996). Such centers would provide early warning of changes in incidence and allow for intervention. Control 
measures should have an integrated approach combining environmental management, chemical control, and 
biological methods. Environmental management is any change in the environment that prevents or minimizes 
vector propagation or man-vector-pathogen contact. These include environmental modification (long-term changes to 
vector habitat such as improved delivery of potable water), environmental manipulation (short-term changes to vector 
habitat including proper storage of containers), and changes to human habitation or behavior (including the screening 
of windows). Chemical control should be used in a limited fashion because of the toxic effects most larvicides have had 
to humans and aquatic organisms in the past. Present use is restricted to containers that cannot otherwise be eliminated 
or managed. Biological control is based on the introduction of living organisms that will prey upon, parasitize, compete with 
or otherwise reduce the abundance of Aedes or anopheline mosquitoes. These interventions have been largely experimental 
and have included introduction of fish, bacteria, and cylclopoids (‘water fleas") which attempt to reduce mosquito 
populations. If little is done to prevent global warming, surveillance and control measures will be our last protection 
against increasing infectious disease transmission. However, preventing warming should be a greater priority to ensure 
that global dissemination of communicable diseases does not occur.  
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Relationships:  Integration Paper
John Callewaert
In my paper, I explored the spatial association between environmental hazards, race, and income for zip 
codes in the state of Michigan.  The results of my analysis showed a strong association between zip 
codes having a high number of environmental hazards and zip codes having the highest minority 
populations.  Only with one environmental hazard variable,  the number of incinerator emissions per zip 
code, was there a strong association between the environmental hazards and both race and income.  This 
type of analysis has come to be understood as environmental justice.  The United States Environmental 
Protection Agency defines environmental justice as 
        …the fair treatment of people of all races, cultures and incomes, with respect to the development,  
        implementation, and  enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies.  Fair treatment 
implies  
        that no people should be forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of the negative environmental 
impacts of  
        pollution or hazards due to a lack of political, economic, or educational strength. 
While this is a very useful and helpful definition, environmental justice can be defined much more 
broadly.  In some situations, gender and age may also be important factors in terms of who is 
experiencing a disproportionate burden of environmental hazards.  Furthermore, environmental justice 
need not only look at the disproportionate burdens of negative environmental impacts, it can also include 
the disproportionate access to certain environmental amenities or resources.  Are particular groups not 
allowed equal access to the resources needed for production and survival? The framework that I will use 
to examine the relationship between my topic and the other papers is the framework of environmental 
justice.   My intent is to identify the environmental justice issues that may be present in each study.  I 
hope to work with the broadest possible definition of environmental justice in order to examine the 
potential for both disproportionate burdens and/or disproportionate access. 
Iyer:  Urbanization in Moscow  
 Here I believe the environmental justice concerns might include lower-income groups and the elderly.  
As land and housing prices increase and with increased capital activity there will be inevitable dumping 
of undesirables (waste management facilities, polluting industries, etc.) in areas of the city with the least 
political and economic clout.  This has been the case in the U.S., but here the market economy is 
contained by certain environmental and housing regulations.  If such regulations do not exist in Russia, a 
laissez-faire economic system will inevitably create disproportionate burdens.  The elderly on state 
pensions may be the prime victims as they do not have the financial means to move out of areas that 
may become the environmental dumping groups of the new Moscow. 
Chaudhury:  Deseritification in the Sahel  
 An important environmental justice concern with this study involves what is happening to the nomadic 
peoples as more and more desertification control schemes involve moving people to settled agriculture 
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lifestyles.  What is happening to the nomads as their way of life is curtailed?  There may be serious 
cultural implications as the Sahel transitions through a variety of changes designed to curtail 
desertificiation.  There are also numerous cases of environmental injustice in the eco-political history of 
the region.  What happened to people and the land due to the colonial forces that demanded a shift to 
export agriculture. 
Kim: The Red River Delta in Viet Nam  
 Despite centuries of intensive agriculture and a high population density, this region of Viet Nam is 
surprisingly stable and productive.  With the changes from sustainable production to a more market 
based economy, however, one should be aware of the development of injustices in terms of resource 
distribution and pollution.  In an ethnically homogenous society who are the groups that experience the 
environmental problems or are left out of the development agenda?  Women?  Children?  The elderly? 
Wegbreit:  Weather Patterns and Dengue Transmission in Trinidad-Tobago  
 Even within a small country like Trinidad-Tobago, one should be cautious of looking at “national” 
data.  While more regionally specific data collection is a much more difficult task, there may not be the 
same correlation between temperature, rainfall and dengue fever for different social groups.  Might the 
elderly or children be more at risk?  Or perhaps there might be a different based on household income?  
It might seem that lower-income groups might have a greater potential to exposure, but if wealthier 
groups have a greater ability to store water in the household they might have a greater risk?  Expanding 
the original question to include more socio-economic variables would be very important for establishing 
public health policies and initiatives. 
Manokham:  Deforestation in Southeast Asia  
 Here I think one needs to ask more specific questions about the connection between deforestation, 
population growth and poverty.  Is the reason that deforestation is occurring as such a rapid rate in the 
region because of population growth and need to raise the standard of living?  It seems that in many 
cases, the deforestation is occurring because of the demand from foreign markets and the desire of 
national elites to exploit the resources and the market.  The plight of the Philippine poor did not improve 
from the deforestation of that country, but the Marcos regime did grow wealthier and more powerful.  In 
such situations, the poor are often exploited as much as the forestry resources.  Attempts at social 
forestry, which includes the interests of a variety of stakeholders seems a more appropriate effort to 
overcome some of the injustices associated with deforestation in Southeast Asia.  
   
England:  Population Growth, Violence and Environmental Degradation in Burundi  
 In this study the injustices based on ethnic and class tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi were clearly 
evident.  These injustices have led to severe and violent clashes between the two groups over the last 
several decades.  Recent initiatives such as the regroupment camps in which Hutu men (the ethnic 
majority) are confined will only exacerbate the tensions between the groups regarding access to land and 
environmental resources.  The government’s mandate that there be no discussion of ethnic differences 
makes the task of addresses the injustices between groups even more difficult.  However, if there are 
differences between the two groups based on class, perhaps development schemes and environmental 
programs could use that factor to seek a more equitable distribution of resources.  To deny the injustices 
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that exist and to not seek to address them would seem to only lead to more violence. 
Scaff:  German Reunification and Consequences to the Environment  
 As with the Moscow study, it seems that the group that is experiencing the environmental burdens left 
by the East German political system are those that are not able to move to the West.  As noted in the 
presentation, this is often the elderly.  Furthermore, given the rapid and unmanaged growth in the East, 
what is happening with the inevitable waste generation?  Where is it going and how is it being handled?  
The former political system left severe environmental scars on the land, are the “flexible” regulations of 
the new political system creating similar scars, and if so, who is bearing the burden? 
Lo:  Urbanization in Sao Paolo, Brazil  
 What has been the environmental impact of the dizzying urbanization of Sao Paolo and how has it 
affected different groups?  Along with incredible disparities in wealth, Brazil is also a racially diverse 
country.  Have certain groups bore the impact of urbanization more than others.  Do the environmental 
disamenities affect one group or groups more than others?  Or has the rapid growth of the city affected 
everyone equally despite if they live in a gated household or a favela.  It would seem that within a 
society with great income disparities there are also environmental disparities.  What are they?  How are 
they impacting public health, environmental policies, etc.?  
   
 These comments are only suggestions for broadening any examination of the population-environment 
dynamic to include aspects of environmental justice.  Including environmental justice would allow for a 
more complete perspective on the political economy or the political ecology of a particular program, 
plan, or policy.  As human population grows we not only place greater demands on the environment, but 
we also place greater demands on each other.  We can no longer think of environmental regulations and 
environmental protection without determining the social impact of such programs.  Thus, any 
environmental policy of environmental management system needs to consider how various groups are 
being impacted by the related decisions and programs. To not do so, I believe, will only lead to greater 
environmental and social conflict and limit the potential for sustainability.  
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Relationships to Other Papers
Moushumi Chaudhury
   
After having listened to very interesting papers presented by my classmates, I realized that the problems 
of the Sahel are not necessarily unique. Deforestation, consequences of population explosion, growth of 
urbanization, economic policies that advocate agricultural, and social conflicts between people who 
share scarce resources are common issues throughout the world. Most interestingly, I have also realized 
that although the case studies presented were very different from one another, the policies suggested can 
also be applied to the Sahel or elsewhere to a great extent. The three common themes among the papers 
that could be comparable are conflict over natural resources, agricultural policies, and urbanization. 
The paper presented on the effects of population growth in Burundi was very similar to the conditions of 
the Sahel. Like the Sahel, Burundi is practicing deforestation at an alarming rate because land needs to 
be cleared for a very densely populated region that relies on subsistence agriculture. Therefore, there is a 
striking resemblance between the Sahel and Burundi where the quality and the quantity of natural 
resources, such as land, is decreasing in order to accommodate for a growing population. The situation 
then results in conflict or violence. The conditions in Burundi may be slightly different because of the 
ethnic conflicts involved in relation to access to land, but nevertheless, like the Sahel, unequal access to 
land depends on who has the upper-hand in the conflict. Furthermore, the poor have the least access to 
natural resources or are subjected to the worst environmental conditions because they have no economic 
assets or representation as in the Sahel, Burundi and even Michigan. Environmental injustice is 
widespread. In order to reduce conflict and poverty, the policy to reduce population growth was 
commonly suggested. 
The correlation between population growth and the use of agriculture as a policy to accommodate for the 
increase in population density has also been a common theme. The Sahel shares the consequence of poor 
agricultural policies with the present situation in Southeast Asia. Due to population pressures, 
deforestation in Southeast Asia is also occurring at a fast pace. After loggers use the forests, the farmers 
use the land to the extent that they can, and then leave the area to farm elsewhere. This is a case, as in 
the Sahel, where poor forest resource management exists. There is no incentive for reforestation and 
intensification of land use. However, agriculture as a policy can also be beneficial if practiced correctly 
as in the Mekong River region of Vietnam. In this case, agriculture is a means to support an extremely 
densely populated region. This is also the case in the Sahel where agriculture has the potential for 
serving more people and integrating the region into the world economy. The success of this policy will 
only come about in both the Sahel and Vietnam through greater fertilizer use, the products of the Green 
Revolution, and most importantly, intensification of land use, not extensification. 
In relation to population growth and the failure of agricultural policies in rural areas, more people are 
moving into urban areas for employment opportunities. As in the Sahel, there is also a considerable 
amount of internal migration from former East Germany to the West and in Russia. This has caused 
difficulties in terms of availability of living space and work opportunities. Although the process of 
"decentralization" of living space is different for all three cases, the policies recommended have all 
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suggested development in the outskirts of the cities or rural areas. For example, in the Sahel, 
"decentralization" of space may come through reforestation programs in rural areas; the German 
government may encourage development in the former East Germany; and communist Russia advocated 
dispersion through mandates that were a part of the centralized planning process. 
It is truly amazing to realize that even though conditions of population and environment dynamics may 
vary around the world, suggested policies relating to population growth, agriculture, and urbanization 
can be the same to remedy problems. This clearly shows the potential of learning from the mistakes and 
situations in other countries in order to improve the ecological and social conditions of a particular 
nation in trouble. 
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The Relationship of "Environmental Scarcity and
Violent Conflict: A Case Study of Burundi" to
Class Projects in SNRE 575
Shannon England
My paper studied the relationship between violent conflict and environmental scarcity in Burundi. 
Specifically, the paper studies the lack of access to agricultural land that has resulted from exponential 
population growth and how this may have contributed to Burundi's history of ethnic conflict since 
Independence in 1961. The paper that was most closely related to this topic was Moushoumi 
Chaudhury's research on the Sahel. This area of the world also seems to be approaching its "limits" in 
terms of expansion of agricultural land. Many of the problems and the solutions suggested by the 
research would be applicable to Burundi as well. Further research on Burundi may also be aided by 
including a similar simulation model from Stella to determine what the actual limits of agricultural 
production and population growth might be, as well as what the results of possible policy 
implementations might be. 
The most interesting research project in terms of providing solutions for areas experiencing high 
population densities was Daria Kim's paper about the Red River Delta region of Vietnam. The extremely 
high population densities (over 2000 people per square kilometer in some places!) in this area have been 
supported by extremely intensive and integrated agricultural systems. This type of technology is 
urgently needed in Africa where agricultural production has not been keeping pace with concurrent 
growth in population, as has been the case in the rest of the world. (See Chart.) Lessons on agricultural 
integration and intensive farming methods from this area of the world, while perhaps not directly 
applicable, may point the way to a solution for countries like Burundi. 
John Callewaert's study of environmental justice in Michigan may seem to be very removed from 
research on violence and agricultural land in Burundi, but I am intrigued by the possibilities for analysis 
and possible political reform that might be manifested by the type of technology linking geographic 
information and social data used in this research. It is hard to imagine a more forceful representation or 
depiction of injustice than a map highlighting discrepancies in such a clear manner. Perhaps reform is a 
long way off in Burundi, but true change would focus on attempting to undue the wrongs that have 
occurred in the past. Data on ethnicity and ownership of land mapped over time, could, perhaps, help 
Burundians to achieve a more equitable distribution of resources. 
The research conducted by Jeny Wegbreit on global climate change and Dengue fever raises interesting 
questions about the global environment and its effect on local populations. Changes in air emissions a 
continent away now may have dramatic consequences for illness in people in Trinidad and Tobago. For 
resource poor countries dependent upon agriculture, the implications of global climate change include 
not only changes in disease transmission rates, but also changes in agricultural systems and the 
productivity of the land. A net decrease in an agricultural system's productivity due to changes in 
precipitation, temperature, or the timing of cyclical season changes is not hard to imagine. The 
implications that naturally follow would be that the world should prepare for possible food shortages in 
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much of the developing world if global climate change does occur. 
All of the research for this class showed that first and foremost, populations and the environment are 
linked in relationship to each other. We have an impact upon the land as it has an impact upon us: 
careful monitoring of this relationship is crucial to preventing hardship and harm to ourselves and 
others. We must recognize now more than ever that we are not separate from the global environment, 
but rather that we live within it. 
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 Relationships among other semester projects
Seema Iyer
   
After seeing the results of my colleagues’ work at the end of the semester, interdisciplinary collaboration 
has new meaning for me. Although those of us taking NR&E 545 entered with a range of backgrounds 
from the natural, physical, and social sciences, none of us had previously been exposed to transition 
theory, or at least not in the manner in which it had been presented. The concepts of overshoot-and-
collapse and "turnings" in time empowered us to view problems in a whole new light as well as united 
us with a common language. In other words, our independent paths of knowledge intersected with the 
concepts of population-environment dynamics, but then took off into different directions based on our 
interests and background. By starting on the same footing, connections and relationships were easier to 
define and understand. 
The geographical areas presented in this monograph not only span the globe but also span the spectrum 
of political and economic infrastructures. However, the population dynamic is additionally affected by 
the social, environmental, and spatial characteristics of a region or country. The chapters by Kim and 
Scaff have an interesting connection to mine because of the communist governments that were (or are) 
in power. In a centrally-planned economy, particularly as practiced by the Soviet regime, it is 
theoretically possible to manipulate movement and migration within the country. Clearly in Vietnam, 
Eastern Germany and Russia, attempts were made to control where and how the population lived. In 
Russia, the government encouraged or forced people to move from European Russia to Siberia and in 
Vietnam, the government induced people to moved out of the densely-populated Red River Valley. The 
transition of the population out of the traditionally populated areas was very different in Russia and in 
Vietnam, however, due to two important aspects of transitions themselves. First, the vastly different 
sizes of the countries meant that the scale of the transitions were very different, and secondly, the nature 
of political power meant that the trajectory of the transitions were different. 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, migration within Russia is no longer regulated by the 
government but instead is driven by viable economic opportunities. The geography of the country in 
terms of the climate and physical infrastructure determine where the economic opportunities will be 
located. The chapter on the Sahel by Chaudhury presents an area of similar size and similar variations in 
climate, although opposite in the extremes. The desertification of the Sahel region is the outcome of 
continuous deforestation, which has precipitated population movement into coastal, urban areas for 
economic reasons. The population in the former East Germany is moving from the environmentally 
degraded regions into Berlin and West Germany for similar reasons. 
The urbanization transition is characterized throughout the chapters, but perhaps, the chapter by Lo 
offers a glimpse at our future world. Sao Paolo is a manifestation of ultra-urbanization that is occurring 
throughout many parts of the world. In Brazil, urbanization has been accompanied by a huge population 
increase. The disparity between the rural and urban areas also promotes rural-urban migration. Although 
Russia is not experiencing a population increase, many cities that were created by the socialist 
government are declining because the current economic structure cannot sustain their existence. Hence, 
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urban areas that can support a bigger population are attracting people from smaller urban areas. 
At the heart of all the chapters, however, are the reasons and circumstances that have led to the current 
state of transition in each country or region. Past practices offers insights into future outcomes, which is 
the basis for the curve fitting of data. The chapter by England provides an interesting account of the 
history of violence in Burundi in order to understand the past and predict the future. This is the premise 
of The Fourth Turning, which challenges us to find connections between our present-day world and the 
not-so-near past. 
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Relationships to Other Papers
Daria Kim
When I first began my studies on the agricultural sustainability of a small village in North Vietnam, my 
purpose was clear cut: in order to explore the relationship between population and natural resources, I 
would focus my project on just those two aspects, the growth rate and the region’s agricultural yield, 
expecting to see that one would simply be the inverse of the other. As I continued my research and as I 
became exposed to the projects of my fellow students, I began to notice that the challenges in exploring 
the dynamics between population and environment could be both amazingly simple and yet tantalizingly 
complex. 
Most projects were developed within the framework of transitional theory. Transitions as defined by 
Professor Drake is "a specific period of time which spans the shift from slow to rapid change in the 
sector and then usually a return again to relative stability." Transitions are usually characterized by the 
fact they can exist over many different sectors, have similar trajectories, and are apparent at different 
geographic or temporal scales. Because of the nature of change within transitions, there is a period when 
sectors may become vulnerable to damage and, in some transitions, pass a threshold of irreversibility. 
Therefore, unless steps are taken to address some of the societal implications of transitions, the resulting 
stability may indeed be one that’s undesirable. 
The projects which were explored within this framework shared the common themes of transitional 
theory, and thus could be compared simply along those same lines. What is interesting about transition 
theory is that despite the many similarities transitions may share, transitions frequently interact with one 
another which makes analyzing them quite complex. Most the projects in this class presented policy 
changes as a way of addressing these transitional vulnerabilities. 
Thammasack’s paper on Deforestation in Southeast Asia looked at both forestry transitions and 
economic transitions, whereas my paper explored the relationship between demographic transitions and 
agricultural transitions. Her paper was of direct interest to me because one of the things I wanted to 
research was the role of forestry in Vietnam’s socioeconomic and environmental development. Her 
transitional theory revealed that Vietnam’s deforestation rates were alarming (annually over 100,000 
hectares), and that this will continue to grow. Because forests are important for the protection of water 
resources, control of soil erosion, as well as for shelter, and for providing medicinal plants, its protection 
and its conservation is of utmost importance. 
Based on transitional theory and on Thammasack’s careful analysis, Vietnam is currently going through 
the vulnerable stages of its forestry transition, and sectors such as the economy, agricultural cultures 
(including my once oh-so-simple village in North Vietnam), and urban centers will become affected by 
its current trajectory. The key to addressing this is in the creation of policies aimed at restoring forestry 
and with the long term goal of sustainable development. Thus, unless deliberate steps are taken to ensure 
the protection of Vietnam’s current forest coverage, the country’s deforestation rate may pass into one of 
irreversibility and eventually undesirable stability. 
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A scenario no one wants. 
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Relationships to Other Papers
Thammasack Manokham
  
An increasing population (especially within developing countries) has many consequences. Some of 
these consequences may be much needed within that country, such as providing a steady labor supply 
for agricultural production and industrialization. In many cases, however, a rapidly increasing 
population easily forecasts destruction for that country and the world. 
A rapid increase in population has been shown to be a major cause in deforestation, or the loss of forest 
cover, in eight Southeast Asian Countries; the cause of conflict among different ethnic groups, and 
between nomadic farmers and permanent plantation farmers, in regions such as South Africa; and the 
depletion of natural resources and minerals (in Vietnam). As the population increases, there is an 
increasing demand for land for agricultural production, fuel wood collection, and housing 
accommodation. The rates of consumption of forest products and services will also increase. To 
accommodate demands placed by the increasing population, forest areas will be encroached upon for 
cultivation, commercial logging, and uncontrolled fuel wood collection. 
Consequently, many developing countries, with a rapidly increasing population, destroy their 
environment and natural resources for socio-economic development. As the available land diminishes 
and natural resources become scarce, there are regional, local, and government disputes about the 
ownership and use of the land (such as in Thailand) and natural resources. Most will claim ownership, 
but not responsibility for its destruction. As the quality of the land deteriorates because of overuse, many 
will move to other areas until that land has deteriorated too. This results in deadly conflicts between 
many nomadic groups and plantation owners. In order to limit deforestation and to reduce contestations 
between groups, agroforestry on a sustainable basis will have to be practiced by all groups. Ownership 
will also have to be extended because it will provide incentives to the nomadic farmers to permanently 
reside there and harness and manage the renewable and reproductive capacities of their land. It will also 
prevent them from crowding out forest-dependent communities from their traditional forest farming 
land. Thereby, it reduces deadly confrontations between groups. 
As the population increases and living space decreases, the density of people per housing area increases. 
As a result, the city becomes crowded and the quality of life within that city declines (such as in South 
America). Overall, housing conditions are characterized by overcrowding and inadequate infrastructure. 
Many are forced to living within the congested confines of the city area, where their exposure to 
diseases and other health related problems are increased. Water is stored in buckets where they become 
ideal breeding spots for malaria-carrying mosquitoes. Because urban planners are more focus on 
maximizing the number of dwelling units that could be achieved within the housing area, they are not 
including recreational space such as parks and playgrounds within their urban plans. However, as a 
country becomes more affluent, less emphasis is placed on increasing the number of people per housing 
area, and more focus is shifted to decentralization and the development of new towns and a green belt to 
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stop the continued expansion of the central area (such as the new Russia). Urban planners must consider 
the impact of the increasing population and its distribution of people, as well as ethnic group 
distribution, on current and new cities if they are to improve the quality of life within the city. 
An increasing population can translate into destruction and death for the people and environment, but it 
can also translate into opportunities for sustainable management of resources. Fortunately, the people of 
both developing and developed countries are given the role as the translator and can affect its translation. 
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Relationships among the Papers:  Common Themes
Rosalyn Scaff
In the Fall 1998 Population and Environment course many common themes appeared throughout the 
student papers. The three themes that relate specifically to my paper are: urbanization, environmental 
impacts on communities and regional planning. 
Urbanization patterns were one of the common threads in some of the papers, particularly Seema Iyer 
and Ken Lo’s works. Both students examined the patterns of urbanization in two very different places. 
Seema Iyer investigated the urban fabric of Moscow. In this country communist control overpowered 
land development. Private ownership of land and market driven development were non-existent. While 
the government controlled where people lived, they also provided low rents for citizens. As buildings 
became rundown, the government merely moved people into new developments instead of fixing the 
old. Thus, Moscow has been left with poor-quality, run-down residential units. 
Ken Lo’s paper examined the urbanization patterns in Brazil. This work provided an interesting 
juxtaposition to the Iyer paper. Unlike Russia, Brazil does not exist under communist rule and therefore 
does not purport equalization of the citizens. This is clearly seen in areas such as Sao Paulo where 
wealthy, gated communities coexist with slum areas. This country, driven by capitalism and a market 
economy, has seen massive development for its million plus citizens. Mega cities like Sao Paulo have 
sprung up in the past decade and can not support the needs of the people. 
These two papers represent two extremes and fit rather nicely with my work. East Germany became a 
communist country under Russian rule after WWII. Urbanization patterns like those in Moscow are also 
apparent in East German cities. The main difference is that East Germany had a declining population 
throughout the Cold War period. This coupled with the fact that the country had a relatively small 
population meant that East German cities were not as large and densely populated as Moscow. On the 
other hand, post WWII West German development was driven by demand and a market economy. One 
differences I see between West Germany and Brazil is that land development in the FRG has been very 
controlled. Solid planning mechanisms have been used to help protect the environment and control 
growth. Yet, my research shows that a declining to stable population in Germany is, nonetheless, using 
more land than necessary. Although I do not expect the country to look like Sao Paulo any time soon, I 
suggest Germany examine closely their land use planning policies. 
The second theme which I found interesting was that of environmental justice. John Callewaert wrote 
about this topic as it is occurring in Michigan. His findings concluded that minorities, no matter what 
their income level, were more likely to live near hazardous waste sites than any non-minority 
community. I am interested in how this topic relates to my work, particularly the idea that communist 
governments promoted environmental injustice through their polices. While suppressing information and 
controlling growth patterns, the government was able to place intensely hazardous sites near 
communities. This coupled with a lack of environmental regulations produced extremely polluted areas 
in East Germany. Statistics show that East Germans suffered from the poorest water quality in the 
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eastern block. The idea of how governments or systems get away with placing or allowing people to live 
near contaminated sites relates very well with my paper. 
Regional planning also became a theme in the presentations. Thammasack Manokham spoke specifically 
about regional controls in Southeast Asia that could help curb deforestation. Her paper and mine come to 
the same conclusions, namely if we are going to help the environment we need to do it on a regional 
basis. While work must be done on a small scale in communities and countries, it is equally important to 
examine the depth of our actions on a regional inter-country and global scale. 
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Dengue Fever's Widespread Impact: Implications for the Regions Studied
Jennifer Wegbreit
 
Dengue Fever is a disease intimately associated with the majority of the regions studied by the students 
in this course. According to D. J. Gubler1, the incidence of dengue infection has increased dramatically 
in the past 30 years, first in Asia, then in the Pacific and Americas, and finally in Africa. If warming 
occurs, it is likely that cases of dengue fever will rise even further. The possibility of warming may 
enhance the environmental changes focused on by the students of this course which have the potential to 
enhance dengue transmission. Therefore the policy measures recommended in my paper to mitigate 
future impacts, namely control and surveillance, should also be implemented in the other regions studied.
In her paper, Thommasack Manokham detailed the loss of forested area in Southeast Asia to create land 
suitable for agriculture. Increased agriculture may provide food to support a greater population. 
Increased population in a region already very dense may facilitate transmission. It
is estimated that that in Southeast Asia alone, there have been over 700,000 hospitalized cases of 
Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever in the past 30 years with over 200,000 deaths. These numbers may jump 
dramatically if the population continues to expand.
In 1987, seriological surveys estimated that one million infections occurred in Rio de Janeiro in 1986 
and 1987.2 The implications of this number for the region studied by Ken Lo are tremendous. Lo's study 
focused on the effects of urbanization on the public health of this region. He found that urbanization has 
not only decreased the general public health of this area as measured by life expectancy and incidence of 
various diseases, but that the difference between the heath of the rich and poor was dramatic. Increased 
urbanization will increase the incidence of dengue fever in this region as has been found in past studies. 
Also, because of the living conditions of the poor in which a lack of running water necessitates 
containers of water often infested by Aedes aegypti, those living in poverty will be disproportionately 
impacted. The effects of global warming may cause the expected rise in dengue fever to be even greater.
The two situations illustrated in Southeast Asia and Brazil underscore the importance of dengue fever 
surveillance and control measures in the Americas, Asia, and Africa as well. Public policy should 
mandate that dengue be a reported disease in hospitals and clinics to allow scientists and doctors to 
monitor the problem and focus on the most sensitive regions. Control policies should also be mandated 
in order to decrease the population of infectious Aedes aegypti. Because the possible effects of global 
warming are not restricted to Trinidad alone, comprehensive measures to mitigate the likely increase in 
dengue fever in all tropical and subtropical regions is necessary.
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List of Abbreviations and German Words 




FRG Federal Republic of Germany
GDR German Democratic Republic
Land a German state (singular)
Länder the German states (plural) 
new Länder the states which make up the former German Democratic Republic
old Länder the states which make up the former Federal Republic of Germany
PPP polluter-pays principle
Treuhandanstalt federal privatization agency set up after reunification
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